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INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 2012, the United States Secretary of Homeland Security
(DHS), Janet Napolitano, issued a departmental memorandum announcing the Obama administration’s intention to refrain from deporting “certain young people who were brought to this country as children and know
only this country as home.”1 This program became known as Deferred
Action on Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, for short. The DACA Program
provided that American immigration authorities would refrain, at least
temporarily, from pursuing and removing certain “low priority” unlawfully present immigrants, specifically teenagers and young adults who
arrived in the United States as children, spent a considerable number of
years in the United States, had no criminal record, and posed no threat to
national security or public safety.2 Once registered with the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, these immigrants were deemed
“lawfully present” in the United States3 and were assured that, at least
temporarily, they would not be deported.4 They also became eligible to
1. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Dep’t Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs.; John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Re: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter
DACA Memorandum].
2. Id. at 1–2 (explaining the criteria to qualify for DACA).
3. For an articulation of the difference between holding a “legal [immigration] status” and being
“lawfully present,” see Secretary of Department of Homeland Security Jeh Charles Johnson
Memorandum for León Rodriquez, et. al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are
the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents, issued November 20, 2014 [hereinafter Expanded
DACA Memorandum].
4. Under the DACA program, the DHS would exercise “prosecutorial discretion” and defer any deportation action against DACA registrants. The DACA Memorandum emphasizes that it “confers no substantive rights [or] immigration status.” Expanded DACA Memorandum, supra note 3; see also USCIS,
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work and receive other benefits.5 Approximately 793,000 people successfully registered for DACA,6 and as of April 30, 2019, 669,080 people
were still registered.7
The DACA program was implemented after several failed attempts by the
Obama administration and earlier administrations to regularize the immigration status of undocumented immigrants who grew up in the United States.8
These immigrants are popularly known as Dreamers, a name adopted from
the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, the
first of many bills introduced in Congress over the past twenty years to regularize the immigration status of such persons.9 Although they are not citizens,
because of their acculturation, language skills, education, and social circles,
they are – in a word – Americans.
The Obama administration justified the implementation of DACA on
the basis of both resource allocation10 and humanitarian concerns. In fact,
DACA’s champions praised it as a “step in the right direction,”11 by
allowing people to “come out of the shadows,”12 and making the immigration system “more just.”13 When announcing DACA, President
Obama declared, “We are a better nation than one that expels innocent
young kids.”14

Instructions for Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Form I-821D, OMB No. 16150124, at p. 1 (“Individuals who receive deferred action will not be placed into removal proceedings or
removed from the United States for a specified period of time, unless the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) chooses to terminate the deferral.”).
5. DACA Memorandum, supra note 1, at 3.
6. USCIS, Form I-821D, available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/
Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/daca_
performancedata_fy2017_qtr2.pdf.
7. Id.
8. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration
(describing the latest failed attempt to pass the DREAM Act) [hereinafter Remarks]; American
Immigration Council, infra note 9; Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion
in the Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 267–72 (2013) (summarizing DACA
implementation).
9. DREAM Act, S.1291 (2001) (explaining that the term “Dreamers” only applies to law-abiding young
people); see also American Immigration Council, “The Dream Act, DACA, and Other Policies Designed to
Help Dreamers,” Aug. 2019, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_
dream_act_daca_and_other_policies_designed_to_protect_dreamers.pdf (listing numerous dream acts that
have been introduced in Congress since 2001).
10. See DACA Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1.
11. See Sabena Auyeung, A Broken American Dream: The Current State of U.S. Immigration Laws
and Its Adverse Effect on Students, Education, and the Economy, 18 PUB. INTEREST L. REPR. 84, 86
(2012).
12. Julia Preston, Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2012,
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html. See also Juan
Escalante, DREAMers Like Me Have Flourished under DACA. Trump Might Take It All Away, VOX.COM,
Aug. 31, 2017, https://www.vox.com/first-person/2017/8/29/16220680/daca-trump-dreamers-undocumentedimmigrants.
13. Obama, Remarks, supra note 8.
14. Id.
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DACA’s opponents, however, have derided the program as an example of
unconstitutional executive overreach. Since the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) states that unlawfully present aliens are subject to deportation,
opponents of DACA argue, among other things, that the President failed to
adhere to his constitutional obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed”15 and that DACA violates the separation of powers since it explicitly contradicts the intent of Congress.16 Opponents also argue that DACA
violates both procedural and substantive requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).17
In September 2017, the Trump administration, pursuant to a memorandum by the then-Acting Secretary of DHS, Elaine Duke, announced that
it would rescind the program altogether.18 This announcement was met
with public outrage and triggered several lawsuits against the Trump
administration and DHS. States, counties, cities, universities, unions,
non-profit organizations, and DACA recipients themselves sued the
Trump administration and DHS arguing that the proposed rescission
would, among other things, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, the APA, and principles of equitable estoppel.19 As a result of
these lawsuits, several lower courts ordered DHS to maintain the DACA
program for people who had been successfully registered as of September
5, 2017.20 The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in these consolidated
DACA cases in November 2019.21 At the time of publication of this
Article, those injunctions are still in place.

15. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
16. E.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigrations Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 858
(2013); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH.
L. REV. 1195 (2014).
17. E.g., Brief for the States of Texas, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18-22, Dep’t
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca. (No. 18-587) (2019).
18. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James W.
McCament, Acting Dir. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et. al., Re Rescission of the June 12, 2012
Memorandum Entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to
the United States as Children” (Sept. 5, 2017) [hereinafter DACA Rescission Memorandum].
19. Regents of the U. Cal. v. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal 2018) (issuing a
nation-wide preliminary injunction); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.DC 2018) (issuing a final
judgment); American Civil Liberties Union, Written Statement Submitted to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Ex-Officio Hearing on the Human Rights Situation of Person Affected by
the Cancellation of Temporary Protected Status and DACA in the United States, Feb. 27, 2018, https://
www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu.iachr_.submission_on_daca_2.23.2018.final_.pdf
(explaining that despite these orders, DHS is permitted to stop registering new applicants and is no
longer required to entertain international travel requests (advance parole) from DACA registrants.
Additionally, despite these orders, the DHS is still permitted to revoke DACA protection on an
individualized basis as it deems appropriate. Since President Trump took office, many DACA
recipients have been arrested, detained, and/or had their DACA status revoked).
20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Julie Rheinstrom, Deferred Dreams Denied: A Study of What Comes Next
Following the Supreme Court’s Historic Tie on DACA and DAPA, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 135 (2016).
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A cursory study of the public debate surrounding DACA reveals the existence of two camps. One is sympathetic to, and frames its arguments around,
the plight of Dreamers. The other, though not unsympathetic to Dreamers,
asserts the rule of law, emphasizes the limits on executive authority, and
highlights the alleged costs citizens and other permanent residents might
incur as a result of DACA, particularly the alleged increased public expenditures and job competition.22
Among the courts and the academic literature, most of the debate surrounding DACA has focused on one of two issues. First, whether the Obama
Administration had the constitutional or statutory authority to implement
DACA,23 and second, whether the Trump administration has properly exercised its constitutional and statutory authority to rescind it.24 What has not
been discussed with any degree of detail, however, is the possibility that
deporting DACA recipients might violate the United States’ international
human rights obligations,25 specifically the United States’ legal obligations
under Article 12.4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).26 This Article undertakes that discussion and encourages the public, academics, courts, Congress, and the executive branch to incorporate this
particular human rights dimension into their analyses, judgments, and
prescriptions.

22. See, e.g., Christopher Rugaber, Trump’s Harsh Message to Immigrants Could Drag on Economy,
apnews.com, September 6, 2017, https://www.apnews.com/70d54a71362e4d90ad1959c8d33266ac
(quoting Trump administration Attorney General Jeff Session saying that DACA “denied jobs to
hundreds of thousands of Americans by allowing those same jobs to go to illegal aliens”).
23. For arguments that the implementation of DACA is within the prerogatives of the executive
branch, see, e.g., The Department of Homeland Security, The Department of Homeland Security’s
Authority to Prioritize the Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to
Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/file/179206/download;
Expanded DACA Memorandum, supra note 3; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred
Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. 59 (2012); Gilbert, supra note 8; Brief for Amicus Curiae
Immigration Law Scholars Supporting Respondents, Dep’t Homeland Sec v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca.
(No. 18-587) (2019); see also Leti Volpp, Immigrants Outside the Law: President Obama, Discretionary
Executive Power, and Regime Change, 3 CRIT. ANALYSIS L. 385 (2016). For arguments that the
implementation of DACA was unconstitutional and/or prohibited by federal statute, see, e.g., Brief for
Texas, supra note 17, at 17–23; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 16; Love & Garg, supra note 16.
24. For argument that the rescission of DACA is within the constitutional and statutory authority of the
executive branch, see, e.g, Brief for Texas, supra note 17, at 5–17; NAACP, et al. v. Trump, supra note 20
(concluding that the attempt to rescind DACA was “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the APA);
Regents of U. Cal. v. DHS, supra note 20; DHS, Memorandum from Secretary of DHS Kirstjen M. Nielsen
(June 22, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf.
For arguments that the Trump administration’s attempt to rescind DACA would violate the Constitution and/
or the APA, see, e.g., Regents of the U. Cal. supra note 20; See also NAACP, supra note 20.
25. But see, David B. Thronson, Closing the Gap: DACA, DAPA and U.S. Compliance with
International Human Rights Law, 48 CASE. W. RES. J. INT’L L. 127 (2016); William Thomas Worster,
Deporting Dreamers as a Crime against Humanity, 33 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 367 (2019). See also David
Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants’ Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627
(2006) (advocating some of the same statutory and constitutional interpretation strategies I present in
Parts III.C, III.D, and IV of this Article).
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. DOC. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, acceded to by the United States of America 8 Jun. 1992, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en#top [hereinafter ICCPR]
(citing Article 12.4).
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Article 12.4 of the ICCPR states, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
the right to enter his own country.” The right to enter one’s own country
includes the right not to be exiled, banished, or deported from one’s own
country.27 Upon first reading, it may appear this right is clear-cut and uncontroversial, but the scope of one’s “own country” is actually quite broad.
Customary treaty interpretation methods, including an analysis of the negotiation history (preparatory works) of the ICCPR, demonstrate that people
who are not citizens or nationals of a country may enjoy the right to stay in
that country. In the context of ICCPR Article 12.4, one’s “own country” may
be a country of which they are not citizens or nationals. Whether or not a
country is one’s “own country” is a function of a person’s attachments to a
country – familial attachments, cultural attachments, social attachments, language attachments, educational attachments, professional attachments – and
the relative lack of such attachments to any other country, including one’s
country of origin. For many DACA recipients, the United States is their own
country. As such, the government may not deport them. Or, in other words,
since deportation from one’s own country is typically referred to as banishment or exile,28 the government may not banish or exile them, at least not
“arbitrarily.”
The ICCPR does permit non-arbitrary banishment.29 Immediately one
wonders how a banishment can be non-arbitrary. To expel someone from
one’s own country and prohibit them from reentering is so far removed from
our modern societal norms that it is hard to imagine what would qualify as a
non-arbitrary banishment. It is, in fact, unconstitutional to banish citizens
from the United States.30 Justice Warren described banishment as “a fate

27. It is axiomatic that the right to enter one’s country necessarily entails the right not to be deported,
exiled, banished, or expelled from one’s own country. Numerous commentators have asserted the same.
E.g., Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 538/1993, Stewart v. Canada (views adopted on
November 1, 1996), U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 [hereinafter HRC Stewart], at Individual opinion
by Elizabeth Evatt and Cecilia Medina Quiroga, co-signed by Francisco José Aguilar Urbina (dissenting)
(“If a State party is under an obligation to allow entry of a person, it is prohibited from deporting that person.”); Id. at Individual opinion by Prafullachandra Bhagwati (dissenting) (“[A]rticle 12, paragraph 4,
protects everyone against arbitrary deportation from his own country . . .”). Although these were dissenting opinions, the Human Rights Committee has never questioned the assertion that the right to enter one’s
own country entails the right not to be deported from one’s country. See also, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess.,
954-59th mtgs., U.N. DOCS. A/C.3/SR.954 through A/C.3/SR.959 (1959) (making it abundantly clear that
the states negotiating the ICCPR contemplated that Article 12.4 would include a prohibition against deportation (exile). There is nothing in the preparatory works to suggest that the reason for Article 12.4 is
merely to ensure that aliens who are deported from a host country have another country to go to, i.e., the
country of their citizenship. For a discussion of the preparatory works of Article 12.4, see infra Parts I.A.2
and I.B.2. See also, Fang Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[D]eportation is a drastic measure
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile . . .”).
28. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), defines banishment and exile as synonyms. Exile is
defined as “Expulsion from a country, esp. from the country of one’s origin or longtime residence;
banishment.”
29. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 12.4.
30. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–03 (1958) (announcing that denationalization and the threat of
banishment violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment).
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universally decried by civilized people.”31 He declared denationalization to
be “a form of punishment more primitive than torture”32 in large part because
it could lead to banishment.33 Denationalization, he wrote,
is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It
subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He
knows not what discrimination may be established against him, what
proscription be directed against him, and when and for what cause his
existence in his native land may be terminated.34
But when framed in the context of immigration law when the person being
expelled from the country is an immigrant (and let’s imagine an undocumented immigrant at that), banishment might seem less offensive, more acceptable. But why? After all, a Dreamer is in almost the exact same
precarious position as an American stripped of his citizenship. A Dreamer
lacks status in the national community. Her very existence is at the sufferance
of the United States, and she is subject to a fate of ever-increasing fear and
distress. As Justice Brandeis recognized a century ago, when anyone is
deported, their removal may result in “loss of both property and life, or all
that makes life worth living.”35
One might argue that banishment of a Dreamer is acceptable in modern society since she has another country to go to, the country of her citizenship.36
But she is likely to feel the pain of banishment just as much as a denaturalized
person would, especially if she is unfamiliar with the country of her citizenship. And her lived experience while in the United States might even be
worse than that of the denationalized person since she is undocumented and
thus constantly fearful of being discovered.
One might also argue that the banishment of a Dreamer is acceptable
because she is in the country “unlawfully.” After all, a country has a right to
enforce its immigration laws, doesn’t it? But if someone has a right to be in
her own country, how can it also make sense to banish her on the basis that
she did not have express permission to be there? Someone with a right does
not need permission. Furthermore, to assert that it would not be arbitrary to

31. Id. at 102.
32. Id. at 101–03.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 101–02.
35. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Justice Frankfurter would repeat this lament
three decades later. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 350 (1954). See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 759 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (“The punishment [of deportation] is beyond all reason in
its severity . . . As to its cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one’s residence, and the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family and business there contracted.”).
36. It is not always the case that someone facing deportation or who has been deported has a country
of citizenship. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 2264/2013, Budlakoti v. Canada
(views adopted on April 6, 2018) U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/122/D/2264/2013, ¶ 9.4 [hereinafter HRC
Budlakoti]; Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1559/2010, Warsame v. Canada (views
adopted on July 21, 2011), U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/102/D/1559/2010, ¶ 8.6 [hereinafter HRC Warsame].
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banish an undocumented American for the simple reason that his or her entry
and or continued residence within the country was never expressly permitted –
that is to say, to deny someone permission to remain in the country for the
simple reason that she does not have permission to be in the country – is tautological. And indeed, the Human Rights Committee has stated in the context of deporting illegal aliens in violation of other ICCPR rights that “it is
incumbent on [a] State party to demonstrate additional factors . . . that go
beyond a simple enforcement of its immigration law in order to avoid a characterization of arbitrariness.”37 In other words, a State party is not permitted
to enforce its municipal38 immigration laws if those municipal immigration
laws violate the ICCPR. Just because a deportation is “lawful” under some
municipal law does not necessarily make it non-arbitrary or in accord with
human rights law. Quite simply, the ICCPR limits a country’s ability to
enact or enforce certain immigration laws.39
Both the context of Article 12.4 within the ICCPR and the ICCPR’s negotiation history clearly show that “arbitrarily” as used in Article 12.4 is an
exceedingly strict standard. Many negotiating states did not want to provide
any legal exception to the prohibition against depriving people of their right
to be in their own country. In fact, the negotiating states deliberately wrote
Article 12.4 to exclude exceptions for “national security, public order and
public health or morals.” As a result, on at least three occasions the Human
Rights Committee has decided that even the deportation of alien-criminals
was a violation of their human rights since they were being banished “arbitrarily” from their own countries. After all, we do not banish citizens who are recidivist violent criminals. Such banishment would seem wholly unjust.
This Article focuses on the plight of DACA recipients and other Dreamers
and has been asserting, somewhat casually, that they all have an international
37. See infra note 255.
38. A country’s law, formally, includes international law. “Municipal” law, or what many people
including courts and scholars refer to as “internal” law or, imprecisely, as “domestic” law, is that set of a
country’s laws that does not include customary international law, general principles of international law,
or treaties in force to which the country is a party (except to the extent treaties are self-executing).
BLACK’S, infra note 28, defines “municipal law” as “the internal law of a nation, as opposed to international law” and has no definition at all for “domestic law.” “Domestic” is defined as “of or relating to
one’s own country,” implying that the “domestic law” of the United States includes its treaties, especially
considering that treaties are part of the law of the land pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2. For a discussion of how international law, including treaties, are part of American law, see
The Paquete Habana, “International law is part of our law . . .” 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also,
RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, infra note 55 at § 301(1) (“Treaties made under the
authority of the United States are part of the laws of the United States . . .”); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 163 (1895) (“International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense . . .. is part of our law. . . .
The most certain guide [for courts] . . . is a treaty or a statute of this country.”); Young, infra note 49, at 92,
94 (“The Supremacy Clause plainly makes treaties “part of our law . . . [T]he Supremacy Clause explicitly
recognizes treaties as supreme federal law.”). It is regrettable that the phrase “municipal law” seems to have
fallen out of use. It is very useful and contributes to analytical clarity. This Article will often use the phrase
“municipal law” in that strict meaning. So although the ICCPR is American domestic law, it is not
American municipal law except to the extent it is self-executing. See infra Part III.A–B.
39. See also, ICCPR, supra note 26, at art.13 (providing due process rights to aliens facing deportation proceedings); infra Part IV (presenting other ICCPR provisions that restrict the deportation of
aliens).
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right to stay in the United States. This is a generalization made in part for rhetorical ease and in part for rhetorical resonance. DACA recipients and
Dreamers as a class constitute a highly sympathetic group of people, but, of
course, it is likely that there are some DACA recipients and some Dreamers
for whom the United States is not their “own country.” These peoples’ ties to
the United States may be weak enough (and their ties to other countries strong
enough) that the United States has not become their “own country” within the
meaning of ICCPR Article 12.4. By the same token, however, there are certainly many other aliens – both documented and undocumented – in the
United States who were not DACA-eligible and would not be considered
Dreamers but who nonetheless can rightfully claim the United States as their
own country. I will refer to all aliens who can claim the United States as their
own county pursuant to the terms of ICCPR Article 12.4 as “non-citizen
Americans.” This Article will nonetheless focus on DACA recipients and
Dreamers. By using a class of highly sympathetic migrants as a focal point, I
intend to highlight how it can be that some aliens, even undocumented ones,
should be able to enjoy the benefits of ICCPR’s Article 12.4 and stay in the
United States even against the U.S. government’s wishes, an assertion that
some might find, at first blush, preposterous or imprudent.40
Every time the United States arbitrarily deports a non-citizen American, it
violates an international legal obligation that the United States owes to the
other 172 ICCPR States parties. However, U.S. courts have invariably
deemed the ICCPR to be “non-self-executing” (NSE); that is to say, they
have deemed the ICCPR to lack some degree of municipal legal force. In
fact, some might conclude that the ICCPR’s NSE status renders it domestically irrelevant and incapable of protecting non-citizen Americans. But this
conclusion would be premature and overstates the ICCPR’s lack of legal
significance.41
As an initial matter, it must be highlighted that the ICCPR’s NSE status
does not alter or diminish the United States’ international legal obligation to
adhere to its terms.42 The U.S. has an obligation to implement the terms of
the ICCPR to the extent it has not already done so. Given Article 12.4, then,
the U.S. is under an international obligation to refrain from deporting people
like DACA recipients. Somehow, someway, the legal or administrative

40. The argument presented in this Article is a legal one, one premised on the interpretation of
Article 12.4 of the ICCPR and the status of Article 12.4 within the municipal law of the United States.
Although this Article hints at moral arguments for refraining from deporting DACA recipients, Dreamers,
and other long-term resident aliens, it is beyond the scope of this Article to present any comprehensive
moral argument. For a moral argument that jibes with the legal argument presented herein and the principles that apparently animate the ICCPR, see Joseph H. Carens, Global Justice: Who Gets the Right Stay?,
BOSTON REV., Jan. 23, 2018, http://bostonreview.net/global-justice/joseph-h-carens-who-gets-right-stay,
(“[T]he moral right of states to apprehend and deport irregular migrants erodes with the passage of time”
and suggesting that a right to stay vests after only ten years); Joseph H. Carens, IMMIGRANTS AND THE
RIGHT TO STAY (2010).
41. See infra Part III.
42. See infra notes 290–296 and accompanying text.
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machinery of the U.S. must implement this obligation. The most obvious
implementation avenue would be for Congress to pass legislation providing a
right for DACA recipients, Dreamers, and other non-citizen Americans to
remain in the United States permanently. This has not happened, and in the
absence of such congressional implementation, the NSE status of the ICCPR
does hamper its implementation and enforcement.43 The question, however,
is: How exactly is enforcement hampered and what avenues of implementation remain?
As a ratified American treaty, the ICCPR not only constitutes an international obligation of the United States, it also constitutes a “supreme Law of
the Land” pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.44 The ICCPR’s NSE status
does not change that fact. The other laws of the land – the Constitution and
federal statutes – bind the President and the states and can be enforced by
courts in the usual ways. If the ICCPR were fully self-executing, it would
function like a federal statute. It would bind the President, it would bind the
States, and it could be enforced by courts. If the ICCPR were fully non-selfexecuting, the President and the states would be free of its demands and the
courts could not enforce it. With that understanding, a more specific set of
questions arises: To what extent is the ICCPR non-self-executing? To what
extent is the President and the executive branch free of its demands? To what
extent are the states free of its demands? And to what extent can courts
enforce its provisions?
The ICCPR is only non-self-executing to the extent the U.S. treaty makers –
the Senate that consented to its ratification and the President who ratified it –
intended. A careful study of the debates surrounding the ratification of the
ICCPR reveals that the U.S. treaty makers intended that the ICCPR not create
any private causes of action. It is possible they also intended that courts refrain
from directly enforcing it at all. The U.S. treaty makers did not intend, however, to prohibit the executive branch from implementing the ICCPR, nor did
the U.S. treaty makers shield the executive branch from the ICCPR’s international legal obligations.45
If this analysis is correct, then, the executive branch is obligated – on the
municipal plane – to implement and enforce the terms of the ICCPR, including, of course, Article’s 12.4’s obligation to refrain from deporting DACA
recipients, Dreamers, and other non-citizen American (at least to the extent a
later-in-time federal statute does not conflict with Article 12.4). And there
appears to be no doubt that the ICCPR’s NSE status does not deprive the executive branch of any freedom to choose to exercise its prosecutorial discretion and refrain from deporting such immigrants.46
43. There is little doubt that the ICCPR is non-self-executing in the United States. See infra Parts II.
C, III.A, and III.B But see infra note 311for a list of scholars have expressed such doubt.
44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
45. See infra Part III.B.
46. See infra Part III.C.
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If it is indeed the case that the ICCPR is non-self-executing with regard to
the judicial branch only to the extent that the ICCPR does not create any private causes of action, then an alien facing removal proceedings should be
able invoke his ICCPR treaty rights in his defense. However, if the U.S. treaty
makers intended the ICCPR’s NSE status to extend to the point that the courts
may not directly enforce the ICCPR at all, aliens could not depend on the
direct judicial enforcement of their treaty rights. If this is the case, however,
there might be avenues for indirect enforcement by the judiciary. Courts
could use the Charming Betsy canon to interpret ambiguous terms in the INA
in light of the United States’ international legal obligations.47 Courts could
thus interpret the INA in such a way that the INA either does not provide the
Attorney General or the Department of Homeland Security with the authority
to banish people (including DACA recipients and Dreamers) or creates particular protections for DACA recipients and Dreamers. In both cases, the
court would not be enforcing the ICCPR directly at all. In the first case, the
courts would merely be failing to find authorization anywhere within federal
law that allows the government to banish people, including non-citizen
Americans. In the second case, the courts would directly be applying protective provisions of the INA. The ICCPR would be in the background, hovering
as a supreme law of the land with some domestic force – even though it cannot be directly enforced by the courts. Additionally, I briefly suggest that
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause might permit immigrants facing banishment to appeal to their individual treaty rights in order to protect
themselves. If this suggestion is correct, any intent on the part of the U.S.
treaty makers to make the ICCPR impotent in such cases would be unconstitutional. I also briefly suggest that the ICCPR can be used to help interpret certain constitutional provisions themselves, including the Fifth and
Ninth Amendments.48
In conducting this analysis on the relevance of the ICCPR’s NSE status, I
have pulled together the work of many international and constitutional law
scholars who have considered the issue of treaty self-execution and those
who have carefully reviewed the Senate debates surrounding the ratification
of the ICCPR. Over the last three decades, the scholarship of treaty selfexecution has been particularly fruitful.49 Although differences of opinion
47. The Charming Betsy canon of interpretation states that where possible, courts should construe
federal statutes to avoid a conflict with treaty provisions. For a fuller discussion of the Charming Betsy
canon, see infra Part III.D.2.
48. See infra Part III.D.3.
49. See, e.g., (in reverse chronological order) Jean Galbraith, Making Treaty Implementation More
Like Statutory Implementation, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1306 (2017); David L. Sloss, THE DEATH OF TREATY
SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2016) [hereinafter Sloss, THE DEATH OF TREATY
SUPREMACY]; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Four Problems with the Draft Restatements of Treaty SelfExecution 2015 BYU L. REV. 1747 (2015) [hereinafter Vázquez, Four Problems]; David L. Sloss,
Taming Madison’s Monster, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1691 (2015) [hereinafter Sloss, Taming Madison’s
Monster]; Michael D. Ramsey, A Textual Approach to Treaty Non-Self-Executing, 2015 BYU L. REV.
1639 (2015); John Quigley, A Tragi-Comedy of Errors Erodes Self-Execution of Treaties: Medellı́n v.
Texas and Beyond, 45 CASE W. RESERVE J. INT’L L. 403 (2012) [hereinafter Quigley, A Tragi-Comedy];
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exist among scholars on the exact nature of treaty self-execution, I draw only
upon conclusions I find the most persuasive and, to an extent, those that provide plausible avenues for successfully enhancing the implementation of the
ICCPR in general and of Article 12.4 in particular.50 As a result of this synthesis, this Article provides a model for approaching other individual rights
provided in the ICCPR that are not already provided in the Constitution or a
federal statute.51
Part I of this Article interprets Article 12.4 of the ICCPR. I use the customary method of treaty interpretation as articulated in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, focusing primarily on the ordinary meaning of the
words in their context in light of the object and purpose of the ICCPR. I
examine the preparatory works of the ICCPR in order to further illuminate
David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate against Treaties? Equivalence, Duality and Non-SelfExecution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228 (2010) [hereinafter Moore, Equivalence, Duality and NSE]; Ernest
A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law”, 88 TEX. L. REV. 91 (2009); David Sloss, The Constitutional
Right to a Treaty Preemption Defense, 240 U. TOL. L. REV. 971 (2009) [hereinafter Sloss, Treaty
Preemption Defense]; David H. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-SelfExecution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 32 (2009) [hereinafter Moore, Law(makers) of the Land]; Laura
Moranchek Hussain, Enforcing the Treaty Rights of Aliens, 117 YALE. L. J. 680 (2008); Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties,
122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land]; Edward T. Swaine,
Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (2008); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty
Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131 (2008) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Duality]; Curtis Bradley, Intent,
Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540 (2008) [hereinafter Bradley,
Intent, Presumptions]; Aya Gruber, Sending the Self-Execution Doctrine to the Executioner, 3 FIU L.
REV. 57 (2007); Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571 (2007); Robert J. Delahunty & John
Yoo, Executive Power v. International Law, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 30 (2006); David Sloss, When
Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and
Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20 (2006) [hereinafter Sloss, Treaties and Individually
Enforceable Rights]; Ann Woolhandler, Treaties, Self-Execution, and the Public Model, 42 VA. J. INT’L
L. 757 (2002); Ann Althouse, A Response to Professor Woolhandler’s “Treaties, Self-Execution, and the
Public Law Model”, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 789 (2002); Caleb Nelson, The Treaty Power and Self-Execution:
A Comment on Professor Woolhandler’s Article, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 801 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
A. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2000); John
Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Public Law Making]; David Sloss, The
Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self Executing Declarations and Human Rights
Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999) [hereinafter Sloss, The Domestication of IHR]; John C. Yoo,
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution]; Martin S. Flaherty,
History Rights? Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the
Land”, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 2154 (1999) [hereinafter Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties]; Carlos Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of
Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 695 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, The Four Doctrines]; Jordan
J. Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993) [hereinafter Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent”
Executive Policy]; Jordan Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 (1988) [hereinafter
Paust, Self-Executing Treaties]; Yuji Isasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United
States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 627 (1986).
50. I have gone to great lengths to cite all the relevant works of these various scholars and attribute
their insights to them. I have also vigilantly tried to include a large set of scholarship that presents opposing or alternative views. All of those citations can be found in Part III, but here I want to highlight three
scholars upon whose work I most relied for this project: Professors Curtis Bradley, David Sloss, and
Carlos Manuel Vázquez.
51. See Sloss, The Domestication of IHR, supra note 49 (characterizing such rights as “non-frivolous,
non-redundant” rights).
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the meaning of Article 12.4. I also discuss how Article 12.4 has been interpreted and applied by the Human Rights Committee. In Part II, I discuss the
relevance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations (RUDs) the
United States made when it ratified the ICCPR. In particular, I show that
the United States did not make any reservations regarding Article 12.4. In
Part III, I discuss the non-self-executing nature of the ICCPR and sketch several ways that Article 12.4 is nonetheless legally relevant. In Part IV, I make
some brief additional observations, including suggesting that some other provisions of the ICCPR might protect certain aliens from deportation. The conclusion includes an acknowledgment that the domestic implementation of
any of these ICCPR provisions might result in a political backlash in the form
of harsh enforcement of current immigration laws and/or the passage of particularly ungenerous immigration laws.
I.

THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 12.4 OF THE ICCPR

The United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights in June 1992, two months after the Senate gave its consent to ratification.52 The Convention went into force for the United States three months
later.53
Article 12, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights states, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.”54 There are, at least for our purposes, two terms that
are ambiguous and require interpretation. The first is “own country” (or “his
own country”). When is a country one’s “own country”? The second term is
“arbitrarily.” What does it mean for one to be “arbitrarily” deprived of the
right to enter his own country? When is such a deprivation not “arbitrary”?
To interpret these terms, we turn to the treaty interpretation provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).55
52. ICCPR, Accession, Succession, Ratification Table, United States of America, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec [hereinafter U.N.
Status of Treaties]; Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification as Reported by the Committee on
Foreign Relations and Approved by the Senate, Treaty Document 95-20, available at https://www.congress.
gov/treaty-document/95th-congress/20/resolution-text.
53. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 49.2; U.S. Dep’t of State, 1992 Treaties and Agreements, ICCPR,
https://www.state.gov/92-908/.
54. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 12.4. There are no exceptions to this rule except for the ICCPR’s
general derogation provision, which can only be triggered “[i]n time of public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.” Compare ICCPR, supra note
26, at art. 4.1. with G.A. Res. 217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”).
55. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. The
United States has signed the VCLT but has not ratified it and thus is not bound by its terms. However, it is
well understood and accepted that most of the substantive provisions of the VCLT are generally codifications of customary international law (CIL) and general principles of international law. As such, these rules
are binding on the United States independently of the VCLT. The treaty interpretation rules contained in
VCLT Articles 31 and 32 are considered codifications of CIL. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 306 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW] (repeating the relevant portions of VCLT Articles 31 and 32 verbatim). See also Letter
of Submittal from William P. Rogers, U.S. Sec’y of State to President Richard M. Nixon (Oct. 18, 1971),
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The VCLT states that treaties are to be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”56 This rule of interpretation, therefore, takes into account three considerations: the ordinary meaning
of the words being interpreted, the context in which they are used, and the
object and purpose of the treaty itself. The VCLT permits recourse to additional means of treaty interpretation if the application of the primary treaty
interpretation rule yields a meaning that is “ambiguous or obscure” or “manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”57 Such supplemental means of interpretation
include analysis of the preparatory works associated with the treaty’s negation and adoption and, more generally, the circumstances of the text’s
adoption.58
A.

The Interpretation of One’s “Own Country”

The customary methods of treaty interpretation, including examination of
the preparatory works, along with an examination of the jurisprudence of the
Human Rights Committee, strongly suggest that a country is someone’s
“own country” if their ties to that country are strong enough. Consequently, a
country can be an alien’s own country, even when the alien is undocumented.
1.

Customary Law of Treaty Interpretation

The meaning of “country” is plain enough and requires no elaboration.
However, searching for and determining the ordinary meaning of a word as
amorphous as the word “own,” at least in the context of “one’s own country,”
can easily devolve into an exercise in confirmation bias. Indeed, dictionary
definitions are numerous, and the definitions are typically as vague as the
word “own” itself. Nevertheless, that is where we must start.59
reprinted in S. Exec. Doc. L, 1 (1971) (noting that the substantive provisions of the VCLT are “already
generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”); U.S. Dep’t of State,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last
visited July 19, 2019) (“The United States considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law of treaties.”). The U.S. Supreme
Court has used treaty interpretation methods that mirror those required by the VCLT. E.g., SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985). The Founders
seem to have fully intended U.S. courts to interpret treaties according to customary international norms.
See 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS 332 (Boston, Thomas B. Wait
1821). See also, RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 306 cmt. g (“Although the courts
have the final authority to interpret a treaty for purposes of applying it as law in the United States . . . the
Supreme Court has stated that it gives ‘great weight’ to the executive branch’s interpretation of a treaty.”). I
have not been able to find an instance where the executive branch has interpreted ICCPR Article 12.4
regarding its applicability or non-applicability to aliens. See generally Evan J. Criddle, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431 (2004).
56. VCLT, supra note 55, at art. 31.1.
57. Id. at art. 32.
58. Id.
59. The Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish versions of the ICCPR are as “equally authentic” as
the English version. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 53.1. The Chinese version of article 12.4 is “人人进入
其本国之权, 不得无理褫夺.” The French, “Nul ne peut être arbitrairement privé du droit d’entrer dans
son propre pays.” The Russian, “Hbrn ye v;en ,sn bdky kbiey ada ya d]el d cd c,cndeyyy cnayy.”
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A relevant definition of the word “own” is “of, relating to, or belonging to
oneself or itself (usually used after a possessive to emphasize the idea of
ownership, interest, or relation conveyed by the possessive.)”60 Of course,
one cannot possess a country like one can possess a car or a house, but a person can be “of” a country, or can have a “relationship to” a country or an “interest” in a country. And there is nothing inherent in the word “own” that
would limit its applicability to citizens of a country.
What about the ordinary meaning of the entire phrase “his own country”?61
It seems possible that in addition to one’s country of citizenship,62 a country
could also be one’s “own” if a person has strong and intimate connections to
that country, especially if they do not have such connections to another country. Factors to consider in order to determine if a country is one’s own might
include the length of one’s residence, family connections, friends and other
social ties, professional relationships (including credentials earned and recognized in the country), ability to speak the language(s) of the country, acculturation in the country, intention to remain in the country, and so on.
On the assumption that everyone has a country,63 what would be the common understanding of “one’s own country” regarding someone like a
Dreamer, a young adult who has resided in the United States since early
childhood and has not lived anywhere else since, who is culturally American,
who is a native speaker of American English, whose friends and family are in
the United States, and who identifies as American? If the person feels a sense
of attachment and belonging to the United States and has little or no sense of
attachment or belonging to any other country, including their country of origin or citizenship, it certainly seems, in the ordinary use of the phrase, that
the United States is that person’s “own country.”
With regard to the context of the phrase “his own country,” it is particularly notable that Article 12.4 does not use the word “citizen” or “national.”
And the Spanish, “Nadie podrá ser arbitrariamente privado del derecho a entrar en su propio paı́s.” It is
beyond the scope of this Article to independently interpret the non-English versions.
60. Own, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/own. Merriam-Webster provides a
similar definition: “belonging to oneself or itself.” Merriam-Webster on-line dictionary, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/own.
61. It is curious that Article 12.4 does not refer to “one’s country,” but rather refers to “one’s own
country.” Any attempt to discern relevance in this observation, however, would seem to be an exercise in
futility at best and an exercise in confirmation bias or, worst, manipulation.
62. It seems wholly possible, however, that someone might not have any particularly intimate ties or
special links to the country of one’s citizenship such that that country would not constitute his “own country” within the meaning of Article 12.4. This Article is largely agnostic regarding any possibility of interpreting Article 12.4 in such a way that a person might not have the right to enter the country of his or her
citizenship. However, if a person always has the right to enter the country of his or her citizenship, most
non-citizen Americans, by virtue of their right to be in the United States, would have at least two “own
countries.”
63. It seems appropriate to avoid interpreting the ICCPR in a way that would render some people
without a country. Although it is possible that one can have no country, the words of Article 12.4 seems
to suggest that everyone has or should have (at least) one country that can be identified as his or her own.
See also The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 U.N.T.S. 175, at preamble (announcing
the States parties’ desire to reduce statelessness); G.A. Res. 896, Elimination or reduction of future statelessness (Dec. 4, 1954).
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It does not speak of “the country of which he is a citizen” or “the country of
which he is a national.” Additionally, the subject of Article 12.4 is “no one” –
not “no citizen” or “no national.” Indeed, Article 12.4 conspicuously avoids
the terms “citizen” and “national.” The relevance of these observations
becomes more apparent when we see that that the ICCPR refers to “citizens”
and “nationals” in other provisions, thus strongly suggesting that when the
countries drafting the ICCPR meant to limit certain rights to citizens or to
nationals, they did so. For example, the ICCPR grants the right to “take part
in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives,” only to citizens.64 It grants the right “to vote and to be elected” for
public office only to citizens.65 And it grants “access . . . to public service”
only to citizens. Likewise, although the ICCPR does not limit any human
right expressly to a country’s “nationals,” it limits the composition of the
Human Right Committee to the “nationals” of States parties.66 Thus, it
appears that the right to enter a country is a right that non-citizens and nonnationals may be able to enjoy, provided, of course, that such country is that
alien’s own country.
It might be argued that ICCPR Article 13 somehow limits the scope of
Article 12.4 to non-aliens. Article 13 states, “An alien lawfully in the territory
of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law. . . ,” and provides
some other procedural safeguards.67 Some might argue that since the ICCPR
provides a process for expelling aliens, an alien cannot possibly have the right
to remain in a host country.68 This conclusion, however, is not at all dictated
by Article 13. Article 13 simply demands that certain due process protections
be applied before a country can expel an alien who is lawfully present in its
territory, not that any and all aliens can be expelled provided such protections
are afforded.69 Pursuant to this interpretation of Article 13, aliens are entitled
to these due process protections provided they are “lawfully” within the
country and are entitled to remain in their host countries provided those host
countries are or have become their own.70 Indeed, the process of providing
64. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 25(a).
65. Id. at art. 25(b).
66. Id. at art. 28(2). See also, id. at art. 29(2) (stating that persons nominated to the Human Rights
Committee “shall be nationals of the nominating State”); Id. at art. 31(1) (“The Committee may not
include more than one national of the same State.”).
67. Id. at art. 13.
68. See, e.g., HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.3.
69. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Rep. of Guinea v. Dem. Rep. of Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep.
639, ¶ 65 (Nov. 2010) (“[I]t is clear that while ‘accordance with law’ . . . is a necessary condition for compliance with [art. 13], it is not the sufficient condition . . .[T]he applicable domestic law must itself be
compatible with the other requirements of the [ICCPR].”) [hereinafter ICJ Diallo].
70. But see, HRC Stewart, supra note 27 (arguing that an alien either qualifies for art. 12.4 treatment
or for Article 13 treatment, but never both). But see, id. at Individual opinion by Eckart Klein (concurring) (“[A]rticle 13 applies in all cases where an alien is to be expelled. Article 13 deals with the procedure of expelling aliens, while Article 12, paragraph 4 . . . may bar deportation for substantive reasons.”);
Id. at Individual opinion by Elizabeth Evatt and Ceclia Medina Quiroga, co-signed by Francisco José
Aguilar Urbina (dissenting) (“[T]here is nothing in the language of Article 13 which suggests that it is
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due process protections should reveal facts that could enable an administrative or judicial body considering expulsion of an alien to conclude that the
host country has become that alien’s own country.71 Such a determination
would foreclose the possibility of expulsion.
The interpretation of “his own country” must also be done “in light of the
object and purpose” of the ICCPR. Its object and purpose can be understood
from its preamble which states that it is to enhance “freedom, justice and
peace in the world” through the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”72
These rights are understood to “derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person.”73 More concretely, the object and purpose of the ICCPR is to restrict
states from impinging on the freedoms of human individuals and, in some
cases, to obligate states to provide certain services to people so that their freedoms and dignity can be better realized.74 But this does not provide much
direct interpretive guidance since states are certainly free to act in all sorts of
ways to restrict the human individual. The ICCPR does not render states
impotent. However, given that the focus of the ICCPR is the protection of
people, typically in their capacity as human individuals, and the corresponding restrictions on state behavior it demands, it would seem reasonable to
interpret ambiguous terms and phrases within the ICCPR in a way that favors
the human individual and disfavors state restrictions on freedoms of the
human individual.75 As the HRC’s Prafullachandra Bhagwati stated in his

intended to be the exclusive source of rights for aliens, or that an alien who is lawfully within the territory
of a State may not also claim the protection of Article 12, paragraph 4, if he or she can establish that it is
his/her own country.”). The three HRC members who authored the two other dissenting individual opinions in Stewart concurred with the Evan and Medina Quioga dissenting opinion. In practice, however, the
adoption of the interpretation of either the Views of the Committee, on one hand, or the Klein concurring
opinion and the individual dissenting opinions, on the other, would protect an alien whose host country is
his or her own country from being deported since that alien would qualify for Article 12.4 treatment. See
also infra notes 124–149 and accompanying text (describing Stewart’s misguided Article 12.4
interpretation).
71. More precisely, only aliens “lawfully in the territory of a State Party” are entitled to due process
protections, whereas Article 12.4 applies to everyone, both lawfully present aliens and unlawfully present
ones. It might seem curious at first blush that unlawfully present aliens are not explicitly entitled to due
process protections but yet may be entitled to a more valuable right, the right to remain in a country, but
the more valuable or fundamental a right, the more important it is to award to everyone. And, regardless,
once identified as an alien whose host country has become his own country, such an alien becomes, by virtue of Article 12.4, lawfully within the territory of the country.
72. ICCPR, supra note 26, at pmbl.
73. Id.
74. See generally Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 257 (1984); THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Dinah Shelton, ed., 2013).
75. The pro homine principle encourages the interpretation of human rights treaties that increases the
protection of the human person as opposed to interpretations that protect state sovereignty. Valerio de
Oliveira Mazzouli & Dilton Riberio, The Pro Homine Principle as an Enshrined Feature of International
Human Rights Law, 3 INDON. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 77 (2016). See also Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265
U.S. 332, 342 (1924) (“Treaties are to construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions
are possible, one restrictive of rights which may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the
latter is to be preferred.”); Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 581 (1908) (“[T]reaties should
be liberally interpreted with a view to protecting the citizens of the representative countries in rights
thereby secured.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628600

340

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34:323

dissent in Stewart v. Canada, the human rights in the ICCPR are “rights of
the individual against the State; they are protections against the State and
they must therefore be construed broadly and liberally.”76 If our question,
whether or not a country can be a non-citizen’s own country, is somewhat
ambiguous even at this point in our analysis, a broad and liberal interpretation, one motivated for the protection of the individual, must yield the answer
“Yes.”77
2.

Preparatory Works

As stated earlier, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties permits
recourse to additional means of treaty interpretation if the application of the
primary method of treaty interpretation yields a meaning that is “ambiguous
or obscure” or “manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”78 And, indeed, it is likely
that some people may consider it manifestly absurd and/or unreasonable that
any alien would be entitled to maintain permanent residence in his host country despite the host country’s wishes. Certainly, others would see no absurdity or unreasonableness at all in such an interpretation. It may be fair to
observe that the exact meaning of ICCPR Article 12.4 – that is to say, the
exact contours of its scope in general, and, in particular, whether an alien can
enjoy Article 12.4 rights – remains somewhat ambiguous even after the application of the primary method of treaty interpretation. The use of additional
means of interpretation, therefore, seems wholly appropriate.79
The supplemental means of interpretation consist essentially of an examination of the preparatory works (travaux préparatoires)80 associated with the
treaty’s negotiation and adoption and, more generally, the circumstances of

76. HRC Stewart, supra note 27, at Individual opinion by Prafullachandra Bhagwati (dissenting).
77. See also Session v. Morales-Santana, 137 S.Ct. 1678, 1700 (2017) (citing Rogers v. Bellei, 401
U.S. 815, 834 (1971)) (in a case concerning citizenship requirements under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, recognizing that Congress considers “the importance of residence in this country as the
talisman of dedicated attachment”) (emphasis added); Atle Grahl-Madsen, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. II, 442 (1972) (“[I]t has never been envisioned that there should be any group
of underprivileged refugees, subject to the whims of the authorities . . . [A]s a state would not dream of expelling its own nationals . . . there is hardly any reason for a state to press too hard for the expulsion of refugees[, and therefore,] after a period of some three years, the interests of the refugee in remaining where
he is, must normally be held to override any other consideration.”) (emphasis added).
78. VCLT, supra note 55.
79. The VCLT also allows the use of additional interpretation methods in order to “confirm the
meaning” resulting from the application of the primary interpretation method. VCLT, supra note 55, at
art. 32. Thus, even if we were to conclude that the meaning generated solely from the primary method of
interpretation – here, at this point, that at least some aliens enjoy Article 12.4 rights – is neither manifestly
absurd, manifestly obscure, ambiguous or obscure, it is a worthwhile exercise to examine the preparatory
works associated with Article 12.4 and the circumstances of its negotiation.
80. It has been suggested that giving considerable weight to negotiation history in the context of a
multilateral treaty is somewhat problematic since not all treaty parties participate in the treaty negotiations and because resort to legislative history is contrary to the legal traditions of many states. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 (1987), Reporters
Note 1. But see International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries
(1966) at 233, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf (observing
that states considering accession to a treaty have access to its travaux pre´paratoires).
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the text’s adoption.81 The preparatory works appear to confirm the interpretation above.
The ICCPR was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations starting in the years immediately after World War II. It was heavily negotiated.
Its text was concluded in December 1966.82 The preparatory works associated with Article 12.4 do shed some light on its meaning. Most significantly,
perhaps, is the fact that in November 1959, a few days prior to the adoption
of the current form of Article 12.4, Canada, at a meeting of the General
Assembly, formally proposed to amend the draft of the text of what would
become Article 12.4 to state that no one could be deprived of the right to enter
“the country of which he is a citizen.”83 Such language would clearly exclude

81. VCLT, supra note 55, at art. 32.
82. U.N. Status of Treaties, supra note 52.
83. U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 954th mtg. at 231–32, U.N. DOC. A/C.3/SR.954, ¶ 25 (Nov. 12, 1959)
[hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.954]. The draft of Article 12 submitted for the General
Assembly’s consideration in November 1959 was as follows:
1.

Subject to any general law of the State concerned which provides for such reasonable restrictions as may be necessary to protect national security, public safety, health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others, consistent with the other rights recognized in this Covenant:
a. Everyone legally within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right
to (i) liberty of movement and (ii) freedom to choose his residence;
b Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

2.
a.
b.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary exile.
Subject to the preceding sub-paragraph, anyone shall be free to enter his own country.

Int’l Covenants on Human Rights, Draft, Rep. of the Third Comm., U.N. DOC. A/4299, ¶ 3 (Dec. 3,
1959). Lebanon was the state that first formally introduced the idea of including a right to return to a country. ECOSOC Comm. on Human Rights, 5th Sess., Draft Int’l Covenant on Human Rights, Lebanon:
Amendments to art. 11 U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/215 (May 20, 1949) (proposing “ . . . every one has the right
. . . [t]o leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”). The Commission on Human
Rights would instead adopt a counter-proposal by France providing that “ . . .every person is free to return
to the country of which he is a national.” ECOSOC, Comm. on Human Rights, 5th Sess., at 10 (June 8,
1949). A year later, Australia proposed using the phrase “his own country.” U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/353/
Add.10, cited in Commission on Human Rights, 6th Sess., UN Doc. E/1681 (May 29, 1950). Australia
argued that the right to return to a country should extend to people who “had established a home in [a]
country” or who “had long resided in a country and might be said to have settled there, although they
might still retain the nationality of some other country.” U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Commission on
Human Rights, 6th Sess., at 12–13, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/SR.151 (April 19, 1950). Australia’s amendment
was rejected by a vote of 7 to 6 with 1 abstention. Id. at 16. Australia persisted, however, and two years
later, in 1952, Australia proposed replacing “the country of which he is a national” in the then-current version of what would become paragraph 2(b) above with “his own country.” Draft Int’l Covenant on
Human Rights and Measures of Implementation, Australia: Revised amendment to art. 8, U.N. DOC. E/
CN.4/L.189/Rev.1, (May 29, 1952). Australia argued that the right should extend to people who have a
“permanent residence” in a country, and the expressions “citizen” and “national” were inadequate to
cover all such people. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, 8th Sess., Summary Record of the Three
Hundred and Fifteenth Meeting U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/SR.315 (May 29, 1952). This time the Commission
on Human Rights adopted Australia’s proposal by a vote of 10 to 2 with 6 abstentions. ECOSOC
Commission on Human Rights, Eighth Session, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/SR.316 (May 29, 1952). This Eighth
Session of ECOSOC’s Comm. on Human Rights adopted the language reprinted above, the language that
would be submitted to the General Assembly in 1959 for its consideration. See also Marc J. Bossuyt,
GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, 260–65 (1987).
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aliens from the benefit of the right to enter and to remain in his or her host
country. This proposal, however, was met with relatively widespread opposition from other state members of the General Assembly.84
The Canadian proposal did not trigger lengthy debate. Some countries
opposed limiting the right of entry because a state can manipulate who is and
who is not a citizen. It was observed that any state that wanted to exile a citizen could simply withdraw citizenship and thus avoid the obligations of
Article 12.4.85 Curiously, no state proposed language that would both limit
the scope of Article 12.4 to citizens while providing an exception to this limitation in the event of state manipulation.
After receiving only limited support, Canada withdrew its proposed amendment.86 It is not apparent otherwise to what extent the negotiating states contemplated or intended Article 12.4 to encompass aliens (let alone
undocumented aliens). Many states acknowledged that the language “his own
country” was vague.87 Of the sixty or so states that participated in these negotiations, four declared for the record, either after Canada withdrew its proposal
or in contemplation of such a withdrawal, that they understood Article 12.4 to
be limited to either citizens or nationals: Canada,88 Czechoslovakia,89
Japan,90 and the United Kingdom.91 One state, Saudi Arabia, declared an
84. U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess. 957th. mtg. at 241, U.N. DOC. A/C.3/SR.957, ¶ 1 (Nov. 16, 1959) [hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957].
85. See, e.g., Summary Statement of Italy, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.954, supra note 83, ¶ 35.
Or, framed another way, a state could choose who not to give citizenship to, thus denying those persons
the rights associated with citizenship. States have an almost unrestricted sovereign right to decide for
themselves who is and is not their citizens, despite the fact that such decisions may be discriminatory or
ungenerous. See generally Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT’L L.
694 (2011) (acknowledging this fact but suggesting that it might be changing).
86. Summary Statement of Canada, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 84, ¶ 1.
87. E.g., Summary Statement of India, Id. ¶ 13; Summary Statement of the United Kingdom, id. ¶ 19.
88. Summary Statement of Canada, id. ¶ 1.
89. Summary Statement of Czechoslovakia, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 958th mtg. at 245, U.N. DOC.
A/C.3/SR.958, ¶ 5 (Nov. 17, 1959) [hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.958] (declaring that
Czechoslovakia understands Article 12.4 as articulating a right to enter a country “whose citizenship had
been bestowed upon the person in question in accordance with that State’s laws and regulations”).
Czechoslovakia’s statement seems distastefully self-serving, however, since it seems largely motivated
by Czechoslovakia’s desire not to be held liable to or for any of the 2.5 million ethnic Germans forcefully
expelled by Czechoslovakia from Czechoslovak territory in the immediate aftermath of World War II in
an Allied-sanctioned ethnic cleansing process that Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš referred to as
“the final solution of the German question.” Id. (“Those [Sudeten] Germans were not Czechoslovak citizens and Czechoslovakia was not their own country.”). Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans were
killed or died from hunger, illness, and suicide during the expulsion campaigns in Czechoslovakia and
elsewhere in Eastern Europe. R.M. Douglas, ORDERLY AND HUMANE: THE EXPULSION OF THE GERMANS
AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2012).
90. Summary Statement of Japan, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 956th mtg. at 239, U.N. DOC. A/C.3/
SR.956, ¶ 30 (Nov. 13, 1959) [hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956] (declaring that Japan
understands Article 12.4 as articulating a right to enter a country of which a person is a “national”).
91. Summary Statement of the United Kingdom, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 84, ¶
19. Additionally, the delegate from Pakistan stated that in order to take advantage of Article 12.4, a person
“should always be able to prove, in accordance with the law of the country concerned, that he was a national
of the country.” Summary Statement of Pakistan, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note 90, ¶ 1;
Summary Statement of Pakistan, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.954, supra note 83, ¶ 36. The delegate from
Yugoslavia formally thanked Canada for withdrawing its amendment, which it considered “superfluous.”
Summary Statement of Yugoslavia, ICCPR Preparatory Works, SR.957, supra note 84, ¶ 7.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628600

2020] THE ICCPR, NON-SELF-EXECUTION,

AND

DACA RECIPIENTS 343

opposing sentiment, observing that “it would be dangerous to make the right
of everyone to enter his own country dependent on the fact of being a national.
To include that idea of being a national would open the way to arbitrary action
and help to increase the number of refugees.”92 No country remarked upon the
Saudi statement.93 The United States delegate made no remarks about whether
Article 12.4 was or should be limited to citizens or nationals.
Although an analysis of the preparatory works does not yield a perfectly
conclusive understanding of whether or not the negotiating countries
intended the scope of Article 12.4 to include aliens,94 the following observations are warranted. First, an amendment to explicitly limit the scope of
Article 12.4 to citizens was roundly rejected. Second, the States parties knew
that “his own country” was vague and yet were comfortable enough to adopt
this language. These two observations alone strongly suggest that the right
contained in Article 12.4 is not limited to citizens (or nationals) of a state.
And, third, absent a reservation, a state’s declared understanding made during
the process of negotiations of what a treaty provision should mean is not dispositive as to that provision’s meaning, even with regard to the provision’s
application to that particular state.
3.

Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee

The ICCPR established an eighteen-person body known as the Human
Rights Committee (HRC).95 The HRC is tasked with evaluating the implementation of the ICCPR by the States parties and with making general comments regarding the interpretation and application of the ICCPR.96 In
addition, many States parties have recognized the competency of the HRC to
receive and consider complaints from other States parties who believe that
the first State party is in violation of the ICCPR.97 The United States has
declared that it recognizes this competency.98 Further, pursuant to the first
Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, several States parties have recognized the
competency of the HRC to receive and consider complaints from individuals
who believe that one or more of their ICCPR rights are being, or are about to

92. Summary Statement of Saudi Arabia, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 84, ¶ 25.
93. Afghanistan formally thanked Canada for withdrawing its amendment since that amendment
could “give rise to restrictive interpretations.” Summary Statement of Afghanistan, id. ¶ 15. It is not evident what Afghanistan was specifically contemplating. Italy also formally thanked Canada for withdrawing its amendment. Summary Statement of Italy, id. ¶ 28.
94. For a discussion of how the debate on the inclusion of the word “arbitrarily” and, more particularly, the meaning of the word “exile” shed some light on this issue, see infra Part I.B.2.
95. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 28.
96. Id. at art. 40.4.
97. Id. at art. 41. As of July 2019, forty-nine States parties, including the United States, have recognized this competency. U.N. Status of Treaties, ICCPR, supra note 52.
98. Id.
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be, violated by that State party.99 The United States has not recognized this
competency.100
The States parties have not, however, designated the HRC as the authoritative interpretive body of the ICCPR. In fact, there is no institution, judicial or
otherwise, designated with the authority to definitively interpret the ICCPR
for all parties.101 Nevertheless, the HRC has interpreted and applied the
ICCPR’s human rights provisions far more than any other institution. Its
reports, comments, and adopted views are particularly considered and should
inform our understanding of the meaning of the ICCPR.102 Ideally, all parties
to the ICCPR, as with any treaty, should understand and interpret the ICCPR
uniformly. The HRC can be significantly influential in bringing about a
harmonized understanding of the ICCPR.103
The HRC has been asked to interpret and apply the meaning of ICCPR
Article 12.4 several times and has invariably stated that the phrase “his
own country” is “broader than the concept ‘country of his nationality.’”104 Its published analysis is based largely on the ordinary meaning
of the text of Article 12.4,105 the fact that the provision is not expressly
99. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(Dec. 19, 1966). As of July 2019, 116 states have recognized this competency. U.N. Status of Treaties,
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&clang=_en.
100. Id.
101. For a discussion of what interpretive bodies have (and do not have) the authority to interpret
treaties, see Young, supra note 49, at 95–107. See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional
Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE. L. J. 1762 (2009) (asserting that most supranational
bodies lack of authority to definitely interpret treaties).
102. See generally ICJ Diallo, supra note 69, ¶ 66 (asserting that the ICJ “should ascribe great
weight” to the interpretations adopted by the HRC, in large part in order “to achieve the necessary clarity
and the essential consistency of international law”); Sandy Ghandhi, Human Rights and the International
Court of Justice: The Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case, 11 HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 527, 535 (acknowledging
that although the HRC’s General Comments “are not in themselves strictly speaking binding . . ., they
constitute an authoritative guidance and interpretation of [the ICCPR]”).
103. Even Justice Antonin Scalia was a proponent of uniform interpretation of multilateral treaty
provisions and respecting others’ reasonable interpretations. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech to the
American Enterprise Institute (Feb. 21, 2006), https://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2006/02/22/1397738.
htm (“The object of a treaty is to have nations agree on a particular course of action. And if I’m
interpreting a provision of the treaty that has already been interpreted by several other signatories, I am
inclined to follow the interpretation taken by those other signatories so long as it’s within the realm of
reasonableness . . . where [their interpretations are] within the bounds of the ambiguity contained in the
text, I think it’s a good practice to look to what other signatories to the treaty have said. Otherwise, you’re
going to have a treaty that’s interpreted different ways by different countries, and that’s certainly not the
object of the exercise.”). See Int’l Law Comm’n, FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL Law, U.N. DOC.
No. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International
Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553 (2002) (discussing the fragmentation of
international law, including the challenge of divergent interpretations of individual treaties by different
adjudicatory bodies).
104. See e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27 on Freedom of Movement, CCPR/C/
21/Rev.1/Add.9, ¶ 20 (1999) (continuing that the scope of “his own country” is “not limited to nationality
in the formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at birth or by conferral”); HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36,
¶ 9.2; HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.3; Human Rights Committee, Communic’n No. 1557/2007,
Nystrom v. Australia, CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007, ¶ 7.4 (2011) [hereinafter HRC Nystrom]; HRC
Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.4.
105. HRC General Comment 27, supra note 104, ¶ 20; HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.4.
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limited to “nationals,”106 and the fact that the negotiating states rejected a
proposal to limit reentry rights to citizens.107 The HRC has repeatedly
elaborated upon its interpretation saying Article 12.4 “embraces, at the
very least, an individual who, because of his special ties to or claims in
relation to a given country cannot there be considered a mere alien.” 108
Additionally,
there are factors other than nationality which may establish close and
enduring connections between a person and a country, connections
which may be stronger than those of nationality. The words “his own
country” invite consideration of such matters as long-standing residence, close personal and family ties and intentions to remain, as well
as to the absence of such ties elsewhere.109
The HRC has interpreted and applied Article 12.4 in response to six individual communications from non-citizens facing deportation from their host
states. The first such communication was in 1996. Each was a dispute about
whether or not the State party in question had the right to deport a noncitizen, even though the non-citizen had lived in the country for a long time.
The HRC’s analysis and application of Article 12.4 have evolved since 1996.
In the first three cases, Stewart (1996),110 Canepa (1997),111 and Madafferi
(2004),112 the HRC concluded that the country in question was not the immigrant’s own country. However, their analysis was deeply flawed, and this
flawed reasoning was recognized by the various dissenting members of the
HRC. By the time the HRC considered its fourth and fifth Article 12.4 cases
in 2011, the flawed analyses in Stewart, Canepa and Madafferi was abandoned in favor of more sound reasoning. In the last three cases, Nystrom
(2011),113 Warsame (2011),114 and Budlakoti (2018),115 the HRC deemed
each of the countries in question to be the non-citizen’s “own country.” What
follows is a discussion of each of these six cases, in chronological order, and
a description of how the HRC interpreted and applied the phrase “his own
country.”

106. HRC General Comment 27, supra note 104, ¶ 20; HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.4.
107. HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.5.
108. See e.g., id. ¶ 12.4; HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.4; HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.4;
HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶ 9.2.
109. HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.4; HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.4; HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶ 9.2. See also, HRC General Comment 27, supra note 104, ¶ 20.
110. HRC Stewart, supra note 27.
111. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 558/1993, Canepa v. Canada, CCPR/C/59/D/
558/1993 (April 3, 1997) [hereinafter HRC Canepa].
112. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1011/2001, Madafferi v. Australia, CCPR/C/
81/D/1011/2001 (July 26, 2004) [hereinafter HRC Madafferi].
113. HRC Nystrom, supra note 104.
114. HRC Warsame, supra note 36.
115. HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36.
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The HRC’s decision in Stewart v. Canada was issued in 1996.116 It was the
first case in which the HRC interpreted and applied Article 12.4 of the
ICCPR in the context of a deportation. The HRC concluded that a 34-yearold British man who had lived in Canada since he was seven years old could
not claim Canada as his own country.117 Charles Stewart had lawfully entered
Canada with his family and had been a lawful permanent resident until
Canada revoked his visa.118 He had married a Canadian woman and had two
young children, both of whom had been born in Canada and were Canadian
citizens.119 Except for an older brother who had earlier been deported, all of
his closest relatives lived in Canada.120 However, he had divorced his wife after an eight-year marriage, and it appears that he had had little or no contact
with his ex-wife and his children.121 He lived with his brother and mother and
was 30 years old at the time the Canadian authorities decided to deport
him.122 Stewart claimed that for most of his life he believed that he was a
Canadian citizen until it was discovered during a criminal prosecution that he
was not.123
Even though Mr. Stewart’s ties with Canada were numerous and significant, the HRC concluded that Canada was not Stewart’s “own country” for
the simple – and perplexing – reason that Stewart had not attempted to acquire Canadian citizenship.124 The HRC in Stewart adopted a very narrow
interpretation of “his own country.” Citizens of a country, of course, could
call the country of their citizenship their own, but aliens almost never
could.125 The Stewart majority justified this narrow interpretation on the
116. HRC Stewart, supra note 27.
117. Id. ¶ 12.9.
118. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 2.2.
119. Id. ¶ 2.1.
120. Id.
121. Id. ¶ 4.2.
122. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 2.4.
123. Id. ¶ 2.2.
124. Id. ¶¶ 12.2–12.9.
125. The Stewart majority listed some examples of non-citizens it would include within the scope of
Article 12.4. These examples were the following: (i) “nationals of a country who have there be [sic]
stripped of their nationality in violation of international law;” (ii) “individuals whose country of nationality has been incorporated into or transferred to another national entity whose nationality is being denied
them;” and (iii) “stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country
of such residence.” HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.4. Although it is abundantly clear that this list was
merely illustrative and non-exhaustive – and, indeed, it is a list of situations to which the application of
Article 12.4 seems wholly unobjectionable – a handful of committee members in Nystrom and Warsame,
cases examined fifteen years later, would cling to the Stewart interpretation and strongly suggest that this
Stewart list comprised the only categories of aliens who enjoy Article 12.4 rights. E.g., HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, at Individual Opinion of Committee members, Sir Nigel Rodley, Ms. Helen Keller and Mr.
Michael O’Flaherty (dissenting); HRC Warsame, supra note 36, at Individual Opinion of Committee
member, Sir Nigel Rodley. Notably, the Nystrom and Warsame committee members who seem to suggest
that this list is exhaustive were nationals of developed, immigrant-receiving states – Hellen Keller
(Switzerland); Gerald Newman (USA); Michael O’Flaherty (Ireland); Yuji Owasawa (Japan); Nigel
Rodley (UK); and Kirster Thelin (Sweden). For the committee members and their nationalities, see Rep.
of the Human Rights Comm., at Vol/ 1, U.N. DOC. A/66/40 (2011). In the recently decided Budlakoti case
(2018), however, not a single committee member who participated in the examination of Mr. Budlakoti’s
communication – including the participating committee members from immigrant-destination states (e.g.,
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assertion that if an alien had lived in country for so many years, as Mr.
Stewart had done with Canada, that country had a “right” to expect the alien
to apply for citizenship and to consequently be burdened with all the obligations of citizenship.126 Since Mr. Stewart did not apply and was not a
Canadian citizen, Canada could not be deemed his own country. The fact that
any citizenship application Mr. Stewart might have submitted would likely
have been denied on account of his criminal record did not trouble the
Stewart majority since such “disability was of his own making.”127
Note the internal tension in the HRC’s reasoning in Stewart. It is the length
of time that an alien has been in a country that warrants that country’s right to
expect that alien to apply for (and, presumably, receive) citizenship, but that
same length of time and the (presumed) eligibility to obtain citizenship is not
in itself enough to qualify that same country to be that alien’s own. For some
reason, the alien must take the administrative steps necessary to apply for and
receive citizenship in order to enjoy the right not to be exiled as provided in
Article 12.4.128 This appears to be contrary to the HRC’s repeated assertions
elsewhere that Article 12.4 can be enjoyed by both citizens and non-citizens.
As stated above, the Stewart majority seems to justify this conclusion on the
belief that long-term non-citizens are somehow escaping the obligations of
citizenship. The Stewart majority, however, does not state what those obligations are. Indeed, it challenging to think of a list of obligations that are not
only triggered only after one becomes a citizen129 but are also so burdensome
France, Israel, Italy, South Africa, and the United States) – maintained the limited interpretation of
Article 12.4 asserted by the Stewart majority. HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36. For the committee members
and their nationalities, see Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., 120th session, 121st session, 122nd session,
at 13, U.N. DOC. A/73/40, (2018). See also, HRC General Comment 27, supra note 104, ¶ 20 (making it
clear that other factors besides those listed in Stewart “may in certain circumstances result in the establishment of close and enduring connections between a person and a country”).
126. HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.8 (“Countries like Canada, which enable immigrants to
become nationals after a reasonable period of residence, have a right to expect that such immigrants will
in due course acquire all the rights and assume all the obligations that nationality entails. Individuals who
do not take advantage of this opportunity and thus escape the obligations nationality imposes can be
deemed to have opted to remain aliens in Canada. They have every right to do so, but must also bear the
consequences . . .. Individuals in these situations must be distinguished from the categories of persons
described in [Article 12.4].”).
127. HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.6. The fact that Mr. Stewart thought for so long that he was a
Canadian citizen and thus would have no need to apply for Canadian naturalization likewise did not concern the Stewart majority. Id. ¶ 2.2.
128. The HRC acknowledged that there would be an exception when the host country placed “unreasonable impediments on the acquiring of nationality.” HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.5 But see id. at
Individual opinion by Prafullachandra Bhagwati (dissenting) (objecting generally to the narrow interpretation of the majority arguing, in part, that “it is the sovereign right of a State to determine under what
conditions it will grant nationality to a non-national. It is not for the Committee to pass judgment whether
the conditions are reasonable or not and whether the conditions are such as to impose unreasonable
impediments on the acquisition of nationality by a new immigrant nor is the Committee competent to
enquire whether the action of the State in rejecting the application of a new immigrant for nationality is
reasonable or not.”).
129. It is a struggle to think of an extensive list of obligations that burden only citizens, as opposed
to permanent resident aliens or any other category of aliens for that matter. Some counties might impose
on citizens an obligation of national service (including registering for such service), the obligation to pay
taxes on income earned while living and working abroad, and/or the obligation to make themselves available for jury duty. In the United States, all male immigrants, whether documented or undocumented,
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that they serve as the quid pro quo for the right not to be banished from your
own country.
Further undermining the Stewart majority’s interpretation are the following observations. First, its interpretation does not seem to be supported by the
text or context of Article 12.4 or the object and purpose of the ICCPR.130
Second, its interpretation is not supported by the preparatory works of the
ICCPR.131 For these and other reasons, the majority’s narrow interpretation
in Stewart of “his own country” triggered vigorous dissenting individual
opinions by six committee members.132
Nevertheless, five months later, in April 1997, in Canepa v. Canada, the
HRC would follow the Stewart interpretation. In Canepa, the HRC concluded
that an Italian citizen could not claim Canada as his own country even though
he had arrived (lawfully) with his family at age five, was raised continuously
in Canada and was still living in Canada at age twenty-three when he
received his first deportation order.133 The HRC, citing Stewart, said Canada
was not Mr. Canepa’s own country because Mr. Canepa did not try to acquire
Canadian citizenship and was otherwise ineligible for Canadian citizenship
because of his criminality.134 Several HRC members issued individual opinions rejecting this analysis as flawed, some citing to their earlier dissents in
Stewart.135

between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five are required to register for the selective service, and all resident aliens are required to pay foreign earned income tax; these are not burdens imposed only on citizens.
Selective Service System, Who Must Register, available at https://www.sss.gov/Registration-Info/WhoRegistration; 50 U.S.C. § 3802; IRS Publication 519 (2018), US Tax Guide for Aliens, https://www.irs.
gov/publications/p519.
130. See Part I.A.1.
131. See Part I.A.2.
132. See, e.g., HRC Stewart, supra note 27, at Individual opinion by Elizabeth Evatt and Ceclia
Medina Quiroga, co-signed by Francisco José Aguilar Urbina (dissenting) (“Individuals cannot be
deprived of the right to enter ‘their own country’ because it is deemed unacceptable to deprive any person
of close contact with his family, or his friends or, put in general terms, with the web of relationships that
form his or her social environment . . .. For the rights set forth in Article 12, the existence of a formal link
to the State is irrelevant; the Covenant is here concerned with the strong personal and emotional links an
individual may have with the territory where he lives and with the social circumstances obtaining in it.
This is what Article 12, paragraph 4, protects.”); id. at Individual opinion by Prafullachandra Bhagwati
(dissenting) (arguing that the consequence of not becoming a citizen cannot be the forfeiture of an ICCPR
right, and observing, “it is because the author is not a Canadian national that the question has arisen[,] and
it is begging the question to say that Canada could not be regarded as ‘his own country’ because he did
not or could not acquire Canadian nationality.”); id. at Individual opinion by Laurel B. Francis (concurring) (opining that Canada, at some point in time, had been Mr. Stewart’s “own country”). Manfred
Nowak, a scholar who served as the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture from 2004 to 2010, referred to
the Stewart rationale as “controversial” and “unfortunate” and characterized the dissenting opinions as
“more convincing.” Manfred Nowak, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY, 285–86, (2d rev. ed. 2005).
133. HRC Canepa, supra note 111, ¶¶ 2.1–2.3.
134. Id. ¶ 11.3.
135. HRC Canepa, supra note 111, at Individual opinion by Elizabeth Evatt and Cecelia Medina
Quiroga (dissenting); Id. at Individual opinion by Committee member Martin Scheinin; Id. at Individual
opinion by Christine Chanet (dissenting) (“The deliberate use of [the] vaguer and hence broader term
[“his own country”] indicates that the drafters of the Covenant did not wish to limit the scope of the text
in the manner decided by the Committee.”).
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Seven years later, in 2004, in the Committee’s next case implicating
Article 12.4, Madafferi v. Australia,136 the HRC applied the Stewart interpretation again. The HRC concluded that an Italian citizen who had arrived in
Australia at age twenty-eight on a six-month tourist visa and then overstayed
his visa could not claim Australia as his own country.137 However, since
arriving in Australia, he had married an Australian citizen, had four
Australian citizen children, and started a retail fruit business that had employees, paid taxes, and was still operating at the time of his first deportation
order.138 He had brothers and a sister in Australia, all of whom had all
renounced their Italian citizenship,139 but he still had three sisters in Italy.140
His bonds with his wife and children were strong.141 He claimed that he had
first assumed that marrying an Australian made him automatically entitled to
remain in Australia.142 Later, he tried to apply for a spouse visa but was
denied because of criminal activity in Italy as a younger man.143 Madafferi
was about forty years old and had been in Australia for approximately eleven
years at the time Australian authorities first decided to deport him.144
Although one might conclude that Australia was not Mr. Madafferi’s own
country since he both arrived in Australia as a full-grown adult and lived in
Australia for only eleven years,145 the HRC gave a different justification.
Citing Stewart, and otherwise not elaborating, the HRC deemed Australia not
to be Mr. Madafferi’s own country since, although he sought Australian citizenship, he did not receive it.146
Under the Stewart doctrine, an alien must be qualified for citizenship and
must have applied for citizenship in order to be able to claim a country as his
or her own. Otherwise, personal ties to that country are irrelevant, as is any
lack of ties to any other country. The Stewart doctrine can lead to clearly
absurd results. Imagine an 80-year old woman who was brought to the
United States as an infant from Hungary. Imagine she lived all her life in the
Midwest, graduated college (with honors) from Iowa State and lived and
worked (and paid taxes) in various cities in the United States. Imagine she
now lives in Des Moines with her husband. Her children and all of her other

136. HRC Madafferi, supra note 112.
137. Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 19.6.
138. Id. ¶¶ 2.2, 6.2, 6.9.
139. Id. ¶ 6.9.
140. Id. at Individual Opinion of Committee Member, Ruth Wedgewood. His parents in Italy had
passed away. His grandfather immigrated to Australia. His father had immigrated to Australia but moved
back to Italy to retire living off his Australian pension. Mr. Madafferi’s Italian passport had expired, and
he had renounced his residency within the town of his birth and was no longer registered as residing in
Italy. Id. ¶ 6.9.
141. Id. ¶ 6.11.
142. Id. ¶¶ 2.2, 6.4.
143. Id. ¶¶ 2.3–2.8.
144. Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.1, 2.7.
145. This Article is agnostic as to whether these facts alone merit a determination that Australia was
Madafferi’s “own country.”
146. HRC Madafferi, supra note 112, ¶ 9.6.
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close family members are in the United States and are American citizens.
Many are in Des Moines, and she sees most of them every Sunday and often
throughout the week. She flies the American flag in her yard year-round and
dresses in red, white, and blue every Fourth of July. Two of her children and
three of her grandchildren served in the U.S. military. She has never traveled
abroad. She does not know Hungarian culture and does not speak any
Hungarian. She has never been back to Hungary since leaving as an infant.
She roots for the Cubs and Vikings and her beloved Iowa State Cyclones. She
and her husband have already bought burial plots for themselves in a little
cemetery outside Des Moines. For the sake of argument, we can even imagine that she came to the United States legally, has been a lawful permanent
resident for her entire life, and has been a completely law-abiding person.
However, if she had never applied for citizenship (and thus never “incurred
the obligations of citizenship”), pursuant to the Stewart doctrine, the United
States would not be her own country. Presumably, she would easily qualify
for citizenship, but for whatever reason, she did not apply. Perhaps it never
seemed important to her because she was American in every sense that mattered in her life. Perhaps she lacked the sophistication or the inclination to
apply. Perhaps she did not know she was not a citizen. If these were the facts,
it might very well be arbitrary for the United States to deport her, but the
question at issue here is whether the United States is her “own country.”
Given that Article 12.4 is not expressly limited to citizens, it is extraordinarily difficult to see how the United States is not her own country for purposes
of that provision.147
Except for a handful of dissenters who emphasized sticking to precedent,
the HRC rejected the Stewart doctrine in each of its next three Article 12.4
cases.148 In its place, the HRC has simply looked to see whether a non-citizen
147. She also would not have met any of the three exceptions articulated in Stewart. See HRC Stewart,
supra note 27. Compare with the real-life Marguerite Grimmond, who was born in the United States, moved
to Scotland at age two with her Scottish mother, and lived in the United Kingdom for the next seventy-eight
years without acquiring British citizenship and without receiving explicit permission from the British government to stay. Upon returning to the UK from her first overseas trip at age eighty, she was told by British immigration authorities that she would be deported and had to leave the United Kingdom within four weeks.
Pensioner Wins Deportation Fight, BBC NEWS, Jun. 20, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/
tayside_and_central/6223440.stm. After eventually receiving authorization to stay, Mrs. Grimmond is
reported to have said, “I was trying to put a brave face on things but I was a bit churned up inside at the
thought that I might have to move to America because I don’t know anyone there . . . I know the weather is
better across there, but I am quite happy here in rainy old Scotland, and it is nice to know I am here legally at
long last.” Id.
148. The HRC did employ ICCPR Article 12.4 in a case in 2000 to help it decide whether New
Zealand had withdrawn citizenship from five Western Samoans in violation of the ICCPR. Although the
communication’s Samoan authors did not explicitly make a claim that New Zealand had violated Article
12.4, the HRC concluded that at the time of the withdrawal New Zealand was not any of the authors’
“own country” as understood in Article 12.4, and, hence, the withdrawal of their citizenship and subsequent deportation did not violate the ICCPR. At the time of the withdrawal, the authors were in their 50s
and 60s, had never lived in New Zealand, and did not even know that they had had New Zealand citizenship. In fact, by the time of withdrawal, only one of the authors had even set foot in New Zealand, and
that was for a short-term visit. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 675/1995, Toala, et al. v.
New Zealand (views adopted on Nov. 2, 2000), U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/63/D/675/1995. Curiously, the HRC
received several individual communications that did not charge a State party with a violation of Article
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has enough “special ties to or claims in relation to a given country.”149 If so,
she can claim the country as her own. What follows is a brief summary of the
relevant facts of each of those three cases.
In 2011, in Nystrom v. Australia, the HRC concluded that Australia was
Stefan Lars Nystrom’s “own country” even though Mr. Nystrom was not an
Australian citizen.150 He was a Swedish citizen and held an Australian permanent residency visa until the Australian immigration authorities decided to
deport him.151 Mr. Nystrom’s parents immigrated to Australia from Sweden
before he was born.152 When she was pregnant with Mr. Nystrom, his mother
visited Sweden and gave birth to him there, returning to Australia with Mr.
Nystrom when he was twenty-five-days-old.153 Mr. Nystrom had few ties to
Sweden, never learned Swedish, and had not been in direct contact with any
family members there. He spent his whole life (other than his first twentyfive days) in Australia.154 He had close ties to his mother, sister, and nephews
in Australia.155 He was not married and had no children.156 Neither he nor his
parents ever applied for Australian citizenship.157 He was 31 years old when
Australia first issued a deportation order against him.158 Because of his cultural, social, and familial ties to Australia and his lack of ties anywhere else,
the HRC deemed Australia to be Mr. Nystrom’s “own country” as that phrase
is used in Article 12.4 of the ICCPR.159 As such, Australia was prohibited
under the terms of the ICCPR from arbitrarily expelling him.160

12.4 but whose underlying facts suggest that the authors, who were all aliens challenging the right of their
host countries to deport them, would have more-than-plausible, if not winning, Article 12.4 claims. See,
e.g., Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1792/2008, Dauphin v. Canada (views adopted on
July 28, 2009), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/96/D/1792/2008 [hereinafter HRC Dauphin] (describing the author as
a 22-year-old Haitian citizen without significant links to Haiti who lawfully came to Canada at age two
with his family and otherwise lived all his life in Canada, most of the while assuming he was a Canadian
citizen); Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 2387/2014, A.B. v. Canada (views adopted on
July 15, 2016), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/117/D/2387/2014 [hereinafter HRC A.B.] (describing the author as a
37-year-old Somali citizen who fled Somalia at age eleven and arrived in Canada at age thirteen with his
mother where he was recognized as refugee and given permanent residency).
149. See, e.g., HRC Stewart, supra note 27, ¶ 12.4; HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.4; HRC
Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.4; HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶ 9.2.
150. HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.5.
151. Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.2, 2.4. In fact, pursuant to the terms of his visa, one called an “Absorbed Persons
Visa,” he was allowed to vote and run for local elective office. Id. ¶ 3.3.
152. Id. ¶ 2.1.
153. Id.
154. Id. ¶ 2.2.
155. Id. His parents divorced when he was five, and he had not been in much contact with his father.
156. Id. at Individual opinion of Committee members Mr. Gerald L. Neuman and Mr. Yuji Iwasawa
(dissenting), ¶ 2.3.
157. Id. ¶¶ 2.6, 4.9. He claimed that he had always assumed he was an Australian citizen and that he
only learned otherwise at age 29 when the state brought up the possibility of canceling his visa. Id. ¶ 2.6.
158. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 2.4. Australia decided to deport him because of his extensive criminal activity. For a
discussion of his crimes and Australia’s decision to deport him, see infra notes 224–225 and accompanying text.
159. HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶¶ 7.4–7.5.
160. For a discussion of the meaning of “arbitrarily” as used in ICCPR Article 12.4 and the HRC’s
decision regarding Nystrom, see infra Part I.B.
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Also in 2011, in Warsame v. Canada, the HRC concluded that Canada was
Jama Warsame’s “own country” even though Mr. Warsame was not a
Canadian citizen.161 He was born in Saudi Arabia to Somali parents.162 He
did not have Saudi citizenship, and even though he had not been registered in
Somalia and had never been to Somalia, the Canadian authorities assumed
that Somalia would recognize him as a citizen as soon as he applied.163 He
came to Canada with his parents at age four and received permanent residency status at age eight as a dependent of his mother.164 He was raised in
Canada, had never visited Somalia, and had limited ability in the language of
his parents.165 He claimed to have close relationships with his mother and sister
in Canada.166 He was not married and had no children.167 He apparently never
applied for Canadian citizenship.168 He was 22 years old when he received his
first deportation order.169 Because of his cultural, social, and familial ties to
Canada and his lack of ties anywhere else, the HRC deemed Canada to be
Warsame’s “own country” as that phrase is used in Article 12.4 of the
ICCPR.170 As such, Canada was prohibited from arbitrarily expelling him.171
Most recently, the HRC concluded in 2018 in Budlakoti v. Canada that
Canada was Deepan Budlakoti’s “own country” even though Mr. Budlakoti
was not a Canadian citizen.172 He was born in Canada to Indian parents who
had arrived in Canada four years earlier on diplomatic passports to work as
domestic servants for Indian diplomats.173 He lived in Canada his whole life
and always considered himself Canadian and believed he was a Canadian citizen.174 His parents eventually became Canadian citizens, but formally, Mr.
Budlakoti had only permanent residency status under Canadian immigration
law, a status he received by virtue of his parents’ legal status in the county.175
Mr. Budlakoti had a younger brother who was a Canadian citizen by birth.176
161. HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.5.
162. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 8.5.
163. Id. ¶¶ 4.2, 4.4.
164. Id. ¶ 2.2.
165. Id. ¶¶ 2.5, 4.4, 8.5.
166. Id. ¶¶ 3.6, 5.10.
167. Id. ¶ 4.9.
168. Id. ¶ 6.6.
169. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 2.3. Canada decided to deport him because of his extensive criminal activity. For a
discussion of his crimes and Canada’s decision to deport him, see infra notes 226–228 and accompanying
text.
170. HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶¶ 8.4–8.5.
171. For a discussion of the meaning of “arbitrarily” as used in ICCPR Article 12.4 and the HRC’s
decision regarding Warsame, see infra Part I.B.
172. HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶¶ 9.2–9.3.
173. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 9.3. Canada normally recognizes everyone born in the territory of Canada as a
Canadian citizen. However, Mr. Budlakoti fell into one of the exceptions. Pursuant to Canadian citizenship law, he was not a Canadian citizen because his parents were in Canada in a diplomatic status. See id.
¶ 4.14.
174. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 9.3. In fact, the Canadian passport authorities issued him a Canadian passport, erroneously, when he was 13 years old based on his birth certificate. See id. ¶ 2.4. Based in part on his misunderstanding, he never applied for citizenship. See id. ¶¶ 2.4, 4.4.
175. Id. ¶¶ 2.4, 4.4.
176. Id. ¶ 2.3.
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Mr. Budlakoti appears to have been largely estranged from his family having
left home at age thirteen,177 and at times he had been a ward of the state.178
He had no spouse and no children.179 For a brief period of time, he had a
small construction business that he started at age nineteen.180 He had visited
India only once, for two weeks, when he was eleven.181 He was not proficient
in any Indian language and claimed not to be familiar with any Indian culture
or with any Indian customs.182 India did not recognize him as a citizen.183 He
was 22 years old when Canada issued its first deportation order against
him.184 Because of his cultural, social and familial ties to Canada, and his
lack of ties anywhere else, the HRC deemed Canada to be Budlakoti’s “own
country” as that phrase is used in Article 12.4 of the ICCPR.185 As such,
Canada was prohibited from arbitrarily expelling him.186
It is worth emphasizing that in each of these three cases discussed above –
Budlakoti, Nystrom, and Warsame – the person in question had been in his
country continuously from very early childhood. Additionally, each achieved
adulthood while in the country. Their close and intimate connections were
with one country and one country only. These connections were the sole consideration for the determination of whether their host country was also their
“own country.” It is also worth emphasizing that none of them sought citizenship. And if they had, it appears likely that each would have been denied
because of their extensive criminal records. The Stewart doctrine had been
abandoned.
It is also worth noting that each person either entered his respective country lawfully or was born to parents who were lawfully in the country.
However, the HRC’s evaluation of the factors that led them to conclude that
each was within his own country never included the fact that each had been
lawfully admitted or born in the country to parents who had been lawfully
admitted.187 The HRC’s analysis focused on the amount and strength of ties –
familial, social, cultural, linguistic, and professional – each person had to the

177. Id. ¶ 4.16.
178. Id. ¶ 5.3.
179. Id. ¶ 4.4.
180. Id. ¶ 3.1.
181. Id. ¶¶ 3.1, 9.3.
182. Id.
183. Id. ¶¶ 5.3, 6.2.
184. Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.6. Canada decided to deport him because of his extensive criminal activity. For a
discussion of Mr. Budlakoti’s crimes and Canada’s decision to deport him, see infra notes 222–223 and
accompanying text.
185. HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶¶ 9.2–9.3.
186. For a discussion of the meaning of “arbitrarily” as used in ICCPR Article 12.4 and the HRC’s
decision regarding Budlakoti, see infra Part I.B.
187. Granted, in none of these cases did the HRC have to wrestle with a situation in which the child
entered unlawfully or was born to parents who were present unlawfully, thus it is not surprising that the
HRC did not expressly highlight this or wrestle with a hypothetical opposite situation. HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶¶ 2.1–2.4; HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 2.1; HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 2.2. But
see infra notes 241–275 and accompanying text (discussing this situation).
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relevant country. The circumstances and legality of their initial entry were
irrelevant.
B.

The Interpretation of “Arbitrarily”

Recall that the full text of Article 12.4 is the following: “No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”188 Therefore, it is
permitted to non-arbitrarily deprive someone of their right to enter his or her
own country, thus raising the question of what “arbitrarily” means within the
context of Article 12.4. Or, in other words, what constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of such right?
The customary method of treaty interpretation, along with an analysis of
the ICCPR’s preparatory works and the jurisprudence of the Human Rights
Committee, clearly establish that the word “arbitrarily” in Article 12.4 has an
extremely broad scope, that is to say, that opportunities for non-arbitrary banishment are exceedingly rare. Indeed, even a concern for national security,
public order, or public health would not necessarily entitle a state to banish
someone from his or her own country. This interpretation also strongly suggests that it would be arbitrary to banish a non-citizen American for the simple reason that that person had entered the country, or stayed in the country,
without explicit permission from the federal government.
1.

Customary Law of Treaty Interpretation

There are many dictionary definitions of the word “arbitrary.” Two from
the online Oxford English Dictionary that on first blush plausibly fit the context of Article 12.4 are as follows: “Derived from mere opinion or preference;
not based on the nature of things; hence, capricious, uncertain, varying” and
“Unrestrained in the exercise of will; of uncontrolled power or authority,
absolute; hence, despotic, tyrannical.”189 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “arbitrary” (with regard to judicial decisions) as “founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact.”190 All of these definitions would grant a
state considerable latitude in choosing whether to deprive someone of his
right to enter his country. They seem to grant a lot of latitude in choosing
whether to banish someone. This cannot be the case, considering that banishment is such a harsh measure. Recall that Chief Justice Warren, in a case in
which the court declared denationalization (depriving someone of their
natural-born American citizenship) unconstitutional, decried banishment as
“a fate universally decried by civilized people.”191 Certainly, the ICCPR
would not permit a country to banish someone merely because it was done
pursuant to some blackletter law or based on some articulable facts. Under
188. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 12.4.
189. “Arbitrary,” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/10180?
redirectedFrom=arbitrary#eid (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
190. “Arbitrary,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
191. Trop, supra note 30, at 102.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628600

2020] THE ICCPR, NON-SELF-EXECUTION,

AND

DACA RECIPIENTS 355

these definitions, for example, it would not be arbitrary to banish someone
based on a law that provides that all citizen criminals can be banished.
The context of Article 12.4 within the ICCPR sheds some light on this matter. Article 12 contains the treaty’s free movement provisions. Article 12.1
provides for freedom of movement within a country and the freedom to
choose one’s residence.192 Article 12.2 provides for the freedom to leave
countries.193 Of all these movement rights, the right not to be deprived of the
right to enter your own country – including the right not to be banished –
seems like not only the most valuable but also the least likely to be restricted.
In fact, states rarely, if ever, banish citizens in the twenty-first century. It is
primitive, unjust, and unnecessary. Meanwhile, states restrict internal movements quite a bit (e.g., exclusions from private or government property,
exclusions from dangerous places, incarceration) and often restrict people
from leaving the country (e.g., incarceration, parole restrictions).
The remaining Article 12 provision, Article 12.3, provides that the freedom of internal movement, the freedom to choose one’s residence, and the
freedom to leave any country can be restricted under the following conditions: the restrictions must be provided by law, must be “consistent with other
rights recognized in the [ICCPR],” and must be “necessary to protect national
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others.”194 Those conditions are very strict. But the right to enter
one’s country is not subject to the exceptions provided in Article 12.3. A state
can deprive someone of the right to enter his own country as long as such deprivation is not “arbitrary,” thus suggesting that this freedom can either be
permissibly restricted either more readily or less readily than a state can
restrict the other movement freedoms. Since the right to enter one’s country
seems like a much more valuable right, and one that is rarely, if ever,
imposed (on citizens, at least), the restriction on states that prohibits them
from preventing people from entering their own countries must be more absolute than the restrictions on the deprivations of the other movement freedom.195 In other words, the deprivation of the right to enter one’s own
country can be arbitrary even if the state were to deem such deprivation necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others. Therefore, “arbitrarily” must have a particularly broad meaning, one that would capture nearly all state actions that

192. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 12.1. (“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.”).
193. Id. at art. 12.2 (“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”).
194. Id. at art. 12.3.
195. But see, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 151st mtg. supra note 83, at 10 (summarizing the American representative’s characterization of banishment as a lesser
deprivation because “a person deprived of the right to return to the country of which he was a national
had, after all, the rest of the world in which to move and choose a residence, whereas the person deprived
of the right of liberty of movement, of choosing his residence within the borders of a state and of leaving
his own, was in a far more serious predicament”).
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deprive a person of the right to enter his own state.196
The object and purpose of the ICCPR also point in the direction of this
interpretation since, as discussed above, we should interpret ambiguous terms
and phrases within the ICCPR in a way that favors the human individual and
disfavors state restrictions on freedoms.
Given all of this, “arbitrarily” in the context of Article 12.4 would seem to
include not just notions of reasonableness but also notions of utter necessity
and strict proportionality. Having “reasons” to expel is not enough. The
achievement of a state goal that results from someone’s banishment must be
important enough to be proportionate to the significant harm that will be
imposed on him. Furthermore, if the state’s goals can be accomplished without banishment (e.g., by sanctioning criminal behavior through imprisonment), then the deprivation of the right to enter would be deemed arbitrary. It
is hard to imagine a situation in which banishment would not be arbitrary.197
Given this interpretation, mere procedural due process is not enough to
make any banishment non-arbitrary. Banishment done merely in accordance
with municipal law may still be arbitrary. There is a difference between being
lawful, on one hand, and being reasonable, necessary, proportionate, and justifiable – i.e., not arbitrary – on the other. States parties have an interest in
enforcing their municipal laws, including their immigration laws, but they
are prohibited from enforcing laws that violate the ICCPR.
2.

Preparatory Works

An examination of the preparatory works leading to the adoption of the
ICCPR yields quite a bit of information about what the negotiating parties
196. The word “arbitrarily” is used in three other provisions of the ICCPR. For a discussion of these
provisions and a discussion of the HRC’s interpretation of each, see infra note 220. It might be assumed
that the word means the same thing in each provision, and, if so, it would be necessary to do an interpretation of the word in each context and then triangulate into the “correct” definition. However, based on the
discussions concerning Article 12.4 by the negotiating states, there is little reason to think that they considered all other uses of the word in the rest of the ICCPR nor that they consciously intended that the
word have the exact same meaning in each case. In the General Assembly’s four-day negotiation leading
to the adoption of the language of Article 12, there were only three comments regarding the fact that the
word “arbitrarily” is used elsewhere in the ICCPR, and those comments were generally unremarkable and
generated no further discussion. Summary Statement of the Philippines, ICCPR Preparatory Works
SR.958, supra note 89, at 246–48; Summary Statement of Panama, id. ¶ 25; Summary Statement of
Ireland, id. ¶ 31. In fact, Ireland’s comment suggests that the interpretation of “arbitrary” in Article 12.4
might be different from the interpretations of “arbitrary” in Articles 6 and 9 since “the meaning of the
wording [in Articles 6 and 9]. . . was amplified and defined in several paragraphs.” Id. The HRC, however,
has interpreted the word “arbitrarily” in each of these provisions to mean that mere lawfulness (under municipal law) does not, in and of itself, constitute non-arbitrary action. See infra note 220.
197. Some have argued that allowing DACA recipients to remain in the United States imposes undue
costs on society, e.g., administrative costs, medical costs, costs associated with increased job competition.
See Rugaber, supra note 22. Some may argue that the desire to rid the country of such costs justifies
DACA recipients’ deportation. However, the societal costs imposed by the average undocumented alien
would not seem to be considerably more than those imposed by the average citizen, and any argument
that asserts that a desire to rid the country of these costs makes deportation of DACA recipients nonarbitrary (as that term is used in ICCPR Article 12.4) would necessarily lead to the absurd conclusion that
the country could also banish any American citizen unless he or she proves themselves to be a net asset to
the country.
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meant by the word “arbitrarily” and confirms a broad interpretation of the
word. The bulk of the discussion that led to their decision to use the word
“arbitrarily” concerned the question of whether or not a state should ever be
allowed to exile people.198 Some states thought it was appropriate to allow
“lawful exile,”199 while others considered exile to be an antiquated practice
and inappropriate regardless of the circumstance.200 Many of the states that
objected to permitting “lawful exile” also objected to any exceptions at all to
the right to enter one’s own country.201 The decision to insert the word “arbitrarily” in the final text of what was to become Article 12.4 was largely a
compromise between the states that wanted to provide for “lawful exile” and
the states that did not want to permit exile or did not want to restrict the right
of entry at all.202 The negotiating states understood that a rule prohibiting “arbitrary” deprivation of a right was quite ambiguous with regard to what kind
of deprivation would be permitted,203 but it was clearly understood to overwhelmingly restrict States parties.204
198. See supra note 83 (providing the proposed draft that the Commission on Human Rights presented to the General Assembly for its consideration prior to the General Assembly’s discussion and
adoption of Article 12.) Note that that draft provided that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary exile”
and that otherwise “anyone shall be free to enter his own country.” Id.
199. E.g., Summary Statement of Portugal, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 84, ¶ 4;
Summary Statement of India, id. ¶ 12; Summary Statement of Italy, id. ¶¶ 26, 31; Summary Statement of
the United Kingdom, id. ¶ 34; Summary Statement of Ireland, id. ¶ 38; Summary Statement of Ireland,
ICCPR Preparatory Works, SR.958, supra note 89, ¶ 4, Summary Statement of Italy, id. ¶ 21; Summary
Statement of the United States, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 959th mtg. at 251, U.N. DOC. A/C.3/SR.959, ¶
32 (Nov. 17, 1959) [hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.959].
200. See e.g., Summary Statement of El Salvador, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note 90,
¶ 31; Summary Statement of Yugoslavia, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 84, ¶ 7;
Summary Statement of Greece, id. ¶ 8; Summary Statement of Argentina, ICCPR Preparatory Works
SR.958, supra note 89, ¶ 2; Summary Statement of Philippines, id. ¶ 10. At least ten additional states
spoke out against the inclusion of any language that permitted “lawful exile” or non-arbitrary deprivation
of one’s right to enter his or her own country. Those countries were Spain, El Salvador, Panama,
Ethiopia, Cuba, Honduras, Afghanistan, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Colombia. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 25; ICCPR
Preparatory Works SR.959, supra note 199, ¶¶ 28–30, 33–34, 36–37. See also, Summary Statement of
the Philippines, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note 90, ¶ 15 (“Exile was no longer a commonly imposed punishment, perhaps because it laid upon other counties the duty of taking in the exile
persons”). Two negotiating states, the United Kingdom and Ecuador, expressed the view that being
“exiled” was something that could only happen to citizens. Summary Statement of the United Kingdom,
ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 84, ¶ 34; Id. ¶ 35 (“A citizen was exiled; a foreigner was
expelled”). This observation lends some support to the argument that the negotiating states were assuming
that the Article 12.4 right to enter was a right held only by citizens.
201. See supra note 200.
202. See Summary Statement of Italy, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.958, supra note 89, ¶ 21 (articulating the compromise of the use of the word “arbitrarily”); Summary Statement of Argentina, id. ¶ 29
(same). The vote to approve inserting the word “arbitrarily” was 29 to 20 with 20 abstentions. ICCPR
Preparatory Works SR.959, supra note 199, ¶ 27. From the tone of the debate and state comments made
after the vote, one can safely assume that many of the countries that abstained were against inserting
“arbitrarily” or any exception at all into Article 12.4 but were abstaining out of respect for those countries
that wanted some kind of exception. See, e.g., Summary Statement of Cuba, id. ¶ 29 (voicing its objection
to any restrictions on the right to enter one’s own country but identifying itself as a state that abstained);
Summary Statement of Honduras, id. ¶ 30 (same); Summary Statement of Colombia, id. ¶ 37 (same).
203. See, e.g., Summary Statement of Yugoslavia, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note
84, ¶ 7; Summary Statement of Italy, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.958, supra note 89, ¶ 21.
204. There was no attempt to define the word “arbitrarily,” and no state articulated their own understanding of what “arbitrarily” meant in the context of Article 12.4. U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 954-59th
mtgs., U.N. DOCS. A/C.3/SR.954 through A/C.3/SR.959 (1959). During the debates that led to the
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Perhaps more enlightening is that during the decade-long drafting process,
any time there was a proposal to allow states to restrict the right of entry for
reasons of national security, public order, public health, and the like, these
proposals were soon rejected by the other negotiating states. For example,
during the drafting conferences of the Commission on Human Rights in
1949, both Lebanon and France proposed language that would permit States
to deprive someone of the right to enter his country for “reasons of security
or in the general interest.”205 Several negotiating states thought those reasons
were too permissive. Some negotiating states argued that the right to enter
one’s own country was a “fundamental” human right.206 Consequently, the
negotiating states decided to isolate the articulation of the right to enter one’s
country from the articulation of the other movement rights and place only the
most limited restrictions on the exercise of the right to enter.207
A similar discussion with similar results occurred during the General
Assembly’s final four meetings before it adopted the final language of
Article 12. Most of those discussions focused on a series of three draft proposals made jointly by Argentina, Belgium, Iran, Italy, and the Philippines,
the so-called “Five-Power” amendments.208 The Original Five-Power
Amendment provided that the right to enter one’s country could be restricted on the basis of “law” that was “necessary to protect national security, (public safety,) health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others.”209 The First Revised Five Powers Amendment provided a similar
set of exceptions.210 These proposals were met with widespread objection
because most states believed that the right to enter one’s country should
not be subject to such permissive exceptions.211 Almost no states voiced
decision to insert the word “arbitrarily” in Article 12.4, there was no explicit discussion about whether or
not aliens could be arbitrarily, lawfully, or otherwise exiled or expelled. This omission is understandable
considering ICCPR Article 13 addresses deportation processes applicable to aliens. See notes 62–66 and
accompanying text.
205. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft International Covenant on
Human Rights, Lebanon: Amendment to Article 11, UN Doc. E/CN.4/215/Rev.1 (May 26, 1949); U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council, Commission on Human Rights, Draft International Covenant on Human Rights,
France: Amendment to the Lebanese Proposal, UN Doc. E/CN.4/275 (May 31, 1949).
206. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 83, at 5–9.
207. Id. at 5–9, 10–11.
208. U.N., G.A. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights: Argentina, Belgium, Iran, Italy,
and the Philippines: amendments to Article 12 of the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.
DOC. A/C.3/L.812 (Nov. 12, 1959) [hereinafter Original Five-Power Amendment]; U.N., G.A., Draft
International Covenants on Human Rights: Argentina, Belgium, Iran, Italy, and the Philippines: revised
amendments to article 12 of the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. DOC. A/C.3/L.812/
Rev.1 (Nov. 13, 1959) [hereinafter First Revised Five-Power Amendment]; U.N., G.A., Draft
International Covenants on Human Rights, Argentina, Belgium, Iran, Italy, and the Philippines: revised
amendments to article 12 of the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. DOC. A/C.3/L.812/
Rev.2 (Nov. 16, 1959) [hereinafter Second Revised Five-Power Amendment].
209. Original Five Powers Amendment, supra note 208, at art. 12.3.
210. First Revised Five Powers Amendment, supra note 208.
211. See, e.g., Summary Statement of the United Kingdom, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note 90, ¶ 23; Summary Statement of Ireland, ICCPR Preparatory Works, SR.957, supra note 84, ¶
3, 38; Summary Statement of India, id. ¶ 12; Summary Statement of Lebanon, id. ¶ 14; Summary
Statement of Afghanistan, id. ¶ 16; Summary Statement of the United Kingdom, id. ¶ 19; Summary
Statement of Saudi Arabia, id. ¶ 24; Summary Statement of Morocco, id. ¶ 32.
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support for those exceptions,212 and those exceptions were roundly
rejected.213
In other words, during the entire drafting process, the articulation of the
right to enter one’s own country in Article 12 was almost always deliberately
isolated from the other Article 12 movement rights (e.g., the right of internal
movement, the right to leave)214 in order to make the entry right more absolute. As I concluded above, the negotiating states did not want the right to
enter one’s own country to be restricted merely because such restrictions
might be “necessary to protect national security, the general interest, public
order (ordre public), public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of
others.” This strongly suggests that the deprivation of the right to enter one’s
own country could be arbitrary even if the state were to deem such deprivation “necessary” to protect such concerns.215 Therefore, “arbitrarily” must
have a particularly broad meaning, one that captures nearly all state actions
that prevent a person from entering his own country. Certainly, concerns like
national security may be considered when determining whether or not a deprivation is arbitrary, but such concerns are not necessarily sufficient to justify such deprivation. Admittedly, this still leaves us to wonder what would
constitute a non-arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country,
but certainly such situations are relatively rare. In fact, the HRC has repeatedly stated that there are “few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of
the right to enter one’s own country could be reasonable.”216
3.

The Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee

As just stated, the HRC has repeatedly asserted that there are “few, if any,
circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country
212. Even the members of the Five-Powers did not actively support these exceptions. Their proposals
were attempts to capture and synthesize the apparent will of the General Assembly based on views most
recently expressed by the negotiating states. As that will became more clear, the Five-Power amendments
evolved in response.
213. This rejection prompted the Five Powers to revise their proposal, and the next morning they
suggested a new text of Article 12, one which not only removed the authority of states to limit the right of
entry based on national security concerns, public order concerns, and the like, but which was adopted later
that day as the final text of Article 12. Second Revised Five-Powers Amendment, supra note 208; ICCPR
Preparatory Works SR.958, supra note 89, at Agenda Items, ¶ 2; ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.959, supra note 199, ¶ 27 (announcing the result of the vote adopting the Second Revised Five-Power
Amendment). The Second Revised Five-Power Amendment also proposed the use of the word “arbitrarily” in Article 12.4, and much of the debate about Article 12.4 for the rest of the day concerned the use of
that word or possible alternatives. For a discussion of those later debates, see supra notes 198–204 and
accompanying text.
214. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 12.
215. The use of the word “necessary” in Article 12.3 and its omission in regards to Article 12.4’s
right of entry raise problematic interpretation issues. If an action is “necessary,” how can it also be “arbitrary”? It is fairly clear that the negotiating states were worried that States parties might abuse the discretion that Article 12.3 grants. They feared States parties might apply Article 12.3 exceptions too liberally
and might restrict the right of entry in ways that are not “necessary” at all. Otherwise, an analysis and
interpretation of the word “necessary” in Article 12.3 is beyond the scope of this paper.
216. E.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, supra note 104, ¶ 21; HRC Budlakoti,
supra note 36, ¶ 9.4; HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.6; HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.6. (emphasis added).
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could be reasonable.”217 In the jurisprudence of the HRC, reasonableness is
one of the hallmarks of non-arbitrariness. In its general comments and recent
cases addressing Article 12.4, the HRC has reiterated that any denial to enter
one’s country must be “reasonable in the particular circumstances.”218 Of
course, this raises the question of what is reasonable.
In Budlakoti, the HRC listed other hallmarks of arbitrariness. It stated,
“The notion of ‘arbitrariness’ includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.”219 Those are quite a few
elements, but the following conclusions can be made about the HRC interpretation on arbitrariness as used in Article 12.4. First, a decision to deny someone the right to enter his own country is one that results after balancing all the
interests, costs, and benefits. Second, in order to be non-arbitrary, denial of
entry (or expulsion/banishment) must be necessary; that is, there must not be
any lesser means to adequately accomplish the State party’s fundamental
goal, a means that would ensure the state’s interests are adequately met without imposing upon someone the extraordinary harsh consequences of banishment from his or her own country.220
In the three most recent cases, Budlakoti, Nystrom, and Warsame, the HRC
concluded that expulsion would amount to an arbitrary deprivation of the

217. See, e.g., HRC, General Comment No. 27, supra note 104, ¶ 21; HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36,
¶ 9.4; HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.6; HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶8.6.
218. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, supra note 104, ¶ 12; HRC Nystrom, supra
note 104, ¶ 7.6; HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.6.
219. HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶ 9.4.
220. The ICCPR prohibits States parties from engaging in three other “arbitrary” behaviors. Article
6.1 of the ICCPR provides, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life.” Article 9.1 provides, “No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” Article 17.1 provides, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks
on his honor and reputation.” In each case, the HRC has interpreted “arbitrary” in a similar fashion as it
interprets “arbitrary” in the context of Article 12.4, that is to say, as a restriction more narrow than would
be required by an obligation to merely act lawfully. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General
Comment 36, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/GC/36, ¶ 12 (Oct. 30, 2018) (“A deprivation of life may, nevertheless,
be authorized by domestic law and still be arbitrary. The notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be fully equated with “against the law”, but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness,
injustice, lack of predictability, and due process of law as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity,
and proportionality.”); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, Article 9 (Right to Liberty and
Security of Persons), adopted Jun. 30, 1982, at ¶4 (requiring that any detention must be both “based on
grounds and procedures established by law” and “not be arbitrary”); Human Rights Committee, General
Comment 16, Article 17 (Right to Privacy): The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and
Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, adopted April 8, 1988, ¶ 4 (interpreting “arbitrary interference” in the context of Article 17 in such a way that even interference done pursuant to municipal law may be arbitrary. In order to refrain from an arbitrary decision, a state’s decision must be “in
accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives” of the ICCPR and “reasonable in the particular circumstances”); HRC A.B., supra note 148, ¶ 8.7. (“[T]he notion of arbitrariness [in the context of Article
17] includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as
well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. The Committee also recalls that the relevant criteria for assessing whether or not the specific interference with family life can be objectively justified must be considered in the light, on the one hand, of the significance of the State party’s reasons for
the removal of the person concerned and, on the other hand, of the degree of hardship the family and its
members would encounter as a consequence of such removal.”); HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶ 9.4
(reiterating the same).
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right to enter one’s country even though each person facing deportation had
engaged in extensive criminal activity.221 Mr. Budlakoti, who was born in
Canada and had lived there all his life, had, before he turned twenty-two,
been convicted of breaking and entering, trafficking a firearm, possession of
an illegal weapon, and trafficking in cocaine, among other charges.222 He had
been sentenced to an aggregate of four years in jail.223 Mr. Nystrom, a
Swedish citizen who had lived in Australia since he was an infant, had been
convicted of a large number of crimes since he was ten years old, including
aggravated rape (of a child of ten when Mr. Nystrom was sixteen), arson,
armed robbery, burglary, theft, and drug possession.224 He had been sentenced to an aggregate of more than twenty years in prison.225 Mr. Warsame,
a Somali man who lived in Canada since he was four years old, began his
life of crime at age fifteen.226 Among his convictions were assault of a 60year-old woman, multiple incidents of theft and robbery (occasionally with
violence, including stabbing a store clerk with a screwdriver during one
robbery), possession of crack cocaine, and assaulting a fellow inmate.227
He had been sentenced to an aggregate of at least three years in jail.228 In
each case, the HRC concluded that expulsion would amount to an arbitrary
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country, and thus each State
party was prohibited under the terms of Article 12.4 from deporting these
men.229
In reaching these conclusions, the HRC balanced the interests of the state
against the harshness of banishment. In none of these cases did the HRC provide a particularly extensive explanation of why it concluded that banishment
would be arbitrary. However, in each of these cases, before stating its conclusion, the HRC reiterated its assertion that “there are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could be
221. HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶ 9.4; HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.6; HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.6.
222. HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶¶ 2.5, 4.5, 4.16.
223. Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.7. See also supra notes 172–186 and accompanying text (concluding that Canada
was Mr. Budlakoti’s own country).
224. HRC Nystrom, supra note 92, ¶¶ 2.3, 2.5, 3.10, 4.6.
225. Id. ¶¶ 1.1–2.8. See also supra notes 150–160 and accompanying text (concluding that Australia
was Mr. Nystrom’s own country).
226. HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶¶ 2.2., 8.10.
227. Id. ¶¶ 2.3, 4.2, 4.3, 5.10, 8.9.
228. Id. ¶¶ 2.3, 2.4, 4.3, 5.4, 5.10. See also supra notes 161–171 (concluding that Canada was Mr.
Warsame’s own country).
229. Despite the HRC’s conclusions, Australia deported Mr. Nystrom and Canada deported Mr.
Warsame. Remedy Australia, Follow-up Report on Violations by Australia of ICERD, ICCPR & CAT in
Individual Communications (1994-2014), issued April, 11, 2014, at 32–34 https://remedy.org.au/reports/
2014_Follow-Up_Report_to_treaty_bodies.pdf (describing Nystrom’s deportation). Canada deported Mr.
Warsame and put him on a set of flights to Somalia, but after disembarking in transit in Amsterdam, he
requested asylum from the Netherlands, claiming he would be subject to persecution in Somalia. In a
Kafkaesque turn of events, however, the Dutch refused to grant him asylum since they deemed him to be
Canadian (not Somali) and not subject to asylum-qualifying persecution in Canada. Andrew Stobo
Sniderman, Jame Warsame is a Citizen of Nowhere, MCCLEAN’S, Dec. 10, 2013, https://www.macleans.
ca/news/canada/jame-warsame-is-a-citizen-of-nowhere/.
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reasonable.”230 Where it did explain its conclusions more particularly, the
HRC emphasized whether or not the crimes were of a violent nature;231 the
extent to which the crimes were motivated or resulted from drug or alcohol
addiction, and, if so, the length of time of sobriety;232 and the length of time
between the crimes, on the one hand, and the deportation orders, on the
other.233 Nevertheless, it is evident that even the commission of violent
crimes did not, in and of itself, justify banishment. Both Mr. Warsame and
Mr. Nystrom had committed quite violent crimes, including rape, arson, and
assault,234 yet the HRC concluded that deporting them would be arbitrary.
Indeed, states do not exile their own citizens who behave in a similar fashion.235 States investigate, arrest, prosecute, punish, and attempt to rehabilitate
citizens.236 As undesirable as one’s crimes may be, his identity as a noncitizen does not make the state’s criminal justice system any less able to
address his criminal activity.237 Further still, banishing such a person imposes
230. HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.6; HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.6; HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶ 9.4. See also HRC Stewart, supra note 27, at Individual opinion by Elizabeth Evatt and
Cecilia Medina Quiroga, co-signed by Francisco José Aguilar Urbina (dissenting), ¶ 8 (declaring – after
concluding, unlike the majority in Stewart, that Canada was Mr. Stewart’s own country and consequently
reaching the issue of arbitrariness – “deportation could be considered arbitrary if the grounds relied on to
deprive him of his right to enter and remain in the country were, in the circumstance, unreasonable, when
weighed against the circumstances which make that country his ‘own country’); Id. at Individual opinion
by Prafullachandra Bhagwati (dissenting) (“Where an action taken by the State party against a person is
excessive or disproportionate to the harm sought to be prevented, it would be unreasonable and
arbitrary.”).
231. HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶¶ 9.4.
232. Id.; HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.6. See also HRC Stewart, supra note 27, at Individual
opinion by Prafullachandra Bhagwati (dissenting) (noting that Mr. Nystrom “has succeeded in controlling
his alcohol abuse”).
233. HRC, Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.6; HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶ 9.4.
234. Supra notes 222–229 and accompanying text.
235. The author knows of no state in the twenty-first century that practices extraterritorial je jure
exile of its undesirable citizens. Regrettably, de facto exile is quite common, often taking the form of
flight from persecution or civil unrest.
236. Allowing states to banish people based on a history of criminal convictions would give states
great latitude to banish people, in particular since states can decide for themselves what to criminalize
and could criminalize (and have criminalized) relatively innocuous things (e.g., drinking alcohol, premarital sex, adultery, blasphemy, apostasy, co-habitation, possession of small amounts of marijuana, underage drinking, public intoxication, homosexual sex, homosexuality, using birth control, having an
abortion, administering an abortion, soliciting prostitution, hiring undocumented immigrants, chewing
gum, drawing graffiti, swearing, driving while texting, publicly criticizing the government, jaywalking,
overeating, drinking soda, spanking one’s children, hate speech, posting fake news memes, homelessness,
screaming at one’s girlfriend, stalking, antitrust activities, tax evasion). Banishment premised on such
criminal activity seems neither necessary to achieve any legitimate state goal nor a proportionate response
to any such threat of continued criminal behavior. Furthermore, the worse the crime, the less justified it
would be to impose such criminality on another country.
237. Several dissenting Committee members in the now-discredited Stewart opinion suggested that a
state’s criminal justice system should always be expected to address any criminal recidivism. See HRC
Stewart, supra note 27, at Individual opinion by Elizabeth Evatt and Ceclia Medina Quiroga, co-signed
by Francisco José Aguilar Urbina (dissenting), ¶ 9 (“It must be doubted whether the commission of criminal offences alone could justify the expulsion of a person from his own country . . .”); Id. at Individual
opinion by Prafullachandra Bhagwati (dissenting) (suggesting that the state’s goal “to protect society
from . . . criminal propensity” can be “achieved by taking lesser action than expulsion or deportation,”
and asserting that if Mr. Stewart were to commit any more offenses, “he can be adequately punished and
imprisoned for it . . . This is the kind of action which would be taken against a national in order to protect
the society, and qua national, it would be regarded as adequate. I do not see why it should not be regarded
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that person’s criminal propensity on another country and on another group of
people. In fact, such a deportation not only shifts some threat of criminality
from one group of people to another, it shifts that threat from a group of people who make up the society in which the non-citizen became a criminal to a
group who make up a society that played little or no role in that
development.238
Determining whether a decision to deport a non-citizen constitutes an arbitrary denial of the right to enter one’s own country involves balancing interests and, ultimately, judgment. Still, such balancing and judgment should be
undertaken with the assumption that depriving one’s right to enter his own
country is rarely non-arbitrary.239
as adequate qua a person who is not a national . . .”). Mr. Stewart had been convicted forty-two times
before being deported from Canada. Most of those convictions were for petty crimes, traffic offenses and
drug-related crimes. He had one conviction for “assault with bodily harm.” HRC Stewart, supra note 27,
¶ 2.2.
238. See Summary Statement of the Philippines, ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note 90,
¶ 15 (suggesting that exile was no longer a commonly imposed punishment “because it laid upon other
countries the duty of taking in the exiled persons”). However, in many cases, a banished person quickly
deteriorates mentally and physically after he is deported to a country with which he has no substantial
connection, whose language he cannot speak, whose culture is unfamiliar, and in which he has few if any
familial or social resources. As a result, he may become less capable of engaging in successful criminality. But this possible “bright side” of banishment – the mental and physical deterioration of someone who
has likely already served his criminal sentences – hardly seem just. In other cases, a lack of resources in a
new country may make a banished person more desperate for self-preservation and more inclined to commit crimes. See also, supra notes 150–60, 224–225 and accompanying text (discussing Nystrom v.
Australia); Remedy Australia, supra note 228, at 33 (reporting that despite the HRC’s conclusion in
Nystrom v. Australia, Australia deported Mr. Nystrom to Sweden where he resumed drinking and has
“variously been homeless, in homeless shelters, in prison and in psychiatric care”); Chris Gelardi, The
Tragic Story of Jimmy Aldaoud, Deported from the Streets of Detroit to His Death in Iraq, THE
INTERCEPT, Aug. 8, 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/08/08/ice-deportation-iraq-jimmy-aldaoud/
(describing the deportation of a non-citizen American to Iraq and his death two months later).
239. The issue of deference reoccurs in the context of Article 12.4 analysis. Regularly States parties
claim to have done an appropriate balancing assessment and thus argue that the HRC should defer to their
judgment. Indeed, States parties regularly assert that they have appropriately incorporated ICCPR obligations into their municipal law and properly interpreted and applied it, or, in the case of direct application
(self-execution) of the ICCPR, properly interpreted and applied the ICCPR. E.g., HRC Dauphin, supra
note 148, ¶ 4.2; Human Rights Committee, Mohammad Sahid v. New Zealand, Communication No. 893/
1999 (views adopted Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter HRC Sahid], ¶ 4.2 (presenting New Zealand’s argument
that the HRC should not reconsider the State party’s application of its municipal law “unless there are
indications of bad faith or abuse of power”). See also HRC Madafferi, supra note 112, at Individual
Opinion by Mrs. Ruth Wedgwood (objecting to the substitution of the HRC’s judgment for Australia’s);
Human Rights Committee, Anna Maroudifou v. Sweden, Communication No. 58/1979 (views adopted
April 9, 1981), U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 83 (1984), ¶¶ 9.3, 10.1 (concluding that the HRC will defer
to state authorities to interpret and apply its own municipal laws and will only upturn such interpretation
and/or application in cases where it is established that the State authorities operated in bad faith or abused
their power, while simultaneously emphasizing that “domestic law must in themselves be compatible
with the provisions of the [ICCPR]”). In response to individual communications received pursuant to the
ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, the HRC assesses both State party executive decisions and State party judicial decisions, both in the light of ICCPR obligations, but it usually declines assessing the degree to which
ICCPR obligations are incorporated into municipal law. It is beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively describe the level of deference the HRC gives to the decisions and judgments of the States parties’ governments or to prescribe levels of deference the HRC ought to apply. However, with regard to
fundamental human rights – highly protected liberties – a low level of deference and a high level of scrutiny seem appropriate. For a comparison to judicial review in the United States of legislation and executive decisions that infringe on protected liberties, see generally R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review
under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights:
The Base Plus Six Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225 (2002).
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In each of the HRC Article 12.4 decisions discussed so far, the non-citizen
subject to deportation entered the country lawfully and faced visa revocation
only upon the state’s decision to deport. Each non-citizen had been convicted
of crimes, and, in some instances, multiple serious crimes. The state’s interest
in each of these matters was to eliminate from its territory the criminal threat
posed by the non-citizen. The state’s interest was the public interest. But
what if the deportee was not a criminal? Can a person be deported from his or
her own country simply because their entry or presence is unlawful? Can the
deportation of a DACA recipient or a Dreamer be non-arbitrary simply
because that person has been present in the United States unlawfully?
The HRC has not yet addressed the question of whether a state’s decision
to deport a non-citizen from his or her own country can be non-arbitrary if
the non-citizen is not a convicted criminal or, more relevantly, in the context
of DACA recipients and other Dreamers, if the only reason the state wants to
deport the non-citizen is that the non-citizen unlawfully entered the territory
of the state and/or resides in the territory of the state in violation of its municipal immigration laws.240
Although the HRC has not answered this question in the context of an
Article 12.4 claim, it has addressed the issue in the context of ICCPR Article
17 and 23 claims. The HRC’s analysis there strongly suggests how the HRC
would analyze this question in the context of Article 12.4. In Winata and Li
v. Australia,241 the HRC considered a claim by two Indonesian citizens, a
man and a woman, who were facing deportation from Australia.242 Each had
lawfully entered Australia on non-immigrant, short-term visas but had long
overstayed their visas.243 They met in Australia, entered into a “de facto relationship akin to marriage,” and had a son they named Barry.244 Barry appears
to have been born while each of his parents was unlawfully residing in
Australia.245 When Barry turned ten, he became an Australian citizen.246 A
day later, his parents applied for asylum (“protection visas”) based on a claim
that they would face persecution in Indonesia because of their Chinese ethnicity and Christian religion.247 Australia denied their applications and eventually issued removal orders.248 Neither the mother nor the father (nor Barry)
240. The term “criminality” as used in this Article does not include any “criminality” resulting only
from unlawful entry into or unlawful presence in the territory of a state. See also U.N. GAOR, New York
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, adopted September 19, 2016, U.N. DOC. A/RES/71/1 (declaring
a commitment to “review[] policies that criminalize cross-border movements”).
241. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 930/2000, Winata and Li v. Canada (views
adopted on July 26, 2001), CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 [hereinafter HRC Winata].
242. Indonesia may have formally withdrawn their citizenship, but Australia assumed that Indonesia
would readily re-recognize their Indonesian citizenship if they moved back to Indonesia and applied for
it. Id. ¶ 2.4.
243. HRC Winata, supra note 241, ¶ 2.1.
244. Id.
245. Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.2.
246. Id. ¶ 2.2.
247. Id.
248. Id. ¶¶ 2.2–2.6, 4.11.
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had engaged in any criminal conduct.249 Australia justified its deportation
orders on the fact that Barry’s parents had been residing in Australia in violation of Australia’s municipal immigration laws.250
Mr. Winata and Ms. Li appealed to the HRC and argued that if they were
deported either Barry would have to live in Australia without his parents or
Barry, an Australian citizen, would be forced to move to Indonesia, a country
to which he had never been and whose language and culture he did not
know.251 They argued that their deportation would violate Article 17 of the
ICCPR in either case.252 Article 17 provides, in part, that “[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, [or]
home . . .”253 Relevant to our analysis, the HRC interpreted “arbitrarily” as it
is used in the context of Article 17 the same way it interprets “arbitrarily” as
it is used in the context of Article 12.4.254 After concluding that such deportations would constitute “interference” with the family, the HRC stated:
[T]here is significant scope for States parties to enforce their immigration policy and to require departure of unlawfully present persons. That
discretion is, however, not unlimited and may come to be exercised
arbitrarily in certain circumstances. In the present case, both [aliens]
have been in Australia for over fourteen years. [Their] son has grown
in Australia from his birth [thirteen] years ago, attending Australian
schools as an ordinary child would and developing the social relationships inherent in that. In view of this duration of time, it is incumbent
on the State party to demonstrate additional factors justifying the removal of both parents that go beyond a simple enforcement of its immigration law in order to avoid a characterization of arbitrariness. In the
particular circumstances, therefore, the Committee considers that the
removal by the State party of the [parents] would constitute, if implemented, arbitrary interference with the family. . .”255
249. This assertion is based on the fact that there is no mention in the HRC communication of any
(non-immigration related) criminal activity. Id.
250. HRC Winata, supra note 241, ¶ 4.11.
251. Id. ¶ 3.4.
252. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.1–3.6.
253. Relatedly, Mr. Winata and Ms. Li also argued that their deportation would violate (i) Article
23.1 of the ICCPR, which reads, “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State;” and (ii) Article 24.1 of the ICCPR, which reads, “Every
child shall have . . . the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.” ICCPR, supra note 26, at arts. 23.1, 24.1.
254. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
255. HRC, Winata, supra note 241, ¶ 7.3. Four HRC members issued a joint dissenting opinion protesting this interpretation. Id. at Individual Opinion by Committee Members Prafullachandra Natwarlal
Bhagwati, Tawfik Khalil, David Kretzmer and Max Yalden (dissenting), ¶¶ 4, 5 ((i) asserting, after
rejecting that there was any “family interference” at all under the terms of Article 17.1, that a mere desire
to enforce state immigration laws is alone an appropriate, non-arbitrary justification for interfering with a
family at least in the circumstances where family unity can be maintained by having the child move to
Indonesia with his Indonesian parents; and (ii) noting that the implication of the majority’s holding is that
undocumented immigrants can create a right to stay in their host countries by having and raising children
there). Australia rejected the HRC’s views but did not deport Mr. Winata and Ms. Li. Remedy Australia,
supra note 229, at 44.
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If the HRC were to apply its interpretation of “arbitrarily” under Article 17
to Article 12.4, a State party would be prohibited from deporting someone
from his or her own country for the mere reason that that person’s entry into
or presence in the territory of that country violated the state’s municipal immigration laws. DACA recipients and Dreamers, based on the HRC’s interpretation and to the extent they could claim the United States as their own
country, would be protected from deportation.256
Three years later, the HRC had the opportunity to apply the Winata rule in
a case involving a Fijian citizen facing deportation from New Zealand. Sahid
v. New Zealand concerned a 57-year-old Fijian man, Mohammad Sahid, who
had been living in New Zealand in violation of its municipal immigration law
for fifteen years.257 He had arrived lawfully on a temporary visa that had long
since expired.258 He had no criminal record and appeared to be a law-abiding,
family man.259 His daughter, a lawful resident, and her four-year-old son, a
citizen, also lived in New Zealand.260 The three appeared to be very close.261
Mr. Sahid claimed that his daughter suffered from physical and emotional
disabilities and that he was the primary caregiver for the entire family.262 The
only justification New Zealand gave for deporting Mr. Sahid was to enforce
its immigration law.263 Like Mr. Winata and Ms. Li above, Mr. Sahid argued,
in part, that his deportation would violate New Zealand’s ICCPR obligation
to protect families.264
Curiously, however, Mr. Sahid did not make an Article 17 claim.265
Instead, he alleged that New Zealand was violating Article 23.1, which states,
“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”266 Nevertheless, New Zealand
defended itself against a hypothetical Article 17 claim,267 and the HRC, without referring to Article 17, cited to Winata in deciding that New Zealand did
not violate its obligations under Article 23 (or any other ICCPR obligation):
[I]n extraordinary circumstances, a State party must demonstrate factors justifying the removal of persons within its jurisdiction that go
256. See also supra note 220 (describing how the HRC has interpreted the word “arbitrarily” in other
provisions of the ICCPR).
257. HRC Sahid, supra note 239, ¶¶ 1, 2.1.
258. Id. ¶ 2.1. Mr. Sahid never hid from New Zealand’s immigration authorities. After his New
Zealand visa expired, he repeatedly applied for further visas, was rejected each time, and appealed each
decision, always without success. This process of applying and appealing lasted many years until he
finally ran out of domestic options and was deported. Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.3.
259. Id. ¶¶ 3.1–3.3, 5.2–5.3. The assertion that he had no criminal record is based on the fact that
there is no mention in the HRC communication of any (non-immigration related) criminal activity.
260. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2.1, 4.25.
261. Id. ¶¶ 3.1–3.3, 5.2–5.3.
262. Id. ¶¶ 3.2–3.3.
263. Id. ¶¶ 4.17, 4.22, 6.3, 6.6.
264. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.1.
265. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.1, 4.13.
266. Typically in complaints about family rights, communication authors allege violations of both
Article 17 and Article 23.1, and the HRC analyzes them together.
267. HRC Sahid, supra note 239, ¶¶ 4.13–4.22.
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beyond a simple enforcement of its immigration law in order to avoid a
characterization of arbitrariness. In Winata, the extraordinary circumstance was the State party’s intention to remove the parents of a minor,
born in the State party, who had become a naturalized citizen after the
required [ten] years residence in that country. In the present case, [Mr.
Sahid’s] removal has left his grandson with his mother and her husband
in New Zealand. As a result, in the absence of exceptional factors, such
as those noted in Winata, the Committee finds that the State party’s removal of [Mr. Sahid] was not contrary to his right under article 23,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant.268
The significance of this statement for the interpretation of Article 17 is debatable. The HRC was not asked to adjudge a claim based on Article 17.
Consequently, the HRC did not make any formal conclusions as to whether
there was “interference with the family” or, if so, whether any such interference was “arbitrary.” Nor is it clear what the HRC meant by the phrase
“extraordinary circumstances.” As stated in Sahid, it is only “in extraordinary
circumstances” that a State party must “demonstrate factors justifying the removal of persons within its jurisdiction that go beyond a simple enforcement
of its immigration law in order to avoid a characterization of arbitrariness.”269
One wonders what is “extraordinary” about a family unit that contains an
immigrant mother, an immigrant father, and a 13-year-old child citizen born
and raised in his parents’ host country as in Winata. Perhaps “extraordinary”
was a poor choice of words. Perhaps it is all a matter of perspective and framing. It is clear, however, that the HRC was not particularly inclined to maintain the cohesion of a family unit that included Mr. Sahid. His continued
presence close to the other members of that family was not particularly important to the HRC. His daughter was a married, full-grown adult, and his
young grandson had parents with whom he lived.270 The need to include
Mr. Sahid in that family did not outweigh New Zealand’s interest in enforcing its immigration laws – at least under the terms of ICCPR Article 23, an article that only requires the state to provide some undefined level of
“protection” for families.
Neither Mr. Winata, Ms. Li, nor Mr. Sahid entered their host countries in
violation of the domestic immigration laws. Mr. Winata and Ms. Li overstayed their visas and resided in Australia unlawfully for many years. Mr.
268. Id. ¶ 8.2.
269. Id. ¶ 8.2. The use of the phrase “extraordinary circumstances” may have been adopted from the
Winata dissent’s reference to “exceptional cases” three years earlier. HRC Winata, supra note 241, at
Individual Opinion by Committee Members Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati, Tawfik Khalil, David
Kretzmer and Max Yalden (dissenting), ¶ 4 (“There may indeed be exceptional cases in which the interference with the family is so strong that requiring a family member who is unlawfully in its territory to
leave would be disproportionate to the interest of the State party in maintaining respect for its immigration
laws. In such cases it may be possible to characterize a decision requiring the family member to leave as
arbitrary.”).
270. HRC, Winata, supra note 241, ¶ 7.3 (emphasis added).
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Sahid overstayed his New Zealand visa and then remained in the country for
a decade while under a deportation order. What if, instead, someone both
entered and resided in violation of the state’s immigration laws? The HRC
has not yet considered such a fact pattern. However, it has stated repeatedly
that mere compliance with municipal law does not, in itself, make a state’s
decision to prohibit a person from entering his own country (or a decision to
expel someone from his own country) reasonable or non-arbitrary.271 The
municipal law itself must comply with the obligations of Article 12.4.
Combined with the Winata assertion that “it is incumbent on the State party
to demonstrate additional factors . . . that go beyond a simple enforcement of
its immigration law in order to avoid a characterization of arbitrariness,”272
HRC jurisprudence seems to dictate that even an immigrant who entered a
country unlawfully and/or resides unlawfully cannot legally be removed
from his host country if that country has become his own country unless the
state can justify the removal beyond a mere desire to enforce its immigration
laws. And, even then, the justification would have to be significant enough to
be deemed non-arbitrary. Recall that in Budlakoti, Nystrom, and Warsame,
the HRC deemed it arbitrary to deport non-citizens with long histories of
criminality, including violent criminality. Consequently, one wonders what
could justify expelling a DACA recipient or a Dreamer from the United
States.273 One wonders what could justify removing anyone from his or her
own country. As the HRC has insisted repeatedly, “There are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country
could be reasonable.”274
But any reasoning that claims that this amounts to a non-arbitrary reason is
circular. It is begging the question to argue that the justification for banishing
someone from his or her country is that they have not been given permission
to remain in their country.275 Denial of permission itself hardly qualifies as a
271. E.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, supra note 104, ¶ 21 (asserting that the
prohibition of arbitrary denial “guarantees that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provision, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the
particular circumstances”) (my emphasis); HRC Budlakoti, supra note 36, ¶ 9.4 (reiterating the same);
HRC Nystrom, supra note 104, ¶ 7.6 (reiterating the same); HRC Warsame, supra note 36, ¶ 8.6. (reiterating the same); HRC Stewart, supra note 27, at Individual opinion by Prafullachandra Bhagwati (dissenting)
(“[T]he concept of arbitrariness must not be confined to procedural arbitrariness but must include substantive arbitrariness as well and it must not be equated with ‘against the law’ but must be interpreted broadly to
include such elements as inappropriateness or excessiveness or disproportionateness.”).
272. HRC, Winata, supra note 241, ¶ 7.3.
273. Recall that in order to qualify for DACA status, one must not have been convicted of a felony
offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, or multiple misdemeanor offenses and must not otherwise
pose a threat to national security or public safety. And pursuant to the original bill for the DREAM Act, in
order to have qualified as a Dreamer, one would have had to be “of good moral character.” DREAM Act,
supra note 9, § 3(a)(1)(E).
274. Supra note 216.
275. At this point, some readers may protest that the banishment (deportation) of some non-citizen
Americans is justified by the fact that these people entered the country and/or remained in the country
unlawfully, but this conclusion begs the question because the characteristic of an alien’s entry or continued stay that leads one to conclude that it is “unlawful” is that it is was not expressly permitted by the federal government.
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reason for denial of permission. The real question is whether withholding (or
revoking) permission is permissible under the ICCPR. Only explanations that
make banishment non-arbitrary justify the banishment. In other words, banishment that is motivated solely by a desire to enforce the law, without more,
is unjustified and unreasonable. It is, in a word, arbitrary. One might argue
that banishment under these circumstances generally fosters respect for law
and governance by the rule of law, but the ICCPR is also law, and respect for
that law requires that no one be banished without extremely good reason.
And as the HRC has emphasized above, it is hard to imagine what justification could exist for banishing anyone from his or her own county.
As Part I demonstrates, there are several strong arguments that Article
12.4’s prohibition against arbitrarily depriving someone of the right to enter
his own country also provides rights to certain non-citizens not to be
deported. The rest of this Article will proceed on the assumption that this is
so.
II.

U.S. RESERVATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS AND DECLARATIONS

The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992.276 In its instrument of ratification, the United States made a set of statements commonly referred to as
“Reservations, Understandings and Declarations,” or RUDs. One of the
RUDs, the declaration of non-self execution, affects the domestic enforcement of Article 12.4.
A.

Reservations

The U.S. did not make any explicit reservations concerning Article 12.4.
This is significant because a reservation to Article 12.4 would have limited
the extent of the United States’ obligations under that provision.277 Without
having made a reservation, the United States is bound under international law
to the full extent of Article 12.4.278
B.

An Understanding

One statement made under the heading “Understandings” might, at first
blush, seem to limit the US’s Article 12.4 obligations towards non-citizen
Americans. The relevant parts of that statement read as follows: “The United
States understands distinctions based upon. . . national or social origin . . . ,
birth or any other status – as those terms are used in article 2, paragraph 1 and

276. U.N. Status of Treaties, supra note 52.
277. See VCLT, supra note 55, at art. 2.1(d) (defining “reservation” as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in
their application to that State.”); Id. at art. 21.1 (explaining that reservations “modif[y] for the reserving
State . . . the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation”).
278. RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 55, § 307, cmt. d.
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article 26 – to be permitted when such distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. . .”279
Since the United States does not deport citizens but permits the deportation
of non-citizens, the U.S. makes distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. This is a distinction based on a “status.” The question then becomes
whether the U.S. understanding operates as a reservation that effectively permits the United States to deport even non-citizens Americans as long as the
government’s deportations are (merely) “rationally related” to a (mere)
“legitimate” governmental objective. The answer is no. Even though the
enforcement of its immigration laws is a legitimate governmental objective,280 and even though deporting non-citizens is rationally related to that
objective, this understanding does not operate as a reservation permitting the
United States to freely (arbitrarily) deport non-citizen Americans.
The United States made this understanding in light of the fact that the general anti-discrimination provisions of the ICCPR (Articles 2.1 and 26) are
worded in an absolute fashion;281 on their face, they prohibit all distinctions
that can be made on the basis of any kind of “status”— without any exceptions.282 As a practical matter, this clearly is too broad.283 Even the HRC has
observed that “not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and
if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant.”284
This observation comports with U.S. practice regarding constitutional prohibitions against discrimination. As Professor Stewart has stated in light of
the ICCPR anti-discrimination provisions, “As in most if not all legal systems. . . U.S. law does permit certain lawful distinctions to be made among

279. Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR states, “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Article 26
states, “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” ICCPR, supra
note 26, at arts. 2.1, 26.
280. But as argued above, enforcement of municipal immigration law might nonetheless violate the
ICCPR. Supra Part I.B.
281. For the text of these provisions, see supra note 279.
282. ICCPR Article 4 permits States parties, “[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life
of the nation” to engage in limited discrimination under strictly prescribed procedures except discrimination based “solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.” ICCPR, supra
note 26, at art. 4.
283. For example, prohibiting children from buying cigarettes would not be deemed a violation of
the ICCPR’s prohibition on status discrimination. Likewise, a public health campaign encouraging men
to get tested for prostate cancer would not be deemed a violation of the ICCPR’s prohibition on sex discrimination. See David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1183, 1197 (1993) (noting the “difficulty [that] lies in the language” of these provisions).
284. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18, Non-Discrimination at 26, ¶ 13, U.N. DOC.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994).
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individuals when those distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective.”285
However, the United States’ understanding should not be read as a reservation that allows the United States, with regard to its ICCPR obligations, to
engage in any and all discrimination so long as such discriminations or distinctions are “rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.”
Instead, the U.S. is establishing a standard below which it can never engage
in discrimination/distinction-making. In other words, the U.S. is stating that
it cannot make any distinctions between groups of people unless such distinctions are at least “rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.”
But this does not imply that any distinction that is “rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective” necessarily comports with the United
States’ non-discrimination obligations under the ICCPR.286 The United
States must still comply with its obligations under the ICCPR. In fact, the
United States made it clear in its first implementation report to the HRC that
its understanding “is construed by the Government as not permitting distinctions that would not be legitimate under the Covenant.”287
One act that is illegitimate under the ICCPR is arbitrarily banishing people
from their own country. Arbitrarily banishing citizens is a violation of the
ICCPR. Arbitrarily banishing non-citizen Americans is also a violation of
the ICCPR. The U.S., therefore, does not, by virtue of this understanding,
reserve a right to distinguish between all citizens and all non-citizens for the
purposes of retaining the right to deport all non-citizens.288 Or, seen from
another angle, the arbitrary banishment of non-citizen Americans is not a
“legitimate government objective” since such people possess the basic
human right pursuant to the ICCPR to remain in their own country.289
C.

A Declaration

Included in the United States RUD was the declaration that “the provisions
of Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.” 290 Since
Stewart, supra note 283, at 1195–96.
Nor is this true for discrimination analysis under the Constitution. See generally JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 747–955 (8th ed. 2010) (discussing standards of
review demanded by the Equal Protection Clause).
287. Human Rights Committee, Comments on the United States of America, 10, issued Apr. 7, 1995, U.N.
DOC. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995). See also U.S. Senate Report on Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.S. Senate Executive Report 102–23 (102d Cong., 2d Sess.), Mar. 24, 1992, https://
www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/drwcasebook/Documents/Documents/Senate%20Committee%20on%
20Foreign%20Relations%20Report%20on%20the%20ICCPR.pdf [hereinafter Senate Report on
the ICCPR].
288. It is widely understood that States parties to the ICCPR can treat all non-citizens differently
than how they treat citizens in a whole host of ways, e.g., registration requirements. In fact, citizenship
status is a common example where distinctions are often legitimately made.
289. Furthermore, it is challenging to imagine a “legitimate” government objective to which arbitrary banishment would be “rationally related.” Indeed, something that is “arbitrarily” done cannot be
“rational” or “rationally related” to anything. For a detailed discussion of what “arbitrarily” means within
the context of ICCPR Article 12.4, see supra Part I.B.
290. Resolution of Advice and Consent, supra note 52.
285.
286.
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Congress has not passed legislation implementing the obligations of Article 12.4,
the fact that the ICCPR is non-self-executing restricts the ability of non-citizen
Americans to enjoy Article 12.4 protections. The ICCPR, however, including
Article 12.4, still matters, both politically and legally. I now turn to this issue.
III.

THE NON-SELF-EXECUTION HURDLE

Before exploring the non-self-executing status of the ICCPR in more
detail, it is first important to re-emphasize that regardless of the ICCPR’s status under U.S. law, the U.S. maintains an international legal obligation to
abide by the ICCPR’s human rights norms, including the obligation to refrain
from arbitrarily depriving someone of the right to enter his or her own country.291 In other words, the ICCPR is legally relevant on the international
plane.292 The fact that the ICCPR is non-self-executing does not abrogate this
291. The customary international law of pacta sunt servanda applies. The VCLT articulates this rule
as follows: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.” VLCT, supra note 55, at art. 26. It is typically understood that the human rights articulated in a
multilateral human rights treaty are erga omnes obligations. See Human Rights Committee, General
Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,
adopted Mar. 29, 2004, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 ¶ 2 (“While Article 2 [of the ICCPR (concerning the general nature of States Parties’ obligations under the ICCPR)] is couched in terms of the obligations of States Parties towards individuals as the right-holders under the Covenant, every State Party
has a legal interest in the performance by every other State Party of its obligations. This follows from the
fact that the ‘rules concerning the basic rights of the human person’ are erga omnes obligations and that,
as indicated in the fourth preambular paragraph of the Covenant, there is a United Nations Charter obligation to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Furthermore, the contractual dimension of the treaty involves any State Party to a treaty being obligated
to every other State Party to comply with its undertakings under the treaty.”).
292. Another ICCPR State party could bring a complaint against the United States pursuant to
Article 41 alleging that the U.S. is in violation of its obligations under Article 12.4. The United States has
declared that it recognizes the competency of the HRC to receive and consider complaints from other
States parties who have made similar declarations. Almost fifty other States parties have made such a declaration recognizing this competency. U.N. Status of Treaties, supra note 52. Only four Latin American
countries have made such a declaration: Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Id. See also Senate Report
on the ICCPR, supra note 287 (“It is in the interest of the United States to participate in and influence the
state-to-state complaint procedure established by the Covenant, not least because it is hoped that the work
of the Committee will contribute to the development of a generally accepted international law of human
rights.”). If such a complaint were made, the HRC would encourage the states to find a “friendly solution.” ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 41.1(e). The HRC is not authorized to decide the matter or even make
recommendations for a solution. Id. at art. 41.1(h)(ii). However, it may, with the consent of the parties
concerned, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission that would be empowered to report “its views on
the possibilities of an amicable solution” if the parties were unable to come to an agreement for a solution.
Id. at arts. 42.1(a), 42.7(c). These “views on the possibilities of an amicable solution” would not be binding on the parties. Nevertheless, this state-to-state dispute resolution process does offer an avenue for
encouraging the United States to adhere to its Article 12.4 obligations. Admittedly, there might seem to
be a certain absurdity if a foreign country were to take it upon itself to bring a matter to the HRC in order
to protect someone’s rights while simultaneously claiming that that person’s own country is the United
States. After all, if that person is essentially American, why would Peru or Ecuador or Algeria expend the
effort to protect that person’s rights (despite the erga omnes nature of the rights)? However, it is not unimaginable that a country would advocate for one of its own citizens. Furthermore, a country might be motivated to avoid the burdens that an unacculturated person would impose. A country would seem to be
particularly motivated to avoid the burdens of someone with a criminal propensity or a history of substance abuse or mental illness (or all of the above). Indeed, this presumption highlights the fact that some
state has to bear the burden of such a person’s presence, and it raises the question of what justifies one
country inflicting that burden on another. For a discussion of passing troublesome people to other countries, see supra footnotes 236–238 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 150–160, 224–225 and
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international obligation in any way.293 As the Supreme Court emphasized in
Medellı´n, the most recent case in which it addressed treaty non-self-execution, even a treaty that is not self-executing “constitutes an international law
obligation on the part of the United States.”294
In fact, declaring that a set of treaty obligations will be non-self-executing
is the functional equivalent of declaring that the domestic machinery of state
government has already taken,295 or intends to take, the necessary steps to

accompanying text (discussing Nystrom v. Australia); Remedy Australia, supra note 229, at 33 (reporting
that despite the HRC’s conclusion in Nystrom v. Australia, Australia deported Mr. Nystrom to Sweden
where he resumed drinking and has “variously been homeless, in homeless shelters, in prison and in psychiatric care”). With regard to alleged Article 12.4 violations, there does not appear to be any binding
international adjudication process that would have jurisdiction over the United States. The ICCPR does
not contain a compromissory clause or any other dispute resolution process other than the state-to-state
dispute resolution process described in Articles 41–42. The U.S. has not ratified the (first) Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR. Supra note 99. Nor does the United States recognize the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice that would otherwise be available under Article 36.2 of the ICJ
Statute. ICJ website, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, https://www.
icj-cij.org/en/declarations. But see Worster, supra note 25 (detailing scenarios in which the United States,
if it deports Dreamers, might face crimes against humanity charges and be subject to the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court).
293. RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 55, § 310(1) (“Whether a
treaty provision is self-executing concerns how the provision is implemented domestically and does not
affect the obligation of the United States to comply with it under international law. Even when a treaty
provision is not self-executing, compliance with the provision may be achieved through judicial application of pre-existing or newly enacted law, or through legislative, executive, administrative, or other action
outside the courts.”); VCLT, supra note 55, at art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”); Young, supra note 49, at 128 (“Non-self-executing treaties bind the United States on the international plane.”). In the United States’ first
implementation report to the Human Rights Committee, the U.S. affirmed its international legal obligations under the ICCPR. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Initial Report of States Parties Due in 1993, Addendum, United States of America, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/81/Add.4, Aug. 24, 1994, at 8 (“In ratifying the Covenant, the United States declared “[T]he
provisions of Articles 1 through 27 are not self-executing”. This declaration did not limit the international
obligations of the United States under the Covenant.”); Core Document forming Part of the Reports of
States Parties, United States of America, U.N. DOC. HRI/CORE/1/Add.49 (1994), at 138–39 (”The distinction [between self-executing treaties and non-self-executing treaties] is one of domestic law only; in
either case, the treaty remains binding on the United States as a matter of international law. Thus, in the
case of human rights treaties, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not, in and of itself, accord individuals a
right to seek enforcement of its protections in a domestic court, even though the United States continues
to be bound to recognize those protections.”).
294. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2007).
295. When he sought the Senate’s consent to ratify the ICCPR, President Bush reported that “existing U.S. law generally complies with the [ICCPR].” Senate Report on the ICCPR, supra note 287. This
assertion of “general compliance” is also often given as the reason for declaring the ICCPR non-self-executing; the creation of additional private causes of action was not necessary. Id. In the United States’ first
implementation report to the Human Rights Committee, the U.S. stated that “the fundamental rights and
freedoms protected by the Covenant are already guaranteed as a matter of U.S. law, either by virtue of
constitutional protections or enacted statutes, and can be effectively asserted and enforced by individuals
in the judicial system on those bases. For this reason it was not considered necessary to adopt special
implementing legislation to give effect to the Covenant’s provisions in domestic law.” Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties, USA, supra note 293, at 8. See also Core Document USA, supra
note 293, at 141 (“[T]he basic rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the [ICCPR] (other than
those the United States took a reservation) have long been protected as a matter for federal constitutional
and statutory law . . .”). But see Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S.
Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 327, 327–29 (2000) (listing several ways that United States law may
not comply with the ICCPR). We can add Article 12.4 protection of non-citizen Americans to Professor
Goldsmith’s list.
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domestically implement those treaty obligations.296 And, indeed, the ICCPR
itself contains a provision reiterating this obligation to domestically implement its
substantive human rights provisions.297 The United States has largely implemented Article 12.4 with regard to non-citizen Americans through prosecutorial
discretion. DACA is an example of such implementation. However, such prosecutorial discretion is not always exercised, and without comprehensive federal
legislation, it is likely that many more non-citizen Americans will be banished.298

296. It is a failure only if the treaty is indeed non-self-executing and there is no other domestic mechanism that achieves the same result. So, for example, with regard to Article 12.4, if there is no federal statute ensuring that non-citizen Americans can remain in the United States, implementation has failed to the
extent the executive branch does not exercise enough prosecutorial discretion to fully implement Article
12.4. See also Young, supra note 49, at 131–34 (arguing that both international law and the Supremacy
Clause dictate that treaty obligations be implemented and suggesting that municipal legislation is the
most appropriate way to do so). See also Core Document USA, supra note 293 (reporting that the U.S. in
its first ICCPR implementation report to the Human Rights Committee stated that “[s]o long as it complies with its undertakings and responsibilities under duly ratified treaties, the United States considers that
it remains generally free to determine the specific modalities of treaty implementation under domestic
law. In other words, unless it has specifically agreed to make the provisions of a given treaty part of the
judicially enforceable body of domestic law, the United States may follow the alternatives available to it
under its own law for implementing treaty obligations in domestic law”).
297. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 2.2 (“Where not already provided for by existing legislative or
other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws
or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”).
The United States, to the extent it fails to domestically implement the full scope of Article 12.4 not only
increases its risk of violating Article 12.4 but also finds itself in continuous violation of Article 2.2. See
generally Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, supra note 291.
298. Increased public awareness of this human rights issue may encourage Congress to act.
However, I am under no illusion that the political branches will implement such a broad rule into municipal law, one that authorizes all non-citizen Americans to stay in the United States. Ambiguous feelings
towards immigrants, the characterization of the presence of some of them as “illegal,” and the fetishizing
of the unacceptability of “illegality” (and, by extension, “illegal” immigrants) are all too strong. And this
will certainly be the case for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, given that there is a certain segment
within the population and within Congress that is quite hostile to “diminishing our sovereignty” or having
the “United Nations tell us what do to,” highlighting the fact that we are currently in violation of certain
treaty obligations, especially one that might serve “illegal aliens,” may actually make this particular segment applaud and undermine any attempt at implementation. Indeed, it is a bit challenging to imagine the
U.S. Congress passing a law in the foreseeable future that provides a right to stay for long-time permanent
legal residents and some kind of rolling regularization process for long-term, (otherwise) unlawfully present aliens. But it becomes imaginable when one frames the issue as one of individual rights and freedoms
and focuses on the fact that banishment from one’s own country seems so positively unjust. It is also
more imaginable when one learns that over the course of the last few decades, the U.S. has passed several
pieces of legislation providing amnesty to millions of unlawfully-present aliens, e.g., The Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (regularizing approximately 2.7 million people); The Section 245(i)
Amnesty of 1994 (regularizing approximately a half a million people); The Nicaragua Adjustment and
Cultural American Relief Act amnesty of 1997 (regularizing approximately one million people); The
Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act amnesty of 1998 (regularizing approximately 125,000 people);
The Life Act amnesty of 2000 (regularizing approximately one million people); The Immigration Act of
1990 (regularizing approximately 170,000 people); the Late Amnesty of 2000 (regularizing approximately 400,000 people). See Alex Nowrasteh, Legalization or Amnesty for Unlawful Migrants – An
American Tradition, CATO INSTITUTE, July 28, 2014, https://www.cato.org/blog/legalization-or-amnestyunlawful-immigrants-american-tradition. Indeed, I have little doubt that the sympathy that most
Americans feel – including Presidents and members of Congress – for Dreamers and DACA recipients is
the exact same sympathy that motivated and underlies ICCPR’s Article 12.4: People should be able to
stay in their own country.
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Self-Execution and Non-Self-Execution

The doctrine of treaty self-execution is complex and not wholly coherent.
This Section provides an explanation of the doctrine based on a survey of the
literature and provides a framework for understanding non-self-execution
that I will apply to the ICCPR in the following Sections.
1.

General Explanation

Non-self-executing (NSE) status is often simply understood to mean that a
treaty lacks “domestic effect”299 or “does not create private rights” or is
“domestically unenforceable in courts,”300 or words to that effect.301 But
these statements imprecisely describe non-self-execution. The collective judicial and academic articulation of the principles of self-execution and nonself-execution is notoriously “confusing and confused.”302 To discuss the
field, given the current judicial and academic theories, one must start very

299. E.g., Francisco Forrest Martin, The Constitution and Human Rights: The International Legal
Constructionists Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights, 1 FIU L. REV. 81 (2006); Paul B.
Stephan, Open Doors, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 23 (2009) (later stating that “what we often mean by
’self-executing’ is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification,” but then,
acknowledging the lack of precision of that explanation, rhetorically asking, “But what does “automatic”
mean? And “effect”?”).
300. See RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 55, § 310(1) (“A treaty
provision is directly enforceable in courts in the United States only if it is self-executing”); Louis Henkin,
U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341,
346 (1995) [hereinafter Henkin, The Ghost] (referring to non-self-execution as keeping a convention
from “having any effect on United States law”).
301. See Medellı´n, supra note 294, at 504–07, 526–27 (explaining that a self-executing treaty is one
that “automatically ha[s] effect as domestic law,” one that “has automatic domestic effect as federal law
upon ratification,” one that “operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision,” one that “require[s]
no legislation to make [it] operative,” one that “creates binding federal law,” and one that “[has] domestic
effect of its own force,” and explaining that a non-self-executing treaty is one that “do[es] not by [itself] function as binding federal law,” one that “does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law,”
one that “can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry [it] into effect,” and one that “is not domestic
law unless Congress has enacted [an] implementing statute[]”).
302. Tim Wu, Treaties Domains, supra note 49, at 579. See also Young, supra note 49, at 108, 111
(asserting that since the first application of the principle of non-self-execution by the Supreme Court
nearly two centuries ago, “there is little consensus on how to approach these questions” and “the multiplicity of questions marching under the banner of non-self-execution makes it difficult to talk about the
issue in any sort of general way.”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of
Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1119, 1122, 1123, n. 142 (1992) [hereinafter Vázquez, TreatyBased Rights] (calling the term “self-execution” “ambiguous,” “amorphous,” and “ill-defined and little
understood” and recommending avoiding the use the term “entirely”); Wu, supra note 49, at 575 (“[T]he
rule of self-execution has been stretched beyond recognition in the twentieth century into a loose doctrine
that blocks judicial enforcement of treaties on a seemingly ad hoc basis.”); Bradley, Intent, Presumptions,
supra note 49, at 540 (“Despite its pedigree, both the theory behind the self-execution doctrine and its
mechanics have long befuddled courts and commentators. There is significant uncertainty, for example,
concerning the materials that are relevant to the self-execution analysis, whose intent should count in
determining self-executing status, the proper presumptions that should be applied with regard to self-execution, and the domestic legal status of a non-self-executing treaty.”); Remarks by Robert E. Dalton,
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties and Self-Execution and Related Doctrines, 100 AM. SOC. INT’L L. 439,
442 (2006) (“[I]t is clear that ‘self-execution’ has become an ambiguous term devoid of generally
accepted meaning.”); Myres McDougal, Remarks, 45 ASIL PROC. 102 (1951) (“The word “self-executing” is essentially meaningless and . . . the quicker we drop it from our vocabulary, the better for clarity
and understanding.”); U.S. v. Postal, 589 F.2d. 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 832 (1979)
(calling treaty (non-)self-execution the “most confounding [doctrine] in treaty law”).
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generally and somewhat imprecisely. And that is what we will do here before
digging deeper into the exact nature of the ICCPR’s non-self-executing
status.303
A few things are clear. There is little doubt that the substantive human
rights provisions of ICCPR are non-self-executing in the United States.
American courts have consistently maintained that the ICCPR is non-selfexecuting.304 The courts’ primary basis for declaring the ICCPR non-selfexecuting is the fact that the U.S. treaty makers – both the President who
ratified the treaty (George H. W. Bush) and the Senate that consented to its
ratification305 – clearly declared their intention that the substantive human
rights provisions of the ICCPR be non-self-executing.306 President Bush and
303. There has been some scholarly debate on the constitutional legitimacy of non-self-execution.
See, e.g., Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 49, at 760 (1988) (asserting that the notion of a nonself-executing treaty is a “judicially invalid notion that is patently inconsistent with express language” of
the Supremacy Clause); Gruber, supra note 49, at 71, 73, 82 (”[T]he constitutional structure requires judicial enforcement of international law” and suggesting that “the whole of self-execution law arose because
of an unfortunate treaty interpretation” and manifests itself today because of a “hostility” to the domestic
application of international law that “is not seen in our constitutional structure, early legal history or even
early treaty case law.”); Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36
COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 211, 222 (1998) (calling NSE declarations “probably unconstitutional”). See
also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion
and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. REV. 571, 575 (1991) (observing that the U.S. Constitution
“directly incorporates treaty law into the municipal order without separate action by the legislature”);
Hussain, supra note 49 (criticizing the reluctance of courts to enforce treaties and arguing the constitutional basis for doing otherwise).
304. E.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that certain provisions
of the ICCPR are non-self-executing because “[t]he Senate’s intent was clear – the treaty is not self-executing”); Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2000); White v. Paulsen, 997 F.
Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (holding that the ICCPR was not a self-executing treaty and noting
that the Senate “expressly declared” this to be so); Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1998)
(holding the ICCPR not self-executing in part due to the “Senate’s express reservation” against it). See
also Sosa v. Alvarez-Manchain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004). Courts are the authority that determine
whether a treaty (or a treaty provision) is self-executing or not. See RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 55, §§ 306(6), 310.
305. The ICCPR is an Article II treaty. Article II treaties are those that are ratified with the advice
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Executive agreements, another constitutionally authorized category of treaties, do not receive the advice and consent of the Senate. See
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (concluding that executive agreements with foreign countries
have “similar dignity” as Article II treaties). Executive agreements present a whole host of unique analytical issues and constitutional uncertainties. All the discussion of self-execution in this Article is intended
to apply to Article II treaties only.
306. See RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 55, § 310(2) (“If the
Senate’s resolution of advice and consent specifies that a treaty provision is self-exciting or non-self-executing, courts will defer to this specification.”). See also Medellı´n, supra note 294 (suggesting that
whether or not a treaty is self-executing turns on the intent of the U.S. treaty makers). See also Young, supra note 49, at 122–23 (“Self-execution is a function of the intent of federal law makers.”); Bradley,
Treaty Duality, supra note 49, at 132 (“[T]he relevant intent in discerning self-execution is the intent of
the U.S. treaty makers (that is, the President and the Senate, not the collective intent of the various parties
to the treaty).”); Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, supra note 49, at 544 (“On balance, the [Medellı´n] decision is best interpreted as endorsing an intent-of-the-U.S. approach.”). Some Supreme Court justices and
scholars, however, have challenged the notion that self-execution (or lack thereof) should be wholly or
primarily a function of the intent of the Senate and the President. In fact, Supreme Court jurisprudence of
the 19th century only tangentially considered the intent of the Senate and the President. Other factors took
precedence, including concerns with separation of powers, justiciability, and the intent of treaty parties.
Such notions justifiably persist today. See, e.g., Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 49 (providing
a list of considerations to determine whether a treaty is self-executing or not); Vázquez, Treaties as Law
of the Land, supra note 49 (same); Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 49 (same); Blair Phillips
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members of his administration repeatedly told the Senate during its debates on
ratification that those provisions of the ICCPR would not be self-executing.307
In its resolution consenting to the ratification of the ICCPR, the Senate explicitly stated that its “advice and consent is subject to the following declaration[]:
That the United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of
the Covenant are not self-executing.” 308 In fact, the US’s instrument of ratification deposited by the President makes the same declaration.309 There is
broad scholarly support for the assertion that NSE declarations (as these declarations have come to be known) establish a treaty as non-self-executing,310
Friederich, Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 238 (1968) (same); John Quigley, The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
1287, 1299 (1993) [hereinafter Quigley, The ICCPR and the Supremacy Clause] (“In determining
whether a treaty is self-executing, the courts ask whether the intent of the parties was to confer rights on
individuals.”); Riesenfeld, & Abbott, supra note 303, at 578, 608 (“Whether or not a treaty is self-executing is not a unilateral question. Whether a treaty requires municipal implementing legislation and is
intended to confer rights directly on individuals is a question of the mutual intent of the parties to the
treaty, to be determined by the language of the treaty and other indicia of intent.”); Comm. of United
States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (1988). But see Iwasawa, supra note 49
(arguing that the “intent of the parties” is not an appropriate indicator of whether or not a treaty is selfexecuting since the parties are generally not concerned with the municipal processes of domestication
(execution) in each State party); Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 49, at 149–57 (same); David
Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35, 69 (1978)
(arguing that with regard to multilateral treaties the intent of the parties and the text of the treaty should
not be used to determine whether a treaty is self-executing in the U.S.). This Article will assume that,
absent the Senate’s and President’s NSE declarations, most if not all of the substantive human rights provisions of the ICCPR – and at least Article 12.4 – would be fully self-executing. This assumption is reasonable given the following three observations. First, the self-execution of Article 12.4 does not appear to
pose any separation of powers, federalism, or other constitutional problems. Second, Article 12.4 is not
precatory nor hortatory; it is specific enough to be justiciable. And, third, there is otherwise little reason to
believe that the human rights provisions of the ICCPR, and certainly not Article 12.4, are addressed only
to the legislatures of the States parties or that the States parties otherwise intended the ICCPR to be nonself-executing. See generally Vázquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 49 (listing categories of reasons
treaties have been deemed by courts to be “non-self-executing”), Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land,
supra note 49 (same); Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 302, at 1114–33 (same); Friederich, supra note 306 (same). Indeed, the ICCPR is treated as self-executing in the vast majority of the States parties. Christopher Harland, The Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
in the Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey through United Nations Human Rights
Committee Documents, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 187 (2000). ICCPR Article 2.2 requires implementing legislation, but that provision does not indicate that the negotiating parties intended the ICCPR to be non-selfexecuting. For a discussion of Article 2.2, see supra note 297 and accompanying text.
307. See Sloss, The Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 165–69.
308. Resolution of Advice and Consent, supra note 52.
309. U.N. Status of Treaties, supra note 52.
310. RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS Law, supra note 55, § 310(2) (“If the Senate’s
resolution of advice and consent specifies that a treaty provision is self-executing or non-self-executing,
courts will defer to this specification.”). See also Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 49, at
681–83; Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 49, at 2174–75; 2183–88; Michael Van Alstine,
Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 906 (2004); Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 49, at 403–23, 439–67. But see Ramsey, supra note 49, at 1647, 1658–61 (rejecting the efficacy of NSE declarations and asserting that a treaty provision’s “non-self-executing character must arise
from the treaty itself”); Louis Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 202 (2d
ed. 1996) (arguing that the practice of non-self-execution declarations “is ‘anti-Constitutional’ in spirit
and highly problematic as a matter of law”); John Quigley, Towards a More Effective Judicial
Implementation of Treaty-Based Rights, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 552, 575 (2006) [hereinafter Quigley,
Judicial Implementation] (“The legal significance of these declarations remains unclear.”); Malvina
Halberstam, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 49, 64–70 (1997) (calling the coupling of a NSE
declaration with an intent not to enact implementing legislation “problematic as a constitutional matter”);
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and almost all American legal commentators who have opined on the subject
have asserted that the ICCPR is non-self-executing (to at least some extent).311
Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” and “Non-SelfExecuting” Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. REV. 515, 527 (1991) (“[A] Senate’s declaration purporting to negate the legal effect of otherwise self-executing treaty provisions is constitutionally questionable. . . ”);
Charles H. Dearborn III, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations That Treaty Provisions Are Non-SelfExecuting, 57 TEX. L. REV. 233, 233–34 (1979) (arguing that NSE declarations “are of dubious validity,
probably have no binding effect on United States courts, and should not be used as aids in construing the
treaties.”); Quigley, The ICCPR and the Supremacy Clause, supra note 306, at 1302–07 (arguing that the
validity of NSE declarations is “doubtful”); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 303, at 631 (asserting that
despite the U.S. treaty makers’ NSE declarations domestic courts would deem most of the substantive
provisions of the Torture Convention self-executing “because the Torture Convention does not otherwise
suggest the necessity for the enactment of subsequent legislation to bring its protection into force”);
Weissbrodt, supra note 306, at 71 (“Because much of the language of the [human rights] Covenants
denotes self-execution, and because self-execution provides an effective means of enforcement, it is
improper for the United States to assert a declaration that categorically denies that effect. Just as United
States courts have examined each article of the United Nations Charter separately to determine its selfexecuting effect, so too should the courts be allowed to consider each Article of the [ICCPR].”); Report
of the Committee on Human Rights, Annex D, Committee Letter to Senator Claiborne Pell, Dec. 11,
1991, PROCS. & COMM. REPS. OF THE AM. BRANCH OF THE INT’L LAW ASS’N, 1991-1992, at 111 n. 26
(“[It] well may be that a non-self-executing declaration . . . does not bind the judicial branch.”) cited in
Paust, Avoiding ‘Fraudulent’ Executive Policy, supra note 49, at n.29.
When the U.S. treaty makers do not make any NSE declarations (or SE declarations), it is more difficult to discern their intent, and there is much judicial and scholarly debate (and confusion) about how
courts should discern what the U.S. treaty makers intended, if anything, with regard to the self-execution
of such a treaty. The five-justice Supreme Court majority in Medellı´n v. Texas stated that the intent of the
Senate and the President is found by examining the text of the treaty itself. Medellı́n, supra note 294, at
519 (“[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions indicate that the President
and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”). See also Nelson, supra note 49 (asserting that NSE status can be discerned from the text of a treaty). This method of using a treaty’s text to discern U.S. treaty makers’ intent has justifiably garnered widespread criticism. Critics note that the issue of
self-execution is a function of municipal law and each State party has its own municipal rules governing
whether a treaty is, to use our American term, “self-executing.” In some countries, all treaties are selfexecuting. In others, none are. In the United States, some treaty provisions are self-executing and others
are not. Among this latter group of countries, what distinguishes self-executing provisions from non-selfexecuting provisions vary. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the intent of our American federal
political branches would be expressed at all within the text of a treaty. This observation is especially true
for multilateral treaties. Critics also note that with regard to many multilateral treaties, often many States
parties do not participate in the negotiation and adoption of the text of the treaty. It would be impossible
for those states to have included any evidence of their own self-executory intentions within the treaty’s
text. Indeed, the text of the ICCPR was adopted by the international community in December 1966, two
and a half decades before the Senate consented to its ratification and the President ratified it. The text of
Article 12.4 was adopted in 1959, seven years earlier than the adoption of the entire ICCPR. ICCPR
Preparatory Works SR.959, supra note 199, ¶ 27. For critical commentaries on the Medellin decision,
see, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Less than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (2008); Sloss, Taming
Madison’s Monster, supra note 49, at 1703–27 (The Court’s “treaty interpretation analysis in Medellı´n is
akin to analyzing regulations promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to answer a
question about California tort law . . . [The Court’s] approach . . . induced [it] to perform a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a question that the treaty does not answer.”); David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v.
Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J. 135, 182–87
(2012) (calling the Medellı´n opinion “inscrutable”); Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, supra note 49;
Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 49, at 164–81; Quigley, A Tragi-Comedy, supra note 49. But see
Moore, Law(makers) of the Land, supra note 49 (generally defending Medellı´n). For a discussion of how
some scholars reject the notion that self-execution turns on the intent of the U.S. treaty makers, see supra
note 306.
311. E.g., Sloss, The Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 165–69; Goldsmith, supra note 295, at
331; Henkin, The Ghost, supra note 300; Buergenthal, supra note 303, at 222, n. 36. But see Paust,
Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy, supra note 49; Halberstam, supra note 310, at 64; Quigley, The
ICCPR and the Supremacy Clause, supra note 306, at 1302–04; David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing
Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1, 46–55 (2002) [hereinafter Sloss, A
Constitutional Fallacy]; Louis N. Schultze, Jr., The United States’ Detention of Refugees: Evidence of

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628600

2020] THE ICCPR, NON-SELF-EXECUTION,

AND

DACA RECIPIENTS 379

There is also no doubt that the treaty would have “domestic effect” if
Congress were to pass implementing legislation.312 To the best of my knowledge, Congress has not passed any legislation for the express purpose of
implementing any ICCPR human rights provision.313 It certainly has not
passed any legislation that expressly provides aliens the possibility of enjoying the rights articulated in Article 12.4.314
Since the ICCPR is non-self-executing and has not been implemented by
Congress, many courts and commentators are quick to deem the ICCPR irrelevant.315 As such, Article 12.4 would be deemed wholly unhelpful to noncitizen Americans facing removal. Indeed, the NSE status of the ICCPR does
render the ICCPR much less relevant as a source of enforceable individual
the Senate’s Flawed Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 641 (1997) (arguing that courts should deem the ICCPR to be
self-executing despite the Senate’s and President’s NSE declarations). See also supra note 310 (citing
scholars who challenge the effectiveness of NSE declarations).
312. After implementing legislation is enacted, the source of law municipally would be the federal
statute, not the treaty itself. Formally, the treaty, even after being so implemented, would remain nonself-executing.
313. To the extent any federal statutes provide individual rights, the passage of such statutes has not
been motivated by any deliberate intent on the part of Congress to implement ICCPR rights qua ICCPR
rights.
314. All aliens enjoy some degree of constitutional and statutory protections, lawful permanent residents enjoying the most. See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 97, 100–
01 (1903) (stating that undocumented aliens have due process rights); Wang Yang Sung v. McGrath, 39
U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950) (“It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may
be expelled only after proceedings conforming to the traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due
process of law.”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, et al., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY
1299 (2016) (noting that lawfully admitted noncitizens “largely enjoy the same rights as citizens”).
315. E.g., Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (conclusorily dismissing, in an action challenging the inability of Puerto Ricans to vote for the President, an argument based on
the ICCPR’s provision stating that every citizen shall have the “right to vote” as being “without merit”);
Roman-Nose v. New Mexico Dep’t. of Human Servs., 967 F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 1992) (expressing
that it did not “know of any manner by which Plaintiff can obtain relief from state actions which violate
international treaties.”); Ralk v. Lincoln Country, Georgia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000)
(“[B]ecause the ICCPR is not self-executing, [the plaintiff] can advance no private right of action under
that document.”); Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27, 43 (D. Mass. 1999); White v. Paulsen, 997 F.
Supp. 1380, 1386–87 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (in addition to referring to the NSE declarations, finding that
based on the text of the ICCPR “it is apparent that the parties to the ICCPR did not intend for its provisions to be self-executing in the sense of automatically creating a private right of action cognizable by
citizens of a State”); In the Matter of the Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 802 n. 17 (D. Conn.
1997); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d. 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]the ICCPR does not create judicially-enforceable individual rights. Treaties affect United States law only if they are self-executing or otherwise given effect by congressional legislation . . . Therefore, the ICCPR is not binding on
federal courts.”); Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004)) (dismissing an ICCPR claim because the ICCPR “was ratified ‘on
the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable
in the federal courts’”); Hurtado v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 401 F. App’x 453, 456 (11th Cir. 2010) (declaring that
the ICCPR has “no effect in federal courts”). See also Goldsmith, supra note 295, at 328–29 (citing seven
court cases in which parties asserted ICCPR rights and how the courts rejected each of them “usually
without consideration of their merits” because of the NSE declaration); Catherine Powell, Dialogic
Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 245, 259 (2001) (“[M]ost courts refuse to view international law claims as relevant to the
resolution of specific cases.”); Cole, supra note 25, at 629 (observing that when human rights arguments
are presented, “they are as often as not ignored or summarily dismissed”); Peter J. Spiro, The States and
International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 567 (1997) (stating that the U.S. ratification conditions “limit[] the scope of ratification to existing U.S. practice, rendering acceptance a largely hollow,
falsely symbolic act”).
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rights than it would be if the ICCPR were self-executing (or if Congress were
to pass implementing legislation).316
However, the ICCPR is not irrelevant. A more sophisticated understanding
appreciates that even NSE treaties have power as international obligations of
the United States317 and as one of the supreme laws of the land pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause.318 A more sophisticated understanding also leads us
to ask what “non-self-executing” really means. And what does it mean for an
NSE treaty to be the supreme law of the land? What did the U.S. treaty makers really intend? Regarding the legal status of the ICCPR within the domestic context of the United States, it seems that the U.S. treaty makers
316. It should come as no surprise that there is considerable debate about the desirability of non-selfexecution, especially with regard to human rights treaties. For commentary lamenting non-self-execution,
see, e.g., Henkin, The Ghost, supra note 300, at 346–49 (characterizing the Senate’s and Executive’s
recent hostility to international law as an “ideological infection”); Damrosch, supra note 310, at 518
(“[T]he trend towards non-self-executing treaty declarations is unfortunate and should be resisted.”);
Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy, supra note 49, at 1283 (“[T]he attempted non-self-execution policy is far worse than abnegative and absurd; it brings serious dishonor to the United States and
should be abandoned.”); Gruber, supra note 49, at 66 (lamenting that the modern self-execution doctrine
appears to be largely driven by “a belief that international and foreign law is illegitimate”); Quigley,
Judicial Implementation, supra note 310; Buergenthal, supra note 303, at 221 (calling it “sad” that the
Senate has denied U.S. courts the opportunity to enforce human rights treaties). Others applaud the ability
of the political branches to declare treaties non-self-executing, particularly human rights treaties. E.g.,
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 49, at 402 (“. . .[RUDs] help bridge the political divide between isolationists who want to preserve the United States’ sovereign prerogatives, and internationalists who want
the United States to increase its involvement in international institutions. . . .”); Stewart, supra note 283,
at 1189 (observing that extensive RUDs were necessary to ensure there would be enough political support
for the ratification of the ICCPR); Sloss, The Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 171–88 (observing
that the U.S. treaty makers insisted on reservations so as to better ensure U.S. compliance with its ICCPR
obligations); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169 (1993) (presenting a relatively
sympathetic understanding of the US’s apparent hypocrisy and recalcitrance to commit to international
(human rights) norms).
317. Supra notes 291–298 and accompanying text.
318. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 49, at 140–48 (arguing that
NSE status never affects a treaty’s status as the “supreme Law of the Land”); Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
supra note 310, at 203 (“Whether a treaty is self-executing or not . . .. it is supreme law of the land.”);
Ramsey, supra note 49, at 1639, 1641–42 (dismissing the assertion that NSE treaties are not the supreme
law of the land as an assertion that is “not a possible reading of the Constitution’s text”); Jordan Paust,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 67–80 (2003) (discussing legal effects of NSE
treaties); Iwasawa, supra note 49, at 645 (“U.S. courts have consistently recognized that provisions of
constitutions and statutes are the law of the land, whether or not they are self-executing. Non-self-executing treaty provisions should not be treated any differently.”); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in
Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 316 (1992) (asserting that a treaty
may be the supreme law of the land even though it may not be directly enforceable in courts); Sloss, The
Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 148 (“The fact that [a treaty] provision is not directly applicable
by the judiciary . . . does not mean that it is without domestic legal force.”); Nelson, supra note 49 at 805
(“[T]reaties can be the ‘supreme Law of the Land’ without being self-executing in American courts.”);
See also, Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 302, at 1122 (accusing courts that conclude that NSE
treaties are not the law of the land as coming to “facile” conclusions and calling their analyses “cavalier”);
Sloss, A Constitutional Fallacy, supra note 311, at 38 n.169 (citing several court decisions concluding
that the ICCPR is the supreme law of the land despite its NSE status). But see Halberstam, supra note
310, at 65 (“A treaty that is not self-executing is not the supreme law of the land.”); Nelson, supra note
49, at 808–10 (suggesting that since the nation’s treatment of its own citizens has “not traditionally been
the subject of international agreements,” modern human rights treaties “might . . . lie beyond the scope of
the treatymaking power and hence [might] not automatically become part of the ‘Law of the Land’ under
our federal Constitution”). See also supra note 38 (discussing how international law is part of American
law).
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envisioned a particular NSE status. Outside this particular NSE status, the
ICCPR has legal force and relevance. In fact, depending on the exact content
of the non-self-executory nature of the ICCPR in the United States, the executive and the judiciary might at times be permitted – or even obligated – to
act in light of Article 12.4.319 What follows is a more detailed analysis of the
nature of the ICCPR’s NSE status and, based on that nature, a description of
other ways the ICCPR has (or might have) actual municipal legal force.
2.

A More Detailed Understanding of Non-Self-Execution – the Sloss
Model

When we say that a treaty is “non-self-executing,” as we do with the
ICCPR, it means, loosely speaking, that it has limited or no effect as
American municipal law. But for our purposes, it is inadequate to say simply
that a treaty is non-self-executing. That term is too ambiguous. More precision is necessary because a treaty can operate within many different

319. If there were customary international law prohibiting a nation from arbitrarily depriving someone of their right to enter their own country, the U.S. would be bound to apply such law independently of
the ICCPR, and a host of implementation problems that result from the ICCPR’s NSE status go away. But
other somewhat unsettled legal issues might impede its application (e.g., locating the status of CIL within
the legal hierarchy of American laws, especially its relationship to federal statutory law; the ability (or
lack thereof) of the executive branch to repudiate CIL through so-called “controlling executive acts”).
However, there appears to be no reason to conclude that such a customary international law exists. Even
though it may be that the general practice of states is to refrain from expelling Dreamer-type people from
their territories, there is no apparent evidence whatsoever that states refrain from such deportations out of
a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on the Identification
of Customary Int’l Law, U.N. DOC. A/73/10 (2018). On the contrary, states generally assert their sovereign right to deport any non-citizen for whatever reason. In fact, Australia and Canada, the two countries
that were subject to the HRC’s Nystrom and Warsame decisions, respectively, refused to accept those
decisions. Australia deported Mr. Nystrom, and Canada deported Mr. Warsame. See supra note 229. But
see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 54, at art. 13.2 (“Everyone has the right to leave
any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”) (emphasis added); G.A. Res. 71/1 New
York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, ¶ 42 (Oct. 3, 2016) (“We reaffirm that everyone has the
right . . . to return to his or her own country.”) (emphasis added); Global Compact for Migration, Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration ¶ 37 (July 11, 2018) (referring to “the human right to
return to one’s own country and the obligation of States to readmit their own nationals”) (emphasis
added); Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Human Rights Declaration ¶ 15 (“Every person has
the right to leave any country including his or her own, and to return to his or her country.”) (emphasis
added); Org. of African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights art. 12.2
(June 27, 1981) (“Every individual shall have the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.”) (emphasis added); Org. of Islamic Conference, Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam art. 12 (Aug. 5, 1990) (“Every man shall have the right, within the framework of the
Shari’ah, to free movement and to select his place of residence whether within or outside his country
. . ..”) (emphasis added). See also, Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights art. 22.5, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR] (“No one can
be expelled from the territory of the state of which he is a national or be deprived of the right to enter it.”)
(emphasis added); Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and
in the first Protocol thereto art. 3.1, Sept. 16, 1963, C.E.T.S. No. 46 [hereinafter ECHR] (prohibiting
States parties from expelling anyone “from the territory of the State of which he is a national”) (emphasis
added); Id. at art. 3.2 (“No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the state in which he
is a national.”) (emphasis added); League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 22 (Sept.
15, 1994) (“No citizen shall be expelled from his country or prevented from returning thereto.”) (emphasis
added). It is notable that both the ACHR and the ECHR provide a right of remaining and a right of return
only to nationals, and the Arab Charter provides similar rights only to citizens.
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municipal contexts, and a treaty that everyone refers to as “non-self-executing” may be non-self-executing within some of those contexts and fully selfexecuting in others.320 With any given NSE treaty, it is necessary to discern
the exact extent to which it is not self-executing. The contexts in which a
treaty is void of legal effect, that is to say, the extent to which it is non-selfexecuting, depends on the intentions of the U.S. treaty makers – the Senate
that consented to its ratification and the President who ratified it.321
Before going further down this path, it is useful to list some of the contexts
in which a treaty might have municipal legal effect. Imagine a fully selfexecuting treaty. A fully self-executing treaty occupies the same level in the
American legal hierarchy and has the same domestic legal effect as federal
statutes.322 Like federal statutes, a self-executing treaty supersedes conflicting state law. Like federal statutes, a self-executing treaty supersedes conflicting earlier-in-time federal statutes.323 Like federal statutes, a selfexecuting treaty might restrict the executive branch’s behavior or obligate
the executive branch to behave in certain ways. Like federal statutes, a selfexecuting treaty might authorize the executive branch to behave in ways not
previously authorized. Like federal statutes, a self-executing treaty might
restrict the behaviors of private entities or obligate them to behave in certain
ways. Like federal statutes, a self-executing treaty might authorize private
entities to behave in ways previously restricted by earlier laws. Courts can
interpret and enforce self-executing treaties just as they interpret and enforce
federal statutes.324 Within the sphere of the judicial processes, a self-executing treaty, like a federal statute, might create a private cause of action and it
might provide certain judicially enforceable individual rights. And, as they
do with federal statutes, courts could employ a self-executing treaty to discern policy and/or interpret other laws.325 But, a non-self-executing treaty
320. Sloss, The Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 134. (“The term ‘not self-executing,’ when
applied to treaty provisions, has multiple meanings.”). An understanding that self-execution may operate
on different planes besides on the political-judicial concept is an understanding that is often lost or
ignored in treaty self-execution scholarship. See e.g., Nelson, supra note 49, at 817 (equating self-execution to mean simply “provid[ing] rules of decision applicable in American courts”).
321. See supra notes 304–311 and accompanying text.
322. See Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1988) (citing Reid v. Covert, 345 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)
(“[A]n Act of Congress . . . is on full parity with a treaty.”)); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888) (“By the Constitution a treaty is placed upon the same footing, and made of like obligation, with
an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given either over the other.”); RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra
note 55, § 309(2). A non-self-executing treaty also occupies the same level on the legal hierarchy. But
see, Quigley, Judicial Implementation, supra note 310, at 582–85 (suggesting the possibility that treaties
“might occupy a rank a step above that of an Act of Congress”).
323. It would also supersede, within the municipal and international spheres, conflicting earlier-intime treaties. See VCLT, supra note 55, at art. 30.
324. RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 55, §§ 301(2), 306(6).
325. Like federal statutes, a self-executing treaty (indeed, all treaties) are subject to the Constitution.
See Vázquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 49, at 718–19 (describing how some scholars and courts
label treaties that conflict with the Constitution or are otherwise limited in effect because of the
Constitution “non-self-executing”); RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 55,
at § 310(3) (explaining that a treaty provision shall be deemed non-self-executing “to the extent that
implementing legislation is constitutionally required”).
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lacks the legal authority to function in one or more of these ways. The extent
to which a non-self-executing treaty fails to function in such ways, that is to
say, the extent to which it is non-self-executing,326 depends on the intentions
of the U.S. treaty makers.
Professor David Sloss has identified three broad categories that a treaty
can be non-self-executing.327 A treaty can be non-self-executing pursuant to
what he terms the “political-judicial concept,” the “congressional-executive
concept,” and/or the “federal-state concept.”328 Any given NSE treaty (like
the ICCPR) is non-self-executing pursuant to one, two, or all three of these
concepts. It all depends on the intention of the Senate and the President.329
Professor Sloss’ political-judicial concept concerns situations where courts
are limited in their ability to enforce treaties.330 Professor Sloss has identified
three political-judicial concept variants – the “private right of action” variant,
the “no private enforcement” variant, and the “no judicial enforcement” variant.331 A treaty that is non-self-executory to the extent of the private right of
action variant (or what I will call the “no private right of action” variant) creates no private cause of action. In other words, no one would be permitted to
maintain a lawsuit alleging a violation of an ostensible treaty right. However,
under this variant, a defendant in an action initiated by the government or
another party could defend themselves with reference to a treaty provision.

326. Often it is inaccurate to say that a particular treaty is self-executing or not-self-executing since
it is possible for some provisions of a treaty to be self-executing and other provisions not to be. This observation points to another dimension of complexity. See Vázquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 49, at
722.
327. Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster, supra note 49, at 1695. Other scholars have articulated
frameworks to understand the principles of treaty (non-)self-execution. E.g., Vázquez, The Four
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 49; Wu, supra note 49. My decision to choose Professor
Sloss’ framework is based in part on its persuasiveness and in part because it lays out a fruitful framework
for identifying the multitude of ways an NSE treaty (or NSE treaty provision) can still matter, legally and
otherwise, qualities that are useful for this project.
328. Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster, supra note 49, at 1691. See also Vázquez, Four Problems,
supra note 49, at 1761–97 (arguing that treaty non-self-execution is not always about judicial
enforcement).
329. See supra notes 304–311 and accompanying text. Lest one simply assume that the President
and the Senate always intend their NSE declarations to extend to the maximum extent possible, Professor
Sloss reminds us that the Senate and the President consider it very important that the United States comply with its treaty obligations, including its obligations under human rights treaties. See Sloss, The
Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 178–83. This policy objective would be undermined whenever it
is discovered that a treaty with maximum NSE scope provides for human rights protections that municipal
law does not already provide. Simply assuming a maximum NSE scope does not do justice to their intention to comply with treaties since opportunities to domestically enforce such treaty provisions contribute
to treaty compliance. See id. at 182. Professor Sloss also highlights examples of Senate ratification consent resolutions where it made NSE declarations clearly demonstrating that it intended the NSE effect to
be partial or that it understood the phrase “non-self-executing” itself to be limited in scope. For example,
Professor Sloss highlights three NSE declarations made by the Senate in 2008. These NSE declarations
were substantially equivalent to the following: “This Protocol is self-executing. This Protocol does not
confer private rights enforceable in United States courts.” Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster, supra note
49, at 1700.
330. See Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster, supra note 49, at 1695 (“Under the political-judicial
concept, self-executing (SE) treaty provisions are judicially enforceable, but courts may not directly apply
NSE treaty provisions unless Congress enacts implementing legislation.”).
331. Id. at 1745.
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The “no private enforcement” variant prohibits courts from entertaining any
claims by any private entity either offensively or defensively.332 However,
courts can enforce such a treaty provided the action is brought by the federal
government.333 The “no judicial enforcement” variant goes further than each
of the other two political-judicial variants. If a treaty is NSE to the extent of
the no judicial enforcement variant, then courts would be barred from directly
enforcing the treaty in all cases, regardless of the litigants.334
Professor Sloss’ congressional-executive concept concerns the effect of a
treaty on the executive branch. This concept comprises two variants. Under
the first variant, what I will refer to as the “strong” congressional-executive
variant, the U.S. treaty makers explicitly prohibit the President and the rest of
the executive branch from carrying out the US’s treaty obligations.335
Pursuant to this type of non-self-execution, the President is permitted to carry
out the US’s treaty obligations only if Congress authorizes it via legislation.
Under the second variant, what I will call the “weak” congressional-executive concept, the U.S. treaty makers intend to shield the President from any
legal obligation that would otherwise be imposed by a treaty.336 Pursuant to
the weak variant, the President comes under a municipal legal obligation to
adhere to a treaty obligation only if the Congress subsequently requires it via
legislation. The difference between the two variants can be summarized as
follows: under the strong variant, the executive branch must not carry out the
US’s treaty obligations,337 while under the weak variant, the executive branch
is permitted, but not required, to carry out the country’s treaty obligations.338
332. Id. at 1739. The “no private enforcement” variant encompasses the “no private right of action”
variant.
333. Id. at 1739.
334. Id. at 1720, 1745–46. Professor Sloss asserts that the no judicial enforcement variant and the no
private enforcement variant may be unconstitutional since they could violate the due process rights of a
defendant facing state criminal charges who might otherwise be able to invoke treaty provisions in their
defense. See Sloss, Treaty Preemption Defense, supra note 49; David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties
in the Draft Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, JUST SECURITY (May 18, 2015), https://www.
justsecurity.org/23073/non-self-executing-treaties-draft-restatement-foreign-relations-law/. But see
Bradley, Treaty Duality, supra note 49, at 137-40 (defending the constitutionality of such NSE).
335. Professor Sloss states that the congressional-executive concept describes the situation under
which “congressional legislation is necessary to authorize federal executive action.” Sloss, Taming
Madison’s Monster, supra note 49, at 1696. I assume he means that in this situation the Senate has effectively prohibited the President from carrying out the United States’ treaty obligations through executive
action (i.e., the “strong” variant).
336. See Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster, supra note 49, at n. 23. In this footnote, I understand
Professor Sloss to be describing the weak congressional-executive variant, the situation where the U.S.
treaty makers shield the President, municipally, from the legal obligations that would otherwise be
imposed by the treaty.
337. It is vital to understand here that any prohibition against executing a treaty is only a prohibition
from the point of view of domestic institutions, most relevantly, American courts. In other words, it is
only a prohibition within the municipal sphere. So from the point of view of U.S. courts, who are bound
by constitutional federal law, the President must not execute such a treaty, at least not until the Congress
authorizes him to do so or requires him to do so. Such a treaty is still binding on the United States within
the international sphere, however. No amount of non-self-execution can diminish that. See supra notes
291–294 and accompanying text.
338. This shielding exists within the municipal sphere, so American courts cannot demand that the
President carry out such a treaty. But, by the same token, American courts cannot declare that the
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The congressional-executive concept (in either variant) might appear to be
in conflict with the Take Care Clause. It is not. The Supremacy Clause states
that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States” are the “supreme Law of the Land,”339 and the Take Care
Clause requires the President to “take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”340 But if a treaty is “supreme Law of the Land,” how can it be that the
President might be prohibited or excused from executing it? The short answer
is that even though all treaties are the supreme law of the land for purposes of
the Supremacy Clause, a treaty that is non-self-executing under the congressional-executive concept is not “Law” for purposes of the Take Care
Clause.341 It is not “Law” under the Take Care Clause because the legislative
authority that ratified the treaty, i.e., the U.S. treaty makers, intended it not to
be. A legislative body can decide for itself the nature and scope of its laws’
obligations. Just as Congress can enact a federal statute that does not obligate
the President to act in any way, the U.S. treaty makers can ratify a treaty
while shielding him from any obligation to execute it (the weak variant). Just
as the Congress could theoretically pass a federal statute that demands the
President refrain from executing it, the U.S. treaty makers can ratify a treaty
and simultaneously prohibit the President from executing it (the strong
variant).342

President is violating any principles of municipal law if he does act to carry out the treaty. But see
Medellı´n, supra note 294, at 527 (stating that a non-self-executing treaty “precludes the assertion that
Congress has implicitly authorized the President – acting on his own – to. . . . unilaterally make treaty
obligations binding on domestic courts”). Medellı´n might seem to suggest that the President is prohibited
from implementing the provisions of any non-self-executing treaty without legislative authorization, but
to the extent such an interpretation is plausible, the facts in Medellı´n can be distinguished from any
attempt by the executive branch to implement Article 12.4 of the ICCPR since there was a federalism concern in Medellı´n, one that would not be an obstacle in the implementation of Article 12.4 and the enforcement of U.S. immigration law.
339. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
340. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
341. The Supremacy Clause says nothing about how the United States is supposed to implement its
treaty obligations. Implementation need not necessarily be the President’s responsibility.
342. The U.S. treaty makers may have many reasons for forbidding the President from enforcing a
treaty. They might want the bicameral legislative process to pass detailed implementing legislation, and
until that happens, the U.S. treaty makers might prefer that the President refrain from taking any action
that might frustrate congressional-mandated implementation mechanisms. Another way of approaching
this issue is to imagine that the day after the U.S. treaty makers ratify a fully self-executing treaty, the
Congress passes a federal statute forbidding the President from executing it. There is no doubt in this
case, then, that despite the fact that the treaty is still the supreme law of the land, and still obligates the
U.S. internationally, and might still be self-executing in all other ways, the Take Care Clause would not
demand that the President execute the treaty. Quite the contrary, the Take Care Clause would demand that
the President refrain from executing the treaty. Note, too, that in the alternative, a legislative body could
simply choose to pass no law at all, in which case there clearly is no a law for the President to faithfully
execute. Or the Congress can change the text of a proposed law until it has the legal scope Congress
wants. In the case of a treaty, especially a multilateral treaty, the U.S. treaty makers have limited ability to
change the text. Indeed, if the language of the treaty is already adopted, the U.S. treaty makers cannot
change the text at all (though they can make reservations). The UN General Assembly adopted the text of
the ICCPR’s text in 1966. The U.S. ratified it in 1992, twenty-six years later. Furthermore, there is rarely
reason to embed within the text of a treaty, especially a multilateral treaty, any explicit language that
explains the scope of municipal implementation within and by the United States. For more discussion of
the use of a treaty’s text to discern whether a treaty is self-executing or not, see supra note 310. The ability
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Finally, under Professor Sloss’ federal-state concept, the provisions of a
non-self-executing treaty do not supersede conflicting state law.343 Under the
federal-state concept, the nature of the legal obligation that would otherwise
be imposed upon the states by this “supreme Law of the Land” would be nonexistent.344
B.

The Non-Self-Executing Status of the ICCPR

As discussed above, the substantive human rights provisions of ICCPR are
non-self-executing in the United States.345 But the U.S. treaty makers were
less clear about the extent they intended those provisions to be non-selfexecuting. It is non-self-executing to the extent of one or more of these concepts (and variants). Which concepts (and variants) depend on the intention
of the Senate that consented to the ratification of the ICCPR and the intention
of the President who ratified it.
The Senate’s ratification resolution and the United States’ instrument of
ratification provide little guidance in determining the exact nature of the
ICCPR’s non-self-executing status since both of these documents merely
state, “Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing” without
further elaboration.346 The best source of evidence of the U.S. treaty makers’
intentions is what was communicated by Senators, the President, and other
executive branch officials during the debates surrounding the Senate’s advice
and consent process.
After extensively researching these debates, Professor Sloss347 has concluded that the ICCPR is non-self-executing at least to the extent of the no
private right of action variant of the political-judicial concept,348 and it may
to regulate or tailor the extent of a treaty’s municipal effect with SE/NSE declarations enables the U.S. to
enter more treaties that it otherwise would. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 49.
343. Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster, supra note 49, at 1696 (“Under the federal-state concept, an
SE treaty automatically supersedes conflicting state laws; no legislation is necessary to give the treaty preemptive effect. Conversely, an NSE treaty does not automatically supersede conflicting state laws.”).
Professor Sloss states that the use of the federal-state concept emerged only in the 1950s in response to
the advent of modern international human rights treaties. Id. at 1703.
344. At first blush, the federal-state concept may not seem relevant for the purposes of Article 12.4
of the ICCPR since the states have no constitutional authority to admit or deport aliens. Therefore, any
immigration rules that might be imposed by the ICCPR would never conflict with state law – for there is
no state law on the subject. However, for our purposes here, this understanding is incorrect. For if it were
the case, for example, that Congress and the President intended the ICCPR to be non-self-executing only
to the extent of the federal-state concept – a concept that makes sense in regards to other ICCPR rights
(e.g., the freedom of religion) – then the ICCPR would have some municipal force. For example, it would
obligate the President and the rest of the executive branch, and courts could enforce it against the executive branch.
345. See supra notes 304–311 and accompanying text.
346. Supra notes 308–309.
347. It is notable that from 1984 to 1993, Professor Sloss worked in the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, where he participated in the executive branch’s efforts to obtain Senate advice and
consent for the ratification of three major arms control treaties. Sloss, The Domestication of IHR, supra
note 49, at 129.
348. Id. at 152–96. Professor Sloss notes that in its letter to the Senate’s Foreign Relations
Committee asking for advice and consent to the ratification of the ICCPR, the Bush administration
explained that “[t]he intent of [the NSE declaration] is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private
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extend so far as to include the no judicial enforcement variant.349 There
appears to be no evidence in those debates, however, that the Senate or
the President specifically intended the NSE declarations to include the
congressional-executive concept (either variant) or the federal-state concept.350 In fact, in its first report to the Human Rights Committee, a report in
which the United States described the implementation status of the ICCPR,
the United States wrote that the NSE declaration “did not limit the international obligations of the United States under the Covenant. Rather, it means
that, as a matter of domestic law, the Covenant does not, by itself, create private rights directly enforceable in U.S. courts.”351 The United States made no
reference to any other limitations within the municipal sphere.352
cause of action in U.S. courts.” Id. at 166, citing to Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., Int’l Covenant on Civ.
and Pol. Rts: Rep., S. Exec. Rep. no. 102–23, at 19 (1992)). Taming Madison’s Monster, supra note 49, at
1719 (“Congress and the executive branch explained [the ICCPR declaration] in accordance with the [no]
private right of action doctrine . . .”) (emphasis in the original). Professor Sloss notes that the NSE declaration made by the Clinton Administration when it ratified the Race Convention is worded identically to
the ICCPR’s NSE Declaration, and since the Clinton Administration “clearly and consistently explained
the NSE declaration for the Race Convention in terms of the ‘private cause of action’ concept,” Professor
Sloss suggests that this is evidence that the ICCPR’s NSE declaration is merely meant to mean the same
thing – that the ICCPR would not create any private causes of action. Id. at 168–71. Professor Sloss also
argues that there is reason to think that the U.S. treaties makers assumed that American municipal law
(constitutional and statutory) already provided all the rights provided in the ICCPR (except those ICCPR
provisions for which the U.S. made reservations). Consequently, there was no need for the establishment
of additional causes of action to protect those rights. This observation, then, serves as the justification for
the U.S. treaty makers’ intention that the ICCPR be non-self-executing to the extent it would not create
private causes of action. Id. at 183–93 (noting that under this assumption, “the NSE declarations would
have no effect on U.S. compliance with international treaty obligations because every claimant entitled to
relief under a treaty would obtain that relief on the basis of some other redundant provision of U.S. law”).
See also supra note 295 and accompanying text.
349. As Professor Sloss explains, the U.S. treaty makers, specifically the Bush Administration, often
explained the ICCPR’s NSE status in terms of the no private right of action variant, but they were not consistent in doing so. Sometimes they explained it in terms of the no judicial enforcement variant. Sloss,
The Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 147–49, 167, 212–13 (“At times, the Bush Administration
explained [its ICCPR] NSE declaration in accordance with the “private cause of action” concept of nonself-execution. At other times, the Bush administration explained the NSE declaration in accordance with
the Foster concept,” i.e., that the treaty “has domestic legal force but cannot be applied directly by the judiciary”). Professor Sloss notes that at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard
Schifter, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs read a prepared
statement that ambiguously described the proposed non-self-executing status of the ICCPR to mean that
“the ICCPR provisions, when ratified, will not by themselves create private rights enforceable in U.S.
courts.” Id. at 166 (quoting from Int’l Covenant on Civ. and Pol. Rts: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Foreign Rel., U.S. Senate, 102d Cong., at 80 (1991), and noting that “[i]n his oral statement, Mr. Schifter
repeated this language almost verbatim”).
350. See Int’l Covenant on Civ. and Pol. Rts.: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel., U.S.
Senate, 102d Cong., at 80 (1991) [hereinafter ICCPR Senate Hearing] (quoting the Bush Administration
as stating, “Under the Supremacy Clause, ratified treaties are the law of the land, equivalent to federal
statutes . . . Consequently, properly ratified treaties can and do supersede inconsistent domestic law. In
interpreting the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court has long distinguished between treaties that are
self-executing and those which are not, the latter being said not to create directly enforceable rights absent
subsequent implementing legislation. With respect to the [ICCPR], the Administration has proposed to
declare Articles 1–27 non-self-executing.”).
351. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties, USA, supra note 293, ¶ 8. (emphasis
added).
352. Given that there is ambiguity as to whether the NSE declarations are meant to only encompass
the no private right of action variant or the much broader no judicial enforcement variant, the Charming
Betsy canon may come into play. That canon would dictate that courts interpret the NSE declarations in
the narrowest way, i.e., only to the extent to which the U.S. treaty makers’ intent is quite evident since
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Many other commentators have concurred with this conclusion.353 I have
scoured the scholarly literature about these debates and have found no scholars who have looked as closely at the ratification history of the ICCPR and
concluded differently.354
If this analysis is correct, then the human rights obligations of the ICCPR
functions as municipal law for the executive branch355 and the ICCPR supersedes any conflicting state law. However, it also means that no one can pursue a claim in a court asserting a cause of action created by the ICCPR, and it
may be that no one can assert an ICCPR right as a defense in any judicial
action against them either.
C.

Legal Significance of the ICCPR for the Executive Branch

Since the US treaty makers’ ICCPR NSE declaration appears to exclude
the congressional-executive concept, the ICCPR is law for the executive
branch. Therefore, except to the extent later-in-time conflicting federal statutes exist, the executive branch, including DHS and the DOJ, is bound by
Article 12.4. And most certainly the executive branch is authorized to exercise discretion to choose to adhere to our article 12.4 obligations.

such an interpretation would least interfere with U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations. Here, then,
the court would interpret the NSE declarations in terms of the no private right of action variant. To the
extent that there might be ambiguity regarding whether the NSE declarations were meant to include the
congressional-executive and/or the federal-state concepts, the Charming Betsy canon would likewise dictate that those declarations only include the political-judicial concept. See Sloss, The Domestication of
IHR, supra note 49, at 213 (“[The Charming Betsy doctrine] applies with even greater force when interpreting a declaration included in the U.S. instrument of ratification for a treaty, because, in the words of
Justice Harlan, ‘it would be wanting in proper respect for the intelligence and patriotism of a co-ordinate
department of the government” for a court to assume that the very instrument in which the United States
accepted international treaty obligations manifested an intention to violate that treaty, unless no other
interpretation is possible. Thus, in cases where a defendant seeks to invoke a human rights treaty as a
defense to civil or criminal charges brought by the government, courts should not construe the NSE declarations to violate U.S. treaty obligations, ‘if any other possible construction remains.’”) (internal citations
omitted). For a discussion of the Charming Betsy canon of interpretation, see infra Part III.D.2.
353. E.g., Bassiouni, supra note 316, at 1181 (“Through its [package of proposed RUDs] the [Bush]
administration clearly stated that no private right of action should be permitted without implementing
legislation.”); Quigley, Judicial Implementation, supra note 310, at 577 (‘[T]he Senate expressed no
intent to preclude a person from invoking rights-guarantee provisions defensively, to avert adverse government action.”); Stewart, supra note 283, at 1202 (asserting that the NSE declaration “means that the
Covenant does not, by itself, create private rights enforceable in U.S. courts”).
354. Many scholars tend to write as if they assume, without being explicit, that the NSE status of the
ICCPR is either all-extensive or exists only to the extent of the political-judicial concept, but their opinions often seem to result from a relatively cursory or uncritical assessment of the U.S. treaty makers’
intent without having delved deeply into its exact scope or limits. It is not surprising that this would be
common. After all, the U.S. treaty-makers declared that the substantive human rights provisions “are nonself-executing” and a desire to prohibit judicial enforcement was the treaty makers’ focus. See, e.g.,
Hussain, supra note 49, at 685; Riesenfeld, & Abbott, supra note 303, at 574.
355. That is to say, the U.S. treaty makers neither intended to shield the President and the executive
branch from the treaty’s obligations nor intended to prohibit him from carrying out the treaty. See supra
notes 335–342 and accompanying text. Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster, supra note 49, at 1698
(emphasizing that if a treaty is only NSE in the political-judicial sense, “an NSE treaty is law for the executive branch”).
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Last-in-Time Rule

If the ICCPR’s human rights provisions are municipal law for some purposes under some circumstances (e.g., binding on the executive branch), it is
necessary to determine how those treaty provisions interact with federal statutes. In particular, we must analyze the relationship between the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) and the ICCPR since the INA purports to grant
authority to the executive branch to deport non-citizen Americans, whereas
Article 12.4 of the ICCPR prohibits the arbitrary deportation of such
Americans.
As discussed above, federal statutes and treaties are understood to occupy
the same level on the hierarchy of American law.356 As a result, the last-intime rule states that if there is a conflict between the provisions of a federal
statute and the provisions of a treaty, the one that was enacted/ratified later in
time trumps the one that was enacted/ratified earlier in time.357 And, in fact,
the Bush administration confirmed during the Senate ratification debates that
it understood that the ICCPR, even given its NSE status, would supersede
prior inconsistent federal statutory law.358
The U.S. ratified the ICCPR on June 1, 1992.359 The INA was enacted in
1952 but has been amended many times since.360 There is neither time nor
space here to comprehensively break down those portions of the INA that
predate June 1, 1992, and those that post-date it, but suffice it to say that the
original version of the INA authorized the Attorney General to deport lawabiding, non-threatening undocumented non-citizens from the territory of the

356. In other words, treaties and federal statutes are pari passu (or of equal footing or rank). Supra
notes 322–323 and accompanying text.
357. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the Constitution a treaty is placed on
the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other . . .. [I]f
the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other.”); Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A
Defense of the Last-in-time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L. J. 319 (2005). There is
apparently only one Supreme Court case in which the court decided a later-in-time treaty overturned an
earlier-in-time federal statute. Barry E. Carter, et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW 210 (7th ed., 2018) (citing
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933)). See also Martin, supra note 299, at 72–79 (challenging the
constitutionality of the last-in-time rule and arguing that “treaties have greater authority than federal statutory law”); Quigley, Judicial Implementation, supra note 310, at 582–85 (suggesting the possibility that
treaties “might occupy a rank a step above that of an Act of Congress”). But see, Bradley, Treaty Duality,
supra note 49, at 157–64 (discussing judicial reluctance to displace statutory law or congressional prerogatives by means of treaty enforcement); Wu, supra note 49, at 595–96 (discussing how courts sometimes
refuse to apply the last-in-time rule if a non-self-executing treaty would otherwise abrogate an earlier
statute).
358. Sloss, The Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 167 (citing ICCPR Senate Hearing, supra
note 350, at 80 (quoting the Bush Administration response to Senate inquiries about the anticipated legal
effect of the ICCPR, “Under the Supremacy Clause, ratified treaties are the law of the land, equivalent to
federal statutes . . . Consequently, properly ratified treaties can and do supersede inconsistent domestic
law.”)).
359. U.S. Instrument of Ratification, supra note 52.
360. For a list of all the amendments to Section 101(a) of the INA as of February 2020, see https://
www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1101.
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United States.361 In other words, the INA provisions that originally authorized the Attorney General to expel DACA recipients and other Dreamers predate the ratification of the ICCPR. Therefore, except to the extent that
post-ratification federal statutes purposefully re-authorized the removal of
law-abiding, non-threatening, undocumented non-citizens, applying the lastin-time rule, DACA recipients and other Dreamers (assuming they are noncitizen Americans) have a right to stay in the territory of the United States despite whatever other authorization or direction the INA purports to grant the
Attorney General (and, now, the Department of Homeland Security) to do
otherwise.
The reader should be reminded that although the focus of the paper is on
DACA recipients and other so-called Dreamers, Article 12.4 would protect
any non-citizen for whom the United States is their own country. The statutory basis for removing some of these people may be found in INA provisions
enacted after July 1, 1992, e.g., the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. In such a case, the last-in-time rule
may not protect them from banishment.362 However, the Charming Betsy
canon might. The Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation is more
commonly associated with the judiciary but may be employed by the executive branch, especially elements of the executive branch operating in an adjudicatory manner. A detailed discussion of the nature and application of the
Charming Betsy doctrine is in Part III.D.2 below.
2.

Article 12.4 is Law for the Executive Branch

Since it appears that U.S. treaty makers did not intend the ICCPR’s NSE
status to include the congressional-executive concept – that is, their intent
was not to shield the executive branch from the ICCPR’s obligations nor prohibit the executive branch from carrying out the ICCPR’s obligations363 –
Article 12.4 is law that restricts the conduct of the executive branch. As a
ratified, in-force treaty, the ICCPR is part of the supreme law of that land pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.364 The ICCPR’s NSE does not change that.365
And as a supreme law of the land – one that the President is neither prohibited
361. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Public Law 414, Jun. 27, 1952, § 241(a)(1), (2), (9)
(listing as among the set of “deportable” aliens, aliens who “entered the United States without inspection,” aliens who are “in the United States in violation of this Act,” and aliens who were “admitted as a
nonimmigrant . . . and failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which he was admitted or to which it
was changed . . . or to comply with the conditions of any such status”).
362. There is neither time nor space in this Article to explore in any depth whatsoever the protections
Article 12.4 might afford every category of non-citizen Americans (e.g., those who are convicted felons,
those who are suspected of being a terrorist threat).
363. See supra Part III.B.
364. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
365. For a discussion of the status of NSE treaties as the supreme law of the land, see supra note 318
and accompanying text. See also Henkin, supra note 310, at 203–04 (“Whether [a treaty] is self-executing
or not, it is supreme law of the land. If it is not self-executing, Marshall said, it is not a ‘rule for the
Court’; he did not suggest that it is not law for the President or for Congress. It is their obligation to see to
it that it is faithfully implemented . . .”).
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from executing nor shielded from having to execute – it is among the laws
that the President is to take care to faithfully execute pursuant to the Take
Care Clause.366 Additionally, as per the last-in-time rule, the ICCPR trumps
any earlier-in-time provisions of the INA that would otherwise authorize (or
require) the deportation of DACA residents and Dreamers. Therefore, assuming the statutory provisions authorizing the removal of DACA recipients and
Dreamers pre-date the ratification of the ICCPR, the executive branch is prohibited from arbitrarily banishing DACA recipients and Dreamers who qualify as non-citizen Americans. If this analysis is correct, then prosecutorial
discretion is not discretionary at all; it is obligatory. And removal actions
must be deferred indefinitely.367
It should be highlighted that the task of interpreting and administering federal immigration law resides in the first instance with the executive branch,
not the judicial. Immigration judges and members of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) are housed in the Department of Justice’s
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).368 Therefore, although
Article III courts have some authority to review EOIR decisions,369 removal
decisions are often made by members of the executive branch. Since it
appears that U.S. treaty makers did not intend the ICCPR’s NSE status to
include the congressional-executive concept and that they only intended it to
extend to (some variant of) the political-judicial concept, the ICCPR is law,
law with municipal force, for the country’s immigration judges and BIA
members. Immigration judges and BIA members, must, therefore take into
consideration and apply ICCPR Article 12.4 when conducting their legal

366. U.S. CONST. art. II § 3. For a discussion of the relationship between non-self-executing treaties,
the Supremacy Clause and the Take Care Clause, see Louis Henkin, The President and International
Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 930, 934 (1986) (“The President’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed includes not only statutes of Congress and judge-made law, but also treaties . . .”); Derek Jinks &
David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 164 (2004)
(arguing that constitutional text, history and policy all support the conclusion that treaties are included in
the “Laws” of the Take Care clause); Frank C. Newman, United Nations Human Rights Covenants and
the United States Government: Diluted Promises, Foreseeable Futures, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1241, 1244–
47 (1993) (arguing that the Take Care Clause requires the President to “promote and respect” and otherwise execute the ICCPR even though the ICCPR is not “effective in courts”). Swaine, supra note 49;
Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law”, supra note 49, at 129 (“[A] non-self-executing treaty may guide
the conduct of the Executive Branch, and particularly officials subordinate to the President . . . [I]t seems
possible that a non-self-executing treaty might nonetheless trigger the Executive’s authority and obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. The President might order federal officials to comply with a non-self-executing treaty’s provisions.”). This discussion assumes that the treaty at issue is not
NSE pursuant to the congressional-executive concept. For a discussion of how a treaty that is NSE pursuant to the congressional-executive concept relates to the Take Care Clause, see supra notes 339–42 and
accompanying text. But see, Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1835, 1855 (2016) (observing that the Supreme Court “has yet to examine what the [Take
Care] clause means by ‘Laws’” and asking rhetorically if it includes the Constitution, treaties, customary
international law or federal common law).
367. Or at least until Congress enacts a federal statute prohibiting the executive branch from implementing this ICCPR obligation. For a discussion of possible congressional responses, see Conclusion.
368. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (2018).
369. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2018).
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analysis and making their decisions. Such analysis should include the use of
the Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation.370
It is also worth noting that despite any possible uncertainty over the outer
contours of the ICCPR’s NSE status, it seems quite certain that the U.S. treaty
makers did not intend the ICCPR’s NSE status to include the strong variant
of the congressional-executive concept, that is to say, that the treaty makers
did not intend to prohibit the executive branch from carrying out the
ICCPR’s obligations. Such a level of NSE would be the strongest to impose
on the executive branch. Pursuant to the strong congressional-executive variant, the executive branch would be prohibited from acting in accordance with
the principles of Article 12.4, and the Department of Homeland Security and
the Attorney General would be obligated to remove (or, at least, try to
remove) every DACA recipient and every Dreamer. Clearly, this is not the
case. The executive branch has exercised, and intends to continue to exercise, quite a bit of prosecutorial discretion with regard to removing such
people.371 Although some have complained about the extent of such prosecutorial discretion and about the DACA program itself, I have yet to find
one instance when opponents of generous discretion premise their arguments on the NSE status of the ICCPR. Indeed, to do so seems absurd.
There seems to be no evidence anywhere that the U.S. treaty makers
intended to eliminate such prosecutorial discretion when it declared its
intention that the ICCPR be non-self-executing. The ICCPR, at least with
regard to Article 12.4, is clearly not non-self-executing to the extent of the

370. For a discussion of the nature and application of the Charming Betsy canon, see infra Part III.
D.2.
371. The DHS has in recent years always made the pursuit and removal of aliens like the Dreamers a
low priority. See DACA Memorandum, supra note 1; Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of
the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t,
et al., Re: Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20,
2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.
pdf (listing among the factors to consider: (i) length of time in the U.S.; (ii) family ties in the U.S.; (iii)
community ties in the U.S.; and (iv) humanitarian factors); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8789
(Jan. 2017) (announcing that the Trump administration would prioritize the enforcement of immigration
laws against those immigrants who have committed crimes); Memorandum from John. F. Kelly, Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot.,
et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementingthe-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf (announcing the
Trump administration’s intention to maintain the DACA program); Memorandum from John F. Kelly,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border
Prot., et al., Re: Rescission of November 20, 2014 Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPAP”) (June 15, 2017), https://governor.
nebraska.gov/sites/governor.nebraska.gov/files/doc/press/DHS%20DAPA%20Memo%206.16.2017.pdf,
at 2 (announcing the Trump administration’s intention to maintain the DACA program in its original,
non-extended form). Three months later, the Trump administration declared it would wind down the
DACA program. DACA Rescission Memorandum, supra note 18. Nevertheless, it continues to be the
Trump administration’s policy to prioritize the removal of non-citizens who have committed crimes. It
should be reiterated, however, that in accordance with ICCPR Article 12.4, even a long-term resident
non-citizen (documented or not) who poses a threat to national security or public safety might also have
an ICCPR right to stay in the U.S. See supra Part I.
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strong congressional-executive variant.372
If, for the sake of argument, we were to assume that the U.S. treaty makers
intended the ICCPR to be non-self-executing to the extent of the weak variant
of the congressional-executive concept (and not the strong variant), that is to
say, that the U.S. treaty makers intended to shield the executive branch from
the obligations of the ICCPR, what would be the result? The executive
branch would not be under any municipal obligation to carry out the US’s
ICCPR obligations, but obviously the executive branch would still have the
discretion to carry out the provisions of the ICCPR. The executive branch
would still be able to exercise prosecutorial discretion and enforce
the nation’s immigration laws in accordance with the United States’ international human rights legal obligations.373 For our purposes, that means that the
executive branch could still exercise prosecutorial discretion with regard to
the deportations of DACA recipients, Dreamers, and other non-citizen
Americans.374 We could refer to this as implementation through executive
discretion.375
However, we can take this analysis further. Continue to assume that the
U.S. treaty makers intended to shield the President from the ICCPR’s obligations. Even though, as just stated, the executive branch would not be under
any municipal obligation to enforce the provisions of the ICCPR, the United
States is still under an international legal obligation to carry out the ICCPR.
The United States cannot shield itself from its treaty obligations on the international plane just because it declared the treaty to be non-self-executing no
matter how far the non-self-execution status extends. International law does
not care about how the United States implements its international obligations.
Each state is a black box in that regard. But if it is evident that the Congress
will not implement the terms of the ICCPR through the enactment of a federal statute or statutes, it may be incumbent on the executive branch to implement this international obligation since only the Congress (acting through the

372. Since the NSE declaration was a blanket statement for all the substantive human rights provisions of the ICCPR, imposing the strong variant would have forbidden the President from implementing
any of the ICCPR rights that protect personal liberties more than the Constitution does.
373. The Clinton administration had an official policy to adhere to the US’s international human
rights obligations, including those of the ICCPR, and to generally “promote respect for international
human rights.” President Clinton directed all executive departments and agencies to carry out their work
in accordance with this policy. Exec. Order No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68991 (Jan. 2017). As of December
1, 2019, Executive Order 13107 has not been superseded, amended, revoked or nullified.
374. There may be other provisions in federal statutes that restrict the ability of the executive branch
to exercise such discretion. It is beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively analyze and discuss
the extent of the President’s discretion to enforce the nation’s immigration statutes against DACA recipients and Dreamers. However, after reviewing much of the litigation initiated against the Obama administration’s DACA program, the author has yet to find a plaintiff who argues that such discretion would be
unconstitutional as long as such discretion is exercised on a case-by-case, individualized manner. For a
discussion of the lawsuits challenging the DACA program, see supra notes 1–24 and accompanying text.
375. See also Thronson, supra note 25 (encouraging the use of executive discretion to bring U.S. immigration policy in line with international human rights law); Jack Goldsmith & John P. Manning, The
President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2293–95 (2006) (suggesting that prosecutorial discretion is within the President’s “completion power”).
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executive branch) or the executive branch itself can carry out the ICCPR’s
Article 12.4’s international legal requirements. It is an intriguing possibility
that, in such a situation, the executive branch may be under an obligation to
implement Article 12.4, but it is not one that I will grapple with further here.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to determine to what extent the President might
or might not be obligated to enforce the ICCPR if the ICCPR were non-selfexecuting to the extent of the weak congressional-federal concept376 – because
there is simply no evidence that the ICCPR is non-self-executing pursuant to
the extent of the weak congressional-federal concept.
But what if the executive branch, despite its international and municipal
obligation to implement Article 12.4 fails to do so? At first blush, judicial
remedies may not be available. But this might not be completely true.
D.

Possible Legal Significance of the ICCPR for the Judicial Branch

If the ICCPR is non-self-executing only to the extent of the no-privatecause of action variant of the political-judicial concept, then non-citizen
Americans facing removal may allege their ICCPR Article 12.4 rights in
defense. However, even if the ICCPR’s NSE status extends more broadly, or
completely, within the political-judicial concept, Article 12.4 may nonetheless affect judicial decisions. A court might be able to use Article 12.4 pursuant to the Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation to guide its
interpretation of federal immigration statutes. Alternatively, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment may require the judicial enforcement of
Article 12.4. Indeed, some scholars and courts have argued that international
human rights law, including treaty obligations like Article 12.4, may be used
to help guide the interpretation of certain constitutional provisions themselves. These possibilities, and others, are presented in this subsection.
1.

Invocation in Defense

We have already established that the ICCPR is non-self-executing at least
to the extent that it does not provide private causes of action.377 If it is nonself-executing only to that extent, then DACA recipients, Dreamers, and
other non-citizen Americans facing removal proceedings would be able to
appeal to the ICCPR as a defense to removal.378 The ability of someone to
376. For a discussion of the relationship between congressional-executive NSE status, the
Supremacy Clause, and the Take Care Clause, see supra notes 339–342 and accompanying text.
377. See supra Part III.B.
378. Some may argue that it must not be the case that an alien could evoke Article 12.4 to challenge
removal proceedings since it would render Article 12.4’s non-self-executory nature devoid of any real
effect. After all, how else would an alien employ Article 12.4 but to challenge a removal process?
However, the following two points should be considered: First, it is easily imaginable that a person – citizen or otherwise – who believes they were arbitrarily deprived of their right to enter their own country
(temporarily or otherwise) might want to file a claim against the government alleging a violation of their
ICCPR rights and asking for compensation. Since the ICCPR does not provide any private causes of
action, such a person’s suit would be dismissed. In other words, a no-private-cause-of-action status even
with regard to Article 12.4 is not at all devoid of effect. Second, there is no evidence to suggest that the
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appeal to a non-self-executing treaty as a defense to a government-initiated
action against that person is a possibility that has been theorized and
defended by many scholars.379 This theory, however, has not garnered much
acceptance in the courts, as they tend to deem any non-self-executing treaty
as one that cannot be invoked in defense. Such conclusions on the part of the
courts are often conclusory and are made without detailed or granular analysis of the treaty makers’ intent.380
2.

The Charming Betsy Canon

What if the political-judicial limitation extends further, as Professor Sloss
suggests it might? Of course, if it extends to what Professor Sloss calls the no
private enforcement variant, that is to say, the NSE status that prohibits courts
from entertaining any treaty claims by any private entity either offensively or
defensively,381 no private litigant could assert an ICCPR right. An alien facing removal would not be able to assert Article 12.4 to avoid deportation.
The same would be true if the ICCPR’s NSE status extended to the no judicial enforcement variant. However, two arguments might nevertheless be
available to these non-citizens facing deportation, arguments that incorporate
Article 12.4 without requiring its direct enforcement. The first involves the
Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation, and the second involves
the scope of two constitutional rights, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause and the Ninth Amendment.
The Charming Betsy canon of interpretation states that if it is possible to
construe a federal statute in a way that comports with international law, then
the federal statute should be interpreted as such.382 The traditional
U.S. treaty makers intended to have different NSE statuses applied to different substantive human rights
provisions of the ICCPR. All the substantive provisions were considered as a group, and the NSE declaration made by the Senate in its consent resolution and the NSE declaration made by the President in the ratification instrument merely state that “the provisions of Articles 1 through 27” are not self-executing.
There are plenty of provisions in Articles 1 through 27 for which a “no private right of action” limitation
would be quite impactful. Seen in this light, it is wholly plausible that the ICCPR might have been
intended to be non-self-executing only to the extent that it does not create any private causes of action.
379. E.g., Newman, supra note 366, at 1244–49; Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 302, at
1143 (“[A] treaty that does not itself confer a right of action . . . is not for that reason unenforceable in the
courts. A right of action is not necessary if the treaty is being invoked as a defense.”); Sloss, The
Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 151–52, 210–13. But see Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts,
the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1198, 1224–25 (1991).
380. See, e.g., Medellı´n, supra note 294, at 505, n. 2 (asserting that a NSE treaty “does not give rise
to domestically enforceable federal law” and thus suggesting that an NSE treaty can never be non-selfexecuting only to the extent that it does not create private causes of action). See also Bradley, Intent,
Presumptions, supra note 49, at 547–48 (commenting that the Court in Medellı´n “seems to be clearly
rejecting the argument . . . that a NSE treaty merely fails to provide a private right of action and thus can
be enforced by courts when [the] treaty is invoked defensively in a criminal case”). But see Quigley, A
Tragi-Comedy, supra note 49, at 425 (arguing that the Court’s understanding in Medellı´n of non-selfexecution as applied to the possibility of invoking a NSE treaty in defense “must be regarded as dictum
since [it] was [not] at issue in Medellı´n”).
381. See supra notes 327–334, 347–354 and accompanying text.
382. “An act of Congress should be construed in accordance with international law where it is possible to do so without distorting the statute.” Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n. 20 (2d Cir. 1980)
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assumption underlying the Charming Betsy canon is that Congress normally
expects the U.S. to comply with its international law obligations and, therefore, rarely passes legislation conflicting with international law.383 As a
result, a court should not interpret a federal statute in a way that conflicts
with international law if any other interpretation is possible. To do otherwise
might inadvertently put the U.S. in a position of violating international law
even though Congress might not have intended to. After all, it is not the judiciary’s role to violate the law.384
A court, therefore, could apply the Charming Betsy canon to the INA and
interpret it in a way that reflects the country’s obligations under the ICCPR –
in particular, in a way that does not authorize the Attorney General or
the Secretary of Homeland Security to arbitrarily deport non-citizen
Americans. There might be enough ambiguity in the INA that a reasonable
interpreter could leverage the Charming Betsy canon.385 In doing so, the court
(quoting Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 67 (1804)). See also
RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 55, § 309(1) (“[Where fairly possible,
courts in the United States will construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with a treaty provision.”). See
generally Ralph G Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Interpretation, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990).
383. Some modern scholars have observed that it does not seem empirically true that the Congresses
of the much more mature United States are particularly concerned with adhering to international law, and,
therefore, the best justification for the application of the Charming Betsy canon is that it helps maintain a
proper separation of powers. It is the Congress’ role to determine when to violate international law, not
the courts’ role. See Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and Abuse
of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1336 (2006); Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998)
[hereinafter Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon].
384. It should be noted that the Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation operates differently
from a similar canon of statutory interpretation known as the presumption against implied repeal. The
implied repeal canon reconciles conflicting statutes by minimally paring back the older statute, as
opposed to repealing the older statute altogether. See generally Repeal by Implication, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 1039 (1955); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Implied Repeal Doctrine:
Expanding Judicial Power to Rewrite Legislation under the Ballooning Concept of “Plain Repugnancy”,
45 GONZ. L. REV. 437 (2009). Whereas the implied repeal canon operates to preserve at least part of an
earlier statute in the face of a later-in-time conflicting statute by paring back the earlier statute to accommodate the later statute, the Charming Betsy canon operates to preserve the municipal force of international law in the face of ostensibly conflicting federal statutes by constricting (where plausible) the
interpretation of the federal statute.
385. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to scour the INA for a comprehensive list of possible
ambiguities or exhaustively analyze them. However, it is worth noting that “immigration law” is defined
in the INA to include “conventions and treaties.” Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(17). Non-citizen Americans’ presence in the United States might, then, be permitted pursuant to U.S.
“immigration law.” Additionally, perhaps non-citizen Americans are not “aliens” as that term is used in
the INA. An “alien” is “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1011(a)(3). “Nationals of the United States” include “person[s] who . . . owe[]
permanent allegiance to the United States.” Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1011(a)(22);
Section 308 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1408) lists certain categories of persons who are nationals of the
United States, but that list is not expressly exhaustive. Given the United States’ obligations under Article
12.4 of the ICCPR, perhaps non-citizen Americans are “nationals of the United States” and thus not subject to the vast majority of the immigration provisions of the INA. See Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752,
757 (9th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that INA Section 308 is not an exhaustive list of “nationals of the United
States” since persons who have applied for citizenship may qualify as nationals); U.S. v. Morin, 80 F.3d
124, 126 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a permanent resident alien of the U.S. who had applied for U.S. citizenship as a “national of the United States”). But see Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9,
14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Manquez-Almanzar v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 418 F.3d 210,
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would not be applying the ICCPR directly; instead the court would be applying the INA directly after interpreting it in such a way that it does not violate
our international legal obligations.386 Or, framed differently, a person facing
banishment would not be enforcing a private right established by law, but
rather would be immune from possible banishment because the INA either
forbids it or simply does not grant the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security the power to inflict it.
Besides finding an appropriate level of ambiguity in the INA, several other
obstacles might stand in the way of applying the Charming Betsy canon in
this way. First, it is debatable whether it is appropriate to employ the
Charming Betsy canon with regard to an NSE treaty. It might be an excessive
infringement on the political branches for a court to employ the Charming
Betsy canon with regard to a treaty that the political branches expect the
courts not to enforce directly.387 It is not my intention to answer this question
here but merely to introduce the possibility of using the Charming Betsy
canon with regard to NSE treaties like the ICCPR. It is notable, however, that
several scholars have argued that this is an appropriate use of the Charming
Betsy canon,388 and several courts have said the same.389 And, indeed, the
218 (2d Cir. 2005) “The phrase ‘owes permanent allegiance’ in §1011(a)(22)(B) [of the INA] is . . . a
term of art that denotes a legal status for which individuals have never been able to qualify by demonstrating permanent allegiance, as that phrase is popularly understood.”); id. at 15 (“The courts of appeals to
consider the issue thus have overwhelmingly concluded that the status of non-citizen United States
nationality is limited to those persons described in 8 U.S.C. § 1408, and that, apart from that provision, an
effort to demonstrate ‘‘permanent allegiance to the United States’’ does not render a person a United
States national.”); Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d at 760 (denying “national of the United States” status to
a man who was born in Poland, orphaned by the age of two, adopted by American citizen parents, entered
the United States at age four, and lived in the United States for the next two and a half decades before
being sentenced to a 24-year prison term); Oliver v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 517 F.2d 426
(2d Cir. 1975) (denying “national of the United States” status to a woman who had moved (lawfully) to
the United States at age ten and lived the next twenty years in the U.S.); In re Moises NAVAS-ACOSTA,
23 I&N Dec. 586 (B.I.A. 2003) (‘[N]ationality under the [INA] may be acquired only through birth or naturalization.”). It is notable, however, that none of these cases suggesting that only birth or naturalization
may confer “national of the United States” status considered the United States’ obligations under the
ICCPR.
386. Applying the INA to enforce individual human rights jibes with the U.S. treaty makers’ understanding that victims of human rights abuses would be able to assert constitutionally provided and/or
statutorily provided rights to enforce ICCPR human rights. See Sloss, The Domestication of IHR, supra
note 49, at 207 (“The political branches have not expressed an intention for the United States to violate its
obligations under human rights treaties; to the contrary, they have clearly expressed their intention to
comply. Therefore, in accordance with the Charming Betsy maxim, courts should, whenever possible,
construe other provisions of U.S. law in a manner that is consistent with U.S. obligations under human
rights treaties.”).
387. See Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 383, at 484 (arguing that the canon “is
best thought of today as a device to preserve the proper separation of powers between the three branches
of federal government”).
388. E.g., id. at 483 (“[T]he Charming Betsy canon presumably applies to all international obligations of the United States, regardless of whether they are viewed as enforceable domestic law.”); Rebecca
Crootof, Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon, 120 YALE L.
J. 1784, 1801 (2011); Sloss, The Domestication of IHR, supra note 49, at 207; Harold C. Webner,
Injunctive Relief: A Charming Betsy Boomerang, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 156, 166 (2006);
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorization for the Use of Force, International Law & the Charming Betsy
Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 353–54 (2005); Damrosch, supra note 310, at 532 (“Even though a non-selfexecuting declaration purports to tell courts not to give direct effect to the treaty, it does not go so far as to
instruct them to violate it.”). See also Melissa A. Waters, Using Human Rights Treaties to Resolve
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purpose of the Charming Betsy canon is to avoid unintended violations of
international law, and the ICCPR’s NSE status does not diminish the US’s
international obligations under it. In fact, the United States told the Human
Rights Committee in 1994 during the US’s first ICCPR implementation
report that “notwithstanding the non-self-executing declaration of the United
States, American courts are not prevented from seeking guidance from the
Covenant in interpreting American law.”390 Some courts, however, dispute
the legitimacy of employing Charming Betsy to an NSE treaty.391
Second, one of the justifications of the application of the Charming Betsy canon
is the assumption that Congress does not normally intend to disrupt the “delicate
field of international relations.”392 But it is debatable whether or not a significant
concern for “delicate international relations” are implicated when Dreamers are
deported.393 Concern for international relations might, however, be implicated
when the United States deports a non-citizen American with criminal propensities,
substance abuse issues and/or a complete lack of foreign acculturation.394
Lastly, the Charming Betsy canon is normally used in relation to international law that existed at the time Congress enacted the statute in question.
To apply the Charming Betsy canon to interpret a federal statute in light of a
treaty that was ratified after the enactment of the statute would be relatively
novel. However, the Charming Betsy canon is not formally limited to the
interpretations of later-in-time statutes.395 It is simply rarely (if ever) used
that way. It is rarely used this way because the canon is not necessary in
Ambiguity: The Advent of a Rights-Conscious Charming Betsy Canon, 38 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L.
REV. 237, (2007) (chronicling the recent use of Charming Betsy-like doctrines for non-self-executing
human rights treaties in New Zealand, Canada, and Australia).
389. E.g., Hyundai Elec. Co. v. U.S., 23 Ct. Int’l Trade 302, 312–14 (1999); Capitol Records Inc. v.
Thomas, 579 F. Sup. 2d 1210, 1226 (D. Minn. 2008); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231–33 (E.
D.N.Y. 1999); My thanks to Rebecca Crootof for bringing most of these cases to my attention. Crootof,
supra note 389. Dr. Crootof also notes that many courts have employed the Charming Betsy canon without first inquiring whether the relevant treaty is self-executing. Id. at 1791–96; e.g., Kim Ho Ma v.
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2001) (doing so with the ICCPR, and doing so to interpret the
INA).
390. Human Rights Committee, Comments on the USA, supra note 287, at ¶ 11.
391. E.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 10, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the
denial of rehearing en banc); Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. U.S., 472 F.3d 1347, 1360 n.21 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
But see Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 53 (Williams, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Judge
Kavanaugh, I think, fails to adequately distinguish between treatment of international law norms as ‘judicially enforceable limits’ on Presidential authority, or as ‘domestic U.S. law,’ and use of such norms as a
‘basis for courts to alter their interpretation of federal statutes.”’) (citations omitted).
392. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 327 U.S. 10, 21–22 (1964) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hildago, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
393. Indeed, many current members of the political branches seem to be rather unconcerned about
being an American bull in the delicate China shop of international relations. See generally Sloss, Treaties
and Individually Enforceable Rights, supra note 49, at 91–110 (documenting the rise of the “nationalist
model” of treaty enforcement).
394. For a discussion of the impropriety of forcing an undesirable person on another country, see supra note 238 and accompanying text.
395. See Jonathan Turley, Dualist Values in the Age of Legisprudence, 44 HAST. L.J. 185, 265 (noting that the Charming Betsy canon can be used “to read a statute in conformity with a later international
agreement”). Professor Turley would, however, call for the “decanonization” of Charming Betsy. Id. at
263–72 (promoting legislative supremacy and condemning “elitist countermajoritarianism”).
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circumstances when a self-executing treaty is ratified (or when an NSE treaty
has been legislatively implemented) after the relevant statute was enacted
since the much stronger last-in-time doctrine would apply. Any later-in-time
self-executing treaty (or implementing legislation) will simply trump any
conflicting provisions in any earlier-in-time federal statute, thus obviating the
need for any Charming Betsy-like canon of interpretation.
3.

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Other
Constitutional Rights

With regard to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause,396 it is possible
to argue that the application of a form of non-self-execution that would
render the ICCPR utterly impotent to protect someone facing the possibility
of banishment is a violation of their due process rights. The argument would
be based on the principle that due process entitles someone facing extremely
harsh and disproportionate (arbitrary) governmental treatment – treatment
that would not only deprive them of their liberty, but would undoubtedly violate their human rights – to appeal to the “supreme Law of the Land” for protection. The demand by the U.S. treaty makers that the supreme Law of the
Land (the ICCPR) must be ignored by the judicial branch even in this situation would be deemed unconstitutional.397 It is beyond the scope of this paper
to craft a particularized due process argument that might allow non-citizens
facing deportation to appeal to their ICCPR rights, and further away still to
evaluate the persuasiveness of such an argument. However, other scholars
have suggested similar arguments in different contexts.398 Professor Sloss,
for example, has argued that defendants facing state criminal charges should
have the right pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
to appeal to individual rights provided in non-self-executing treaties.399
Similarly, Professor Vázquez has suggested that it might be “plausible” that
defendants before federal military commissions have a due process right to
invoke provisions of the Geneva Conventions in support of a defense to criminal charges even if such provisions have been statutorily rendered non-selfexecuting.400
396. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . ..”).
397. Alternatively, the Charming Betsy canon can be applied to ambiguous NSE declarations in a
way that leads the courts to conclude that the NSE declarations are of limited scope, thus enabling a defendant or a potential deportee to appeal to their treaty rights in the face of government-imposed maltreatment. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
398. E.g., Sloss, Treaty Preemption Defense, supra note 49; David L. Sloss, THE DEATH OF TREATY
SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, Chapter 14 (2016). But see, Bradley, Treaty
Duality, supra note 49, at 137-40.
399. Sloss, Treaty Preemption Defense, supra note 49. However, Professor Sloss notes that although
there might be “a constitutional right to raise a treaty-based preemption defense in a state criminal trial, it
does not necessarily follow that there is a similar right to raise a treaty-based defense to federal criminal
charges.” Id. at 973. See also Sloss, Treaties and Individually Enforceable Rights, supra note 49.
400. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commission Act, the Geneva Conventions and the
Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 79 n. 47 (2007) (“If the Due Process Clause applies in
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More aggressively, perhaps, are suggestions that constitutional provisions
themselves may, or should be, interpreted in light of international law.401
Pursuant to these proposals, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
might be interpreted in such a way that the clause itself demands that the federal government refrain from arbitrarily deporting non-citizen Americans.
Perhaps the equal protection dimension of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause402 prohibits the government from banishing any American,
citizen or not. After all, the geographic location of someone’s birth or their
parentage would seem to be irrelevant factors when making distinctions about
which Americans can and cannot be banished.403 The Ninth Amendment
might also be a candidate for containing a right for all Americans to remain in
the country.404 Again, it is beyond the scope of this Article to pursue these
arguments in any detail other than to note that many scholars and courts have
advocated using international human rights law to inform our understanding
and expand the application of constitutional provisions, including the due
processes clauses and the Ninth Amendment.405

full force, the claim that the [military] commissions afford the procedural guarantees required by common
Article 3 [of the Geneva Convention] is more plausible.”).
401. See Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Rights Precepts in United States
History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 543, 570–96
(1989) (citing to 166 Supreme Court cases in which the court “utilize[d] human rights standards as juridic
aids for the interpretation of constitutional or statutory norms”).
402. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (articulating the equal protection dimension of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
403. Indeed, as this Article has argued, there is no category of Americans who may be (arbitrarily)
banished.
404. US. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). It is worth noting that at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, there was no concept or category of “illegal aliens” or “undocumented
immigrants” in the United States. Almost without exception, anyone from anywhere in the world was free
to enter and stay in the United States and did not require permission from the federal government. See
generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833 (1993).
405. E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004);
Cole, supra note 25; Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal
Protection Analysis, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1983); Gordon A. Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights
Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 39 (1981); Paust, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 310, at 323–59; Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 49, at 781–82 (asserting that
although NSE treaties “cannot operate directly without implementing legislation, they can be used indirectly as a means of interpreting relevant constitutional provisions”); Jordan Paust, Human Rights and the
Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975); Quigley, The ICCPR
and the Supremacy Clause, supra note 306, at 1306; Farooq Hassan, The Doctrine of Incorporation: New
Vistas for the Enforcement of International Human Rights?, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 68, 83–84 (1983); Louis
Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 413–20 (1979); Martin, supra note 299,
at 84–87; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination for construing the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee in support of affirmative action programs);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, n.34 (1988) (citing the ICCPR for construing the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as prohibiting the execution of persons under
the age of sixteen); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n. 16 (1963) (citing the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights for construing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in citizenship revocation
case). But see John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 329 (2009) (arguing that the use of international law “does not have a place in a justice-seeking construction of the
Constitution”); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J.
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Dicta

Despite the fact that U.S. courts might not be able to directly enforce the
ICCPR, courts could nevertheless speak out in appropriate cases and declare –
in dicta – that removals contrary to the protections of Article 12.4 violate the
United States’ international legal obligations.406 Such declarations by U.S.
courts might not be the basis for court holdings, but such declarations could
powerfully frame U.S. actions in terms of human rights, bringing attention to
the plight of DACA recipients, Dreamers, and other non-citizen Americans
and highlighting that there is rarely compelling reason to banish someone.
IV.

ADDITIONAL ICCPR PROVISIONS THAT MAY BE HELPFUL TO IMMIGRANTS

Before concluding, it is worth noting other ICCPR rights that might protect
non-citizen Americans from removal. Most notably are the rights associated
with the preservation of the family,407 the protection of children,408 and the
principle of non-refoulement.409 It is well beyond the scope of this Article to
Int’l L. 57 (2004); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
291 (2005).
406. U.S. courts are competent to decide when the United States has violated international law.
Supra note 324.
407. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 17.1 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy [and] family . . .”); Id. at art. 23.1 (“The family is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”). The Human Rights Committee has
stated that “while ICCPR does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State
party . . ., in certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to
entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15, The Position of
Aliens under the Covenant, adopted April 11, 1986, ¶ 5. And I would add: when considerations of banishment contrary to Article 12.4 arise. See also HRC Dauphin, supra note 148, (concluding that the deportation of a Haitian citizen with a criminal record from Canada where he had lived most of his life would
violate his ICCPR rights to family); supra notes 241-256 and accompanying text (discussing Winata);
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, supra note 220; Human Right Committee, General
Comment 19: Article 23 (The Family) Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the
Spouses, adopted July 27, 1990.
408. ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 24.1 (“Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to
race, colour . . . national . . . origin, . . . or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by
his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.”). Such rights have been applied by
the HRC to prohibit the deportation of aliens with citizen children. E.g., HRC Winata, supra note 241.
These rights have also been applied by the HRC to prohibit the deportation of aliens with strong family
links in their host countries and few in the countries of their citizenship. E.g., HRC Dauphin, supra note
148.
409. The ICCPR does not contain an explicit prohibition against refoulement, but it has been interpreted to contain an implicit non-refoulement rule. For example, the HRC has proclaimed that “the
Article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in
their territory and all persons under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is
a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant [asserting a
right to life and prohibiting torture, inhumane treatment and non-consensual medical experimentation,
respectively], either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, supra note 291, ¶
12. The relevant part of Article 2 of the ICCPR reads, “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.” ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 2.1. Article 6 of the ICCPR states
“[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life” and provides certain procedural rules for the imposition of
the death penalty. Id. at art. 6. Article 7 reads, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
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discuss these provisions in any more detail except to say that these ICCPR
rights might matter too – politically and legally—just as much, and in the
same way, as the right contained in Article 12.4.410
CONCLUSION
I am well aware that some of the observations and arguments presented
here reflect the warnings of those Congress members, jurists, and scholars
who fear and protest the intrusion of foreign and international law into the domain of domestic law.411 After all, we have an international treaty to which
the U.S. is bound that authorizes some aliens – even some undocumented
aliens – to remain in the country against the government’s will. And, indeed,
some readers may struggle with envisioning the legitimacy of the legal strategies described in this Article. Some may see these strategies as attempts to
do an illegitimate end-around the ICCPR’s non-self-executing status.412
However, framed from a different perspective, it seems difficult to envision
the legitimacy of banishing anyone from his or her own country, especially a
person who poses no threat to society. We would not imagine doing that to a
citizen, regardless of how despicable and threatening they are. Why would it
be legitimate to do that to someone like a DACA recipient or a Dreamer,
who, through no fault of his or her own, was born somewhere on the earth

or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation.” Id. at Art. 7. The HRC has reiterated this implicit non-refoulement
rule in several of its official communications. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Joseph Kindler v.
Canada (1993), Communication No. 470/1991; Human Rights Committee, Ng v. Canada (1993),
Communication No. 469/1991; Human Rights Committee, Maksudov et al. v. Kyrgyzstan (2008),
Communication No. 1461, 1462, 1476 & 1477/2006; Human Rights Committee, Hamida v. Canada
(2010), Communication No. 1544/2007; Naveed Akram Choudhary v. Canada (2013), Communication
No. 1898/2009, 9.2. See also U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “U.N.
Experts Make Urgent Call for U.S. to Regularize, Protect Rights of Young Migrants as DACA Deadline
Nears” (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
22677&LangID=E (claiming that many former DACA recipients might be expelled to countries where
there are “high levels of violence, lawlessness and crime and where women in particular face very
specific and dire risks”).
410. Some of these rights may be customary international law as well, thus presenting additional
opportunities and hurdles for actualization. See also Thronson, supra note 25; Maria v. McElroy, 68 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 233-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying the ICCPR’s provisions on family maintenance and its
prohibition against cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment in deciding against the deportation of an
alien). See also supra note 319 (discussing customary international law).
411. E.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 405, at 326, 329 (asking rhetorically if American courts of
the 1930s or 1950s should have “looked to the decisions of Nazi or Soviet courts for guidance?” and speculating that Supreme Court justices who are inclined to incorporate foreign and international law into
their decision making might be “seek[ing] . . . reputation and esteem . . . from a transnational class of judicial and regulatory elites.”). See Gruber, supra note 49, at 57–71 (giving many examples of people who
have exhibited similar antagonism towards international law); Henkin, The Ghost, supra note 300, at
348–49 (discussing the persistence of this hostile sentiment); Natalie Hevener Kaufman, HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990) (same).
412. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 49, at 419–20 (arguing that one of the reasons U.S. treaty
makers might use NSE declarations is that they might “believe that if there is to be a change in the scope
of domestic rights protections, it should be done by legislation with the participation of the House of
Representatives”).
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outside the territory of the United States and without American parents?413
However, it must be acknowledged that any strict implementation of
ICCPR’s Article 12.4 could have a boomerang effect, one that results in more
rigorous enforcement of immigration laws. And it could prompt the executive
branch to rigorously ferret out undocumented aliens – all undocumented
aliens – lest they remain long enough in the country to earn the right to stay.
The government might patrol the borders more rigorously to better ensure
that no foreigners enter without permission. After all, the more who enter, the
more who will eventually earn the right to stay permanently. The government
may even less generously grant foreigners permission to enter lest they
morph over time into people who have the right to remain. It could also
prompt Congress to pass more restrictive laws.
Indeed, the ramifications could be even broader. As several commentators
have concluded – usually in response to arguments that ostensible non-selfexecuting treaties be deemed self-executing (or less non-self-executing) or in
response to arguments urging the United States to be more respectful of international human rights generally, including the human rights to which it has
clearly committed (e.g., the ICCPR)414 – the political response to actually
having to adhere to international human rights commitments might lead the
United States to become particularly reticent to ratify any more human rights
treaties or to do so only with extensive reservations that guarantee the United
States need not provide any more individual freedoms than it already does.415
It might even lead the United States to withdraw from human rights treaties
or retreat from the whole international human rights project altogether.
Perhaps a conventional progressive-conservative immigration bargain can
be struck: the enactment of legislation that regularizes the immigration status
of certain sets of sympathetic or deserving undocumented aliens and provides
special protections for non-citizen Americans in exchange for stricter border
controls, stricter immigration enforcement, and perhaps even less generous
legal immigration opportunities. In the meantime, were the President to take
his obligation seriously to take care that the laws – including our treaty-based
laws – be faithfully executed,416 or were the courts to be persuaded by any of
the arguments suggested here and enjoin the executive branch from deporting

413. See Goldsmith, supra note 295, at 338 (highlighting that the immorality of an act evokes more
criticism than the illegality of the act).
414. E.g., Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 383, at 522 (speculating that if arguments
that U.S. human rights RUDs and/or NSE treaty status are unconstitutional or otherwise somehow illegitimate are accepted, it “may have the effect, unintended by the critics, of negating the U.S. ratifications,
both on the international plane and as a matter of domestic politics. They may also have the effect of
reducing the likelihood of future U.S. ratification of human rights treaties”).
415. See Henkin, The Ghost, supra note 300, at 342 (“By its reservations, the United States apparently seeks to assure that its adherence to a convention will not change, or require change, in U.S. laws,
policies, or practices, even where they fall below international standards.”).
416. Including through the DHS and the DOJ.
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non-citizens Americans,417 Congress has the power to stop it.418 A federal
statute that unambiguously denies non-citizen Americans any rights under
Article 12.4 would preempt the earlier-in-time ICCPR and would not be vulnerable to the Charming Betsy canon.419 And the President’s municipal legal
obligations would be those of the just-enacted statute.420 If the statute forbade
the executive branch from carrying out the country’s obligations under
Article 12.4, the executive branch would not be able to exercise prosecutorial
discretion to implement it.421 Any banishment of a non-citizen American,
however, would still violate the United States’ international human rights
obligations – and would prove Chief Justice Warren wrong. Banishment
would not, in fact, be universally decried by all civilized people.

417. See Althouse, supra note 49, at 794–98 (articulating a realist’s appreciation that courts will
more likely enforce treaties providing individual rights if they see judicial enforcement as “necessary and
good” and that “it [would] not matter so much how many doctrines [stood] in the way.”).
418. See Swaine, supra note 49 (discussing the authority of the Congress to “divest” the President of
the authority and/or duty to carry out treaties). See also supra Part III.C.1 (describing the last-in-time
rule).
419. Certain other constitutional provisions might nonetheless protect Dreamers from deportation,
but given the nature of the plenary power the courts have allowed the political branches with regard to immigration and deportation, it would appear challenging for any non-citizen to find a constitutional right to
stay in the country. See supra Part III.D.3 for a brief description of how the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process clause or the Ninth Amendment might serve to protect non-citizen Americans from deportation.
420. It is curious to observe that while it is difficult to imagine the Congress taking such aggressive
steps against DACA recipients and Dreamers, it is simultaneously the case that Congress has failed to
pass any legislation regularizing their immigration status. For a list of Dreamer regularization bills introduced in Congress over the last two decades, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
421. Note that passing such a statute would effectively have the same legal effect as if the U.S. treaty
makers imposed the strong variant of the congressional-executive NSE concept. Such a statute would not,
however, operate to change any constitutional interpretation of the kind sketched out in Part III.D.3. See
also generally Lori McPherson, Law Review Articles Have Too Many Footnotes, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457
(2019).
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